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1.1 Research Questions 
 
The aim of this research is to describe and explain the effects of the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on employee governance, employee 
motivation, and employee performance. These effects are studied using a 
structure-conduct-performance approach. This approach, originating from the 
study of industrial organisations, assumes that an industry’s performance depends 
on the conduct or behaviour of the firms, which, in turn, depends on the structure of 
the market (Carlton and Perloff 1994). In this research, employee motivation and 
employee performance are assumed to be dependent upon the employee 
governance of child-care organisations, which, in turn, is assumed to be dependent 
upon the strength of the market forces the child-care organisation is confronted 
with (see Figure 1-1).  
 
The following research questions are formulated:  
1. To what extent does the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care 
sector influence the employee governance of child-care organisations?  
2. If the employee governance of child-care organisations changes, to what extent 
do these changes influence employee motivation? 
3. If employee motivation changes, to what extent do these changes influence 
employee performance? 
 
Sector level  Market forces 
…………………..……………………………………………………….……...……...……
              1 
Organisation level Employee governance  
………………….……………………………………………………………………………
              2    3 
Employee level Employee motivation            Employee performance 
Figure 1-1: Graphical representation of research questions 
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1.2 The introduction of market forces in child care  
 
The Dutch child-care sector is transitioning from a welfare sector into a market 
sector. The transition process in child care is concurrent with a trend in Dutch 
society as a whole towards a more business-like approach and an accompanying 
emphasis on raising efficiency (Turksema, Siegers and Van Emmerik 1998; Putters 
2001). Even in traditionally welfare-oriented sectors, such as the care sector, market 
forces are introduced. 
Policy makers assume that the introduction of market forces in the Dutch 
care sector improves the balance between supply and demand and increases 
efficiency.  Due to the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector, 
parents are expected to receive more possibilities of choice and the sector is 
expected to become more attractive for new providers (Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of Social Affairs & Employment and Ministry of Finances 2000). While in 
discussions regarding the introduction of market forces in care work the possible 
effects for providers and costumers are taken into consideration, usually no 
attention is paid to the possible effects for care employees. Apart from the question 
whether or not the transition from a welfare sector to a market sector results in a 
realisation of the expected goals, which as we know from earlier research is not 
always the case (Van Thijn 2002; Van Staveren 2003; Tonkens 2003), there is the 
question of whether the possible effects on employees are rightly dismissed.  
In this research, we will describe and explain the effects of the introduction 
of market forces on employees working in the Dutch child-care sector. The reasons 
for focusing on the child-care sector are threefold. In the first place, the child-care 
sector is a representative example of the care sector as a whole with regard to 
sector-specific characteristics like the fact that it is highly labour intensive, that 
there is a high percentage of female employees and a large amount of part-time 
employees (Nivel, Prismant and OSA 2003). Second, child-care employees are 
representative for other care employees with regard to the motivation they derive 
from different aspects of their work. Both child-care and other care employees 
mention autonomy and work that is meaningful as the most important aspects of 
their work, while they are least motivated by the financial compensation and 
career perspectives (Lindsay and Lindsay 1987; Philips, Howes and Whitebook 
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1991; Grunveld 1999). Finally, due to the introduction of a new act in the Dutch 
child-care sector (Wet Kinderopvang), the child-care sector as a whole is forced to 
change in a very short period of time from a financed welfare sector into a demand 
driven market sector. The Dutch child-care sector therefore forms a unique case to 
analyse the consequences of the introduction of market forces in care work on the 
motivation and performance of care employees.  
 
1.3 Explaining employee motivation and employee performance 
1.3.1 Overview of Literature 
The introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector is expected to 
affect employee governance, motivation, and performance. The Dutch child-care 
organisations are expected to adapt to the changes in the market structure of the 
Dutch child-care sector. In order to increase the efficiency of personnel, child-care 
organisations are expected to alter the way in which they govern their employees. 
These changes in employee governance are, in turn, expected to affect the 
performance of the childminders.  
In order to be able to understand how changes in organisations may affect 
employee performance it is of great importance to understand the effects that 
changes in the organisation may have on employee motivation. Because while 
employees might be able to perform a certain job, if they aren’t willing to give their 
utmost while doing this, employee performance will be low. Employee motivation, 
therefore, is an important determinant of performance at the workplace (Houkes 
2002).  
The concept of employee motivation has been the subject of study in many 
different disciplines. However, within each discipline different theories prevail 
about what motivates people to go to work each day and how these motivations 
can be affected by changing the rewards of working. While economic theory 
attributes changes in behaviour to changes in relative prices, psychology generally 
focuses on people’s preferences (Frey and Benz 2002). Psychologists have argued 
for a long time that people are not only motivated to do things because of rewards 
from the outside. According to these psychologists, people can also be motivated 
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to do things even though there is no external reward but the behaviour itself. In 
this case people are said to be intrinsically motivated (Deci 1975). 
The assumption that certain activities provide their own inherent reward 
raises the question of how external rewards will affect people’s intrinsic motivation 
for these activities (Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999). The social-psychological model 
of the interaction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation is introduced in 
economics as the crowding theory by Frey (1992). Frey assumes, in line with Deci 
(1975), that intrinsic motivation increases when individuals perceive an external 
intervention as supportive. In this case, a crowding-in effect is said to occur. 
However, if individuals perceive an external intervention as controlling, intrinsic 
motivation decreases and a crowding-out effect is said to occur (Frey 1997a). In 
social psychology, the phenomenon of crowding out is known as ‘the hidden cost 
of reward’ or ‘the overjustification effect’ (Snelders and Lea 1996; Frey and 
Osterloh 2002, p. 13).   
It is important to note, however, that Frey uses the term external intervention. 
According to Frey, intrinsic motivation is not only influenced by external rewards 
but also by regulations and commands. In Frey’s definition, intrinsic motivation 
has ‘acquired the meaning of being motivated to do something without being 
forced by commands and without being paid to do it’ (Lindenberg 2001, p. 319). 
While enjoyment or fun derived from an activity is at the heart of Deci’s definition 
of intrinsic motivation (Ryan, Koestner and Deci 1991; Deci and Ryan 2000), Frey’s 
definition of intrinsic motivation, therefore, also includes feelings of obligation, 
such as work morale (Frey 1993).  
1.3.2 Explaining employee motivation and employee performance in child care 
In this research we describe and explain how external interventions, and changes 
in the employee governance of child-care organisations in particular, affect 
employee motivation and performance. In doing so we will make use of the social 
production function approach introduced by Lindenberg (1991;1996). 
The social production function approach assumes that everyone has one 
universal goal in life: subjective well-being. Subjective well-being is made up of 
two components: physical well-being and social well-being. In addition, the social 
production function approach specifies two lower-level goals that produce 
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physical well-being and three lower-level goals that produce social well-being. 
Physical well-being can be produced by comfort and stimulation, and social well-
being can be produced by affection, status and behavioural confirmation from 
yourself and others.  
One of the sources that people have for the production of well-being is 
having a job: this provides employees with extrinsic and intrinsic rewards or so-
called production factors for the production of well-being. The higher the level of 
well-being employees are able to produce with the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
they derive from their job, the higher their level of extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation is assumed to be. The extent to which employees are able to produce 
well-being with the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards they receive from their job is, 
however, neither the same for all employees nor stable over time, but depends on 
how effective the rewards are in the production of subjective well-being.  
The extrinsic and intrinsic rewards employees derive from their job as well 
as the productivity of these rewards therefore influence the level of well-being and 
thus the level of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation employees display within their 
job. Therefore, changes in the possibilities of producing well-being affect the level 
of employee motivation. External interventions are assumed to affect extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation by influencing the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards employees 
derive from their job. In addition, the intrinsic motivation of the employees is 
assumed to be influenced by the way in which an external intervention is 
perceived. If, on one hand, an external intervention is perceived as controlling, the 
productivity of the intrinsic rewards that are derived from performing the activity 
decrease and intrinsic motivation will be crowded-out. On the other hand, if an 
external intervention is perceived as supportive, the productivity of the intrinsic 
rewards that are derived from performing the activity increase and intrinsic 
motivation will be crowded-in.  
Applying this theoretical framework to the Dutch child-care sector, we 
presume that the introduction of market forces in this sector affects employee 
motivation by influencing the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards the childminders are 
able to derive from their job as well as the productivity of the intrinsic rewards. 
The expected effects of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care 
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sector on the motivation and performance of the childminders are presented in 
Figure 1-2. 
First of all, the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector 
is expected to affect the employee governance of child-care organisations. The 
employee governance of child-care organisations represents the way in which the 
child-care organisations have been structured in order for the childminders to 
carry out their work and is described by four elements: employment contracts, job 
design, reward system, and career system. With regard to the reward and career 
systems, we distinguish between the focus on pay-for-performance and the 
attractiveness of the reward and career system.  
 
Sector level       Market forces  
 
 
        
Organisation level  Employee governance  
    * employment contracts 
    * job design 
    * reward system    
    * career system 
 
Employee level      Employee motivation             Employee performance
               
      
               extrinsic rewards extrinsic motivation 
                 
                                     performance        
         
                           intrinsic rewards intrinsic motivation 
 
       
Figure 1-2: The effects of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on the 
motivation and performance of the childminders. 
 
Employee governance is, in turn, expected to influence the extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation of the childminders by affecting the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
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employees derive from their job. As will be explained in Chapter 3, changes in the 
employee governance are expected to have both positive and negative effects on 
the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job. Therefore 
the overall effect of the introduction of market forces on the extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation of the childminders is uncertain. 
Second, the intrinsic motivation of the childminders is also expected to be 
influenced by the way in which the changes in employee governance are 
perceived. We expect that the changes in employee governance are perceived 
partly as being positive and partly as being negative by the childminders. An 
increase in the attractiveness of the career system is, for example, expected to be 
perceived in a positive way, whereas an increase in the tightness of the job design 
is expected to be viewed upon as being negative. The interaction effect between 
employee governance and intrinsic rewards is therefore expected to have a positive 
or negative effect on the intrinsic motivation of the childminders, depending on 
whether the change in employee governance is perceived as being positive or 
negative. 
Finally, the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector is 
expected to influence the intrinsic motivation of the childminders by the way in 
which the transition itself is perceived. The transition of the Dutch child-care sector 
from a welfare sector to a market sector is expected to be perceived in a negative 
way by the childminders, since financial considerations have put the transition in 
motion and the position of the childminder has not been the focal point of the 
transition. The introduction of market forces is expected, therefore, to negatively 
affect the productivity of the intrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their 
job. As a result, the interaction effect between market forces and intrinsic rewards 
is expected to negatively influence the intrinsic motivation of the childminders.  
The effects of the changes in the Dutch child-care sector on the extrinsic 
and intrinsic motivation of the childminders are, in turn, expected to affect the 
performance of the childminders. In describing and explaining the effects of the 
introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on the performance of 
the childminders, we will focus on the quality of employee performance. We 
assume that in the child-care sector in particular, it is important to focus on the 
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quality of employee performance, since the quality of child care depends heavily 
on the employees who are working in the sector.  
Both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation are expected to have a positive 
effect on the quality of employee performance. The link between the level of 
motivation and the level of employee performance is based on the mutual-
investment model, which defines the relationship between employer and employee 
as a social exchange relationship and claims that the employer will invest in the 
employee whereas the employee will respond by displaying a high level of 
performance (Tsui et al. 1997).  
Thus, the effect of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care 
sector on the quality of the performance of the childminders depends on the effects 
of the introduction of market forces on employee motivation. Since the changes in 
the child-care sector are expected to have varied effects on the extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation of the childminders, the effect of the introduction of market 
forces in the child-care sector on the quality of the performance of the childminders 
is not clear beforehand.  
 
1.4 Importance of research 
 
The scientific relevance of this research is that it attempts to contribute to a better 
understanding of what the theoretical construct of intrinsic motivation in the 
context of paid work comes down to. Even though the theoretical importance of 
intrinsic motivation is widely accepted currently, in practice organisations don’t 
seem to pay much attention to intrinsic motivation but focus mainly on extrinsic 
stimuli in their attempt to motivate their employees. The recent discussions on the 
importance of pay-for-performance systems are an example of this focus on 
extrinsic motivation (Kohn 1993; Wiegeraad 2002). 
The fact that organisations don’t seem to pay much attention to intrinsic 
motivation in trying to motivate their employees is caused by both theoretical and 
empirical deficits in the research on intrinsic motivation. Theoretically there is still 
no unifying definition of what intrinsic motivation actually is and when one can 
consider intrinsic motivation to be crowded-out or crowded-in. As a consequence 
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there is also no agreement with regard to the effects of external interventions on 
intrinsic motivation (Wiersma 1992; Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999; Eisenberger, 
Pierce and Cameron 1999).  
Moreover, the research performed so far is primarily based on activities for 
which people typically don’t expect to be paid, such as puzzle solving or volunteer 
work. In situations in which people do expect to receive a financial reward, 
external interventions may have a different or no impact on intrinsic motivation. 
Because financial rewards are typically expected in economic contexts, additional 
research is needed to make the point that in the context of paid work external 
interventions may affect the intrinsic motivation of employees also (Fehr and Falk 
2002). By describing and explaining the effects of external interventions on intrinsic 
motivation in the context of paid work, this research contributes to a field of 
empirical research that has not yet been extensively explored. 
The societal relevance of this research is shown in the fact that it’s important 
to know how employees can be motivated to give their utmost while doing their 
job. As stated previously, it’s likely that people don’t just work for the money but 
are influenced by other rewards too. The assumption that people are driven by 
extrinsic rewards only is therefore too limited and may even lead to counter-
productive results when trying to motivate employees. 
Gaining a better understanding of employee performance is especially 
important in the care sector given the fact that the work in this sector is highly 
labour intensive. The performance of this sector, therefore, depends strongly on the 
willingness and quality with which the employees working in this sector apply 
themselves to their tasks (Franco, Bennett and Kanfer 2002). Moreover, the care 
sector faces a high percentage of employee absence and a high personnel turnover 
rate (Statistics Netherlands 2002; Nivel, Prismant and OSA 2003) which puts even 
more pressure on the performance of the employees within this sector. 
Finally, the care sector in the Netherlands is confronted with a transition 
process towards a more market-oriented organisation. It is the question if and how 
this transition affects the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards the employees working in 
this sector derive from their job, and how changes in rewards affect their 
motivation and performance. By achieving a better understanding of the effects of 
the transition in the Dutch child-care sector on the motivation and performance of 
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care employees, recommendations with regard to the introduction of market forces 
in formerly welfare-oriented sectors might be given. 
 
1.5 Research design 
 
For this research, data are collected in 30 Dutch child-care organisations. The child-
care organisations are differentiated with regard to the extent to which they are 
financially dependent on the government, the urbanity of the area in which they 
ase located and their size. Information on employee governance in the year 2003 is 
collected at the level of child-care organisations. On the childminder level, 
information is collected on employee motivation and performance. In addition to 
collecting information on the actual situation in the year 2003, we have measured 
how changes have been perceived over time. The perceived changes over time 
have been measured both retrospectively – i.e. how certain aspects have changed 
over the past three years - and prospectively – i.e. how certain aspects are expected 
to change during the coming three years.   
 
1.6 Outline of the book 
 
In this book we describe and explain to what extent the introduction of market 
forces in the Dutch child-care sector affects employee governance, motivation and 
performance. Chapter 2 gives a description of the Dutch child-care sector. Chapter 
3 presents the theoretical model that explains the effects of the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on employee governance, employee 
motivation, and employee performance. Chapter 4 describes the data, the 
operationalisations and the statistical models that will be used in this research. In 
Chapter 5 the descriptive analyses of the employee governance of child-care 
organisations and the employee motivation and employee performance of 
childminders will be presented. Chapter 6 presents the analyses performed to 
explain employee governance, motivation, and performance. Finally, Chapter 7 
contains the summary and conclusions. 
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This chapter provides a description of the Dutch child-care sector. Specific 
attention is paid to the introduction of market forces in child care. Section 2.2 gives 
a description of the growth of the Dutch child-care sector. Section 2.3 focuses on 
the transition in child care from a welfare sector to a market sector. Section 2.4 
describes the effects of the introduction of market forces in the child-care sector for 
the child care providers and customers. Finally, section 2.5 gives a summary of this 
chapter. 
 
2.2 The growth of the Dutch child-care sector  
 
The supply of formal child care has grown enormously over the past few years in 
the Netherlands, from 20,000 child places in 1989 to over 200,000 child places in 
2004 (see Table 2-1). The Stimulative Measures (Stimuleringsmaatregel 
Kinderopvang) especially have increased the supply of child care. Guided by the 
wish to increase the labour force participation of women, the Dutch government 
introduced the Stimulative Measures on child care in 1990. These measures 
subsidised formal child care and as a result had a stimulating effect on the supply 
of child care (Tijdens, Lieon and Houweling 1993). Due to the fact that child care 
was still short in supply, in 1999 an additional measure to increase the supply of 
child care was introduced. The Expanding Measure (Regeling uitbreiding 
kinderopvang en buitenschoolse opvang) was designed to increase the number of 
child places by 72,000 within four years (Netwerkbureau Uitbreiding 
Kinderopvang 2003b). Currently that expansion has been realised. Table 2-1 




Table 2-1: The growth of the Dutch child-care sector from 1990-20041   
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 20042  
Number of facilities           
Day-care 903 1 399 1 650 1 755 1 918 2 411 2 603 2 979 . 
After-school care 160 404 600 737 992 1 521 2 692 2 142 . 
Capacity child care 
(number of places *1000) 
         
Day-care 25.7 39.6 51.8 56.5 63.3 84.7 101.2 110.9 124.4 
After-school care  3.4 7.5 10.9 13.8 23.4 40.2 59.5 65.7 74.1 
Guest parents3   2.1 8.1 10.8 14.6 19.8 24.8 20.9 21.1 8.2 
Total  31.3 55.2 73.5 84.9 106.5 149.7 181.6 197.7 206.7 
Participating children 
(*1000) 
         
Day-care 45.5 64.9 92.3 104.9 121.1 167.1 178.7 191.7 202.4 
After-school care  5 10.5 15.2 25.2 39 66.9 90.9 92.8 118.6 
Guest parents 2.4 9.3 12.2 15.7 21.7 27.2 23 23.1 19 
Total 52 .9 84.7 119.7 145.9 181.8 261.5 292.5 307.7 340 
Enrolment rates  (in %)4             
Day care (0-4) 6.0  8.3  11.7  13.5  15.6  20.7 21.8 23.4 24.8 
After-school care (4-13) 0.3  0.6  0.9  1.5  2.2  3.8  5.1 5.2 6.6 
Total 2.2 3.5 4.9 5.8 7.1 10.1 10.3 10.9 12.3 
Number of employees  
(*1000) 
         
Formation  5.4 9.7 12.4 13.6 17.4 25.8 32.4 34.3 . 
Persons 8 14.6 19 21.2 27.5 42 56.4 60.4 . 
Age employees5    . . . . 32.9 32.5 33 . . 
Percentage women6    . . 91.0 91.7 92.0 92.9 94.2 . . 
Number of childminders 
(*1000) 
         
Full-time childminders 1.8 2.7 3 2.9 . . . . . 
Part-time childminders 4.8 9.2 12.4 14.5 . . . . . 
Total 6.6 11.9 15.4 17.4 . . 44.6 . . 
1 Source: Statistics Netherlands (2001;2005). It is important to mention that the method of data collecting used by 
Statistics Netherlands from 2001 onwards is different from the one used in preceding years. While the research 
population of 1990-2000 was formed by all possible institutions that supply child care, since 2001 the population is 
restricted to institutions with child care or welfare as their main activity. The data from 1990-2000 are therefore not 
completely comparable to the data from 2002 and 2003. Moreover, with regard to the number of childminders, no 
distinction was made between full-time and part-time childminders in the data collections that were done after 1996.     
2 The data for 2004 are from Research voor Beleid (2005) and are based on a survey among 874 Dutch child-care 
organisations.       
3 The exact capacity of the guest parents is unknown for 2002 and 2003. We have calculated the capacity of guest 
parents by taking 91% of the number of children making use of guest parent facilities, which is comparable to the ratio 
between the capacity and the number of participating children from guest parent facilities in earlier years. 
4 Source: Statistics Netherlands (2003). 
5 Source: Hingstman et al. (2003), Nivel, Prismant and OSA (2003). The data correspond to the figures from the years 
1999, 2001 and 2002. 
6  Source: Statistics Netherlands (2004). The data correspond to the figures from the years 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 
2001. 
. = no data available. 
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It appears that, over the years, both the number of child-care facilities and the total 
capacity (measured in number of child places) has increased enormously. Since 
children do not usually stay full-time in a child-care facility, the number of 
children using formal child-care services is much higher than the amount of child 
places that are available in formal child-care organisations. As Table 2-1 indicates, 
the number of children that make use of formal child care has increased from 
52,900 in 1990 to 339,989 in 2004, which is an increase of more than 600%. 
The use of formal child-care facilities has not only increased in absolute 
figures but also as a percentage of the total population. While in 1990 only 2 
percent of all children from 0 up to 13 years of age made use of child-care facilities, 
this increased to more than 12% in 2004. The enrolment rates of after-school care 
facilities - for children from 4 to 13 years of age - have increased the most, although 
only a small percentage of all children make use of this facility.  Day-care facilities 
are much more popular. Of all the children between 0 and 4 years of age, almost 
25% made use of a day-care facility in 2004. 
The growth of the child-care sector can also be illustrated by the increasing 
number of people working in child care. Table 2-1 illustrates that the child-care 
sector has evolved over the past few years from a small sector with 8,000 
employees in 1990 into a mature sector employing over 60,000 employees in 2003. 
The childminders form the largest group of employees working in the child-care 
sector. Childminders are the employees in the child-care sector that look after the 
children. Most of the childminders have a part-time contract, are female and are 
relatively young (see Table 2-1). Almost half of the employees working in the 
child-care sector are below the age of thirty. The child-care sector, therefore, has 
one of the highest percentages of female personnel and the lowest average 
employee age (Hingstman et al. 2003).   
The status of the childminder profession in the Netherlands is low in 
comparison with its status in Scandinavian countries (OECD 2002). In the 
Netherlands, childminders have a middle-level professional education. This in 
comparison with the teaching staff in the education sector, for example, who have 
a higher professional education (Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education 
2000). Furthermore, the childminder profession in the Netherlands offers little 
possibilities for promotion. Although it is possible for a childminder to become the 
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manager of a day-care centre, the childminder profession itself offers little 
possibilities for differentiation (Van IJzendoorn, Tavecchio and Riksen-Walraven 
2004). 
 
2.3 From a welfare sector to a market sector 
 
Parallel to the growth in the number of child-care places, the Dutch child-care 
sector is confronted with a transition from a welfare sector to a market sector. This 
transition process in child care is in line with a trend in Dutch society as a whole 
towards a more business-like approach and an accompanying emphasis on 
increasing efficiency (Turksema, Siegers and Van Emmerik 1998; Putters 2001). 
Even in sectors that traditionally don’t function on the basis of market forces, such 
as the care sector for example, market forces are introduced. It’s assumed that the 
introduction of market forces in the child-care sector contributes to a more efficient 
use of means and to a better balance between supply and demand (Ministry of 
Health, Ministry of Social Affairs & Employment and Ministry of Finances 2000). It 
is important to mention, however, that even though market forces are introduced 
in the Dutch child-care sector, the Dutch government has not turned away from 
the child-care sector. By compensating parents for the costs of child care, the 
government maintains its influence on the accessibility and therewith the demand 
for child care, while the quality of child care is influenced by imposing certain 
quality standards on child-care providers. Market forces are introduced, therefore, 
in the child-care sector within the boundaries set by the government.   
The first step in the transition from a welfare to a market sector took place 
with the introduction of the Stimulative Measures in 1990. The Stimulative 
Measures were aimed at increasing the supply of child care. In order to be able to 
afford the increase in growth in the child-care sector, the Dutch government tried 
to spread the costs of child care over three parties: the government, the employers 
and the employees. The involvement of employers in financing child care was 
unique for the Netherlands and made it possible for the Dutch government to 
realise a large increase in the child-care sector without being confronted with costs 
that were too high (Van den Nieuwenhuizen 2002; OECD 2002). However, the 
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involvement of employers in the financing of child care led to a complex financing 
structure. The formal child-care sector now consisted of subsidised, employer-
financed and private child places, each with its own financing structure (Plantenga 
et al. 2005).  
The Stimulative Measures did not only increase the supply of child care 
but also stimulated the competition between child-care organisations. Child-care 
organisations were stimulated to sell child places to employers by only granting 
subsidies to child-care organisations that supplied so-called employer-financed 
child places. In turn, the employers were stimulated to invest in child care by 
receiving a premium for every child place they financed (OECD 2002). Since both 
subsidised and non-subsidised child-care organisations could supply employer-
financed child places, the Stimulative Measures offered the possibility for both 
subsidised and non-subsidised child-care organisations to claim subsidies (Pelzer 
1991). Both subsidised and non-subsidised child-care organisations were able to 
profit, therefore, from the Stimulative Measures. Furthermore, the Stimulative 
Measures stimulated new child-care organisations to enter the child-care market.  
An important next step in the transition from a welfare to a market sector 
has been the decentralisation of the child-care policy to the level of the 
municipalities on 1 January 1996. With this decentralisation of the child-care policy 
the Stimulative Measures ceased to operate and the responsibility for the supply of 
child care was taken over entirely by the municipalities (Turksema 2000). The 
child-care subsidies were no longer geared specifically for child care but could be 
spent freely by municipalities. Therefore, the extent to which child-care 
organisations could rely on government subsidies became dependent on the 
policies of the municipalities. The municipalities were allowed to decide which 
child-care organisation they wanted to work with, and were not restricted to grant 
subsidies to subsidised child-care organisations only. Furthermore, municipalities 
could determine the requirements for granting subsidies. 
The decentralisation of the child-care policy to the level of the 
municipalities changed the nature of subsidies. Instead of receiving subsidies for 
covering exploitation deficits, child-care organisations increasingly often received a 
subsidy only for the child places actually bought by the municipality (Hol and 
Nabuurs 1996). Therefore, the difference between employer-financed and 
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subsidised child places became smaller. Since municipalities started relationships 
with various child-care organisations and more often adopted the position of a 
company buying child places from a child-care organisation, subsidised child-care 
organisations were confronted with an increase in competition and an increasing 
pressure to raise efficiency. 
Because child care still remained short in supply, in 1999 an additional 
measure to increase the amount of child care was introduced: the Expanding 
Measure (Regeling uitbreiding kinderopvang en buitenschoolse opvang). The goal 
of the Expanding Measure was to increase the amount of child places by 82,130 
within four years, to 176,000 child places in 2003 (Netwerkbureau Uitbreiding 
Kinderopvang 2003b). With the introduction of the Expanding Measure the 
municipalities were explicitly asked to pay attention to market forces in the 
realisation of the expansion in child care. That is, to not just realise the expansion 
in existing subsidised child-care organisations alone, but to also specifically 
stimulate non-subsidised child-care organisations to realise the expansion 
(Verschuur 2005). Even though the majority of the municipalities realised the 
expansion within existing subsidised child-care organisations, the Expanding 
Measure increased the competition between child-care organisations (SGBO 2002). 
The last step in the transition from a welfare sector to a market sector took 
place with the introduction of a new Act on Child Care on 1 January 2005: the ‘Wet 
Kinderopvang’. With the introduction of this new act the financial organisation of 
the child-care sector changed from a system of supply-financing to one of demand-
financing. Now the demand is subsidised instead of the supply and therefore the 
subsidy relationships between child-care providers and municipalities have ended. 
So, from 2005 onwards the distinction between subsidised, employer-financed and 
private child places has disappeared completely and the child care customers pay 
the full price for the child care of their child and are compensated directly by the 
government and their employer (Plantenga et al. 2005).  
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2.4 Effects of the introduction of market forces for providers and 
customers   
 
The transition of the child-care sector from a welfare sector to a market sector has 
influenced it’s financing structure. Table 2-2 shows that while child-care 
organisations used to receive most of their revenues directly from the government, 
over time the employers have become the most important source of revenue for 
child-care organisations. 
Table 2-2: The financing structure of the Dutch child-care sector from 1990-20041    
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 20042  
Distribution child places  
day-care 
          
Subsidised places (in %) . . . 30 27 21 16 12 10 8 
Employer-financed places (in %) . 44 44 47 50 55 58 62 64 72 
Private places (in %) . . . 16 16 18 21 16 19 17 
Empty (in %)  . . 7 7 6 5 10 7 3 
Revenues child care           
Government (in %) 58 52 41 36 33 26 29 23 19 . 
Employers (in %) 14 21 36 40 45 51 49 58 60 . 
Parents (in %) 26 25 21 21 19 20 20 18 20 . 
Other (in %) 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 1 1 . 
Total (in million euro)  127 272 398 461 590 883 1104 1283 1487 . 
Government budget child care3            
Stimulative Measure 68 114 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 
Municipality Funds 0 0 0 88 93 105 111 . . . 
Expansion Measure 0 0 0 0 41 76 134 0 0 . 
Single parents means 0 0 0 34 41 57 60 . . . 
Tax deductions employers 0 0 0 18 31 73 93 . . . 
Tax deductions parents 0 0 0 14 18 84 107 . . . 
Total (in million euro) 68 114 106 154 224 395 505 . . 650 
Government budget child care4             
Budget in % of total revenues 
child care 
53.5 41.9 26.6 33.4 38.0 44.7 45.7 . . . 
1 Source: Statistics Netherlands (2001;2005). It is important to mention that the method of data collecting used by 
Statistics Netherlands from 2001 onwards is different from the one used in the preceding years. While the research 
population of 1990-2000 was formed by all possible institutions that supply child care, since 2001 onwards the 
population is restricted to institutions with child care or welfare as their main activity. The data from 1990-2000 are 
therefore not completely comparable to the data from 2001 onwards.         
2  Source: SEO (2005). 
3 Source: SGBO (2002). 
4 Government budget for child care divided by the revenues of the child-care sector. 
. = no data available.  
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The decreasing trend in government subsidies over the years, however, does not 
indicate that the government is investing less in child care over time. As is 
apparent from Table 2-2, the child-care budget of the Dutch government has 
increased from 1996 onwards both in absolute figures and as a percentage of the 
total revenues of the child-care sector. Therefore, the decreasing trend of 
government subsidies as a percentage of the total revenues of child-care 
organisations is not an indication of less government financing but rather an 
indication of a change in government financing. Instead of funding the supply of 
child care by subsidising child-care organisations, the demand for child care is 
being subsidised more and more often. 
Due to the changes in the financing structure, the child-care organisations 
are forced to alter their organisational structure. The child-care customers are 
expected to be affected by the transition in the child-care sector in terms of choice, 
costs and quality of care. Section 2.4.1 focuses on the effects of the introduction of 
market forces on the child-care providers and section 2.4.2 on the effects of the 
introduction of market forces on the child-care customers. 
2.4.1 Effects for child-care providers 
With the introduction of the new Act on Child Care the financial organisation of 
the child-care sector changed from a system of supply-financing to a system of 
demand-financing. As a result, the relationships between child-care providers and 
subsidising municipalities ended. Moreover, a demand-driven system implies a 
direct financial relationship between child-care providers and customers, although 
this is somewhat moderated by the tax rebate. As a result, the selling prices have 
received more and more attention in the child-care sector and consequentially the 
cost price of child-care services has come to play a more central role.  
An important strategy for child-care organisations to deal with the changes 
in the child-care sector is by increasing efficiency. Child-care organisations have 
two strategies at their disposal to increase efficiency: increasing internal cost 
efficiency and increasing dynamic efficiency. Internal cost efficiency refers to the 
degree to which an organisation is able to optimally use the inputs for the creation 
of its products. Dynamic efficiency refers to the degree to which an organisation 
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adapts to changing circumstances in the market (Bos 1995, p. 45; Turksema 2000, p. 
27). 
In child care, internal cost efficiency can be improved by economies of 
scale and economies of scope (Mocan 1997), by the occupancy rate, and by the 
staff-to-child ratio. Over the years child-care organisations have tried to realise 
economies of scale by increasing their size. Table 2-3 shows that from 1996 to 2003 
the number of day-care and after-school care facilities per child-care organisation 
increased from 3 to 4.3, whereas the number of child places for day-care and after-
school care per child-care organisation increased from 84.6 to 148.7. Economies of 
scope have also been realised (not presented in the Table). Increasingly, more 
child-care organisations are providing more than one type of child care within one 
location - for example day care and after-school care - and realise economies of 
scope in doing so (Netwerkbureau Uitbreiding Kinderopvang 2003b). 
The sizes of child-care organisations in the Dutch child-care market are 
also illustrated in Table 2-3. In 2004, more than 60% of the child-care organisations 
consisted of only one location. The market share of these one-location 
organisations was 17%. In the same year only 5% of the child-care organisations 
consisted of more than 10 locations. The market share of these child-care 
organisations was, however, 48%. Trends in the development of the sizes of the 
child-care organisations over time are not quite clear. This might partly be due to 
the fact that the data are based on different sources and only cover a relatively 
short period of time. On the basis of the latest developments it seems likely, 
however, that the Dutch child-care market will continue its process of 
concentration, with small and mid-sized child-care organisations in particular 
being taken over. In the end, the Dutch child-care market is expected to consist of a 
few large child-care organisations that offer child-care services throughout the 
Netherlands. In addition, small specialised child-care organisations will operate on 
a local level (Marangos and Plantenga 2005).  
Another important strategy to improve internal cost efficiency is to 
increase the occupancy rate. The occupancy rate is the percentage of the total 
capacity of the child-care organisation that is occupied by children. A child-care 
organisation can have a very large capacity, but if there are no children occupying 
these child places, the organisation will receive no money. Therefore the occupancy 
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rate is very important for the revenues of the child-care organisation. For new 
child-care locations or in the case of expansion of existing child-care locations 
especially it is, however, difficult to realise a high occupancy. In 1993, the average 
occupancy rate of day care in the Dutch child-care sector was 78% (SGBO 2002). 
Table 2-3 reports an increase in the occupancy rate of day-care centres to 90% in 
2001, which is a particularly large increase given the expansion in child care over 
this period of time. Since 2001 the occupancy rate of day-care centres has been 
fairly stable. 
 
Table 2-3: The organisational structure of the Dutch child-care sector from 1996-20041    
 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 20042  
Facilities per organisation 3.0 3.7 3.9 4.5 4.7 4.3 . 
Child places per organisation 84.6 109.9 124.7 140.5 141.3 148.7 . 
Size child-care organisation        
1 location (in %) . . 60 . 59 55 61 
2-5 locations (in %) . . . . 28 30 27 
6-10 locations (in %) . . . . 6 7.5 7 
> 10 locations (in %) . . 7 . 7 7.5 5 
Market share child-care organisations        
1 location (in %) . . 24 . 16 14 17 
2-5 locations (in %) . . . . 24 23 21 
6-10 locations (in %) . . . . 14 14 14 
> 10 locations (in %) . . 46 . 46 50 48 
Efficiency          
Occupancy rate day-care (in %) 3    . 89 90 90 . . 91 
Formation per group per week (in %) 4      114 113 108 108 . . . 
Hours open per week5     51 . . 52.5 . . . 
1 Source: Netwerkbureau Uitbreiding Kinderopvang (2003a;2003b). 
2 The data for 2004 are from Research voor Beleid (2005) and are based on a survey among 874 Dutch child-care 
organisations. 
3 The data reported in the columns 1998-2001 are from SGBO (2002) and correspond to the occupancy rates from the 
years 1998, 2000 and 2001. The population of SGBO differs from that of Statistics Netherlands. SGBO approaches the 
municipalities to provide information on child-care supply in their municipality, while Statistics Netherlands 
approaches the child-care organisations directly. The data reported in column 2004 are from Waarborgfonds 
Kinderopvang (2005) and are based on data from 133 child-care organisations.   
4 Source: VOG (2000), MO Groep (2002). The formation per group per week that is presented in Table 2-3 corresponds 
to the figures from the years 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2001. The median formation of the sample is presented. 
5 Source: MO Groep (2002). The median number of opening hours of the sample is presented. 
. = no data available. 
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Finally, the internal cost efficiency can be influenced by the staff-to-child ratio. The 
staff-to-child ratio is the ratio between the number of full-time childminders and 
the number of children that are present in the day-care centre during opening 
hours. The collective labour agreements in the child-care sector state that every 
certified childminder is allowed to look after a maximum amount of children at the 
same time, depending on the age of the children. The number of children that 
childminders are allowed to look after ranges from a maximum of 4 children in the 
age category from 0 to 1 to a maximum of 8 children between ages 3 and 4. For 
groups featuring children with mixed ages the required staff-to-child ratio is the 
average mean of the required staff-to-child ratios for the different age groups. On 
average two childminders are required for a group of twelve children between 
ages 0 and 4 (Ministry of Social Affairs & Employment 2002).  
The staff-to-child ratio influences the number of formation hours that is 
required for a group. For a group of twelve children two childminders are required 
during the whole day, except for one hour after opening time and one hour before 
closing time and during breaks. For the child-care organisation the internal cost 
efficiency will now be high if the amount of formation hours for a group is as close 
as possible to the minimum that is required by law. The availability of more 
childminders than required is an indication, therefore, of inefficient staff planning. 
As is apparent from Table 2-3, over time the formation of the childminders of a 
group moves closer to the minimum that is required by law, which is set at 100%. 
This indicates an increase in efficiency of staff planning.    
Apart from increasing internal cost efficiency, child-care organisations can 
also raise their dynamic efficiency. Dynamic efficiency can be increased by offering 
services that other organisations don’t provide such as longer or flexible opening 
hours or other services besides child care such as, for example, different courses 
that children can attend or a baby-sitter during nights and on weekends. Over time 
child-care organisations have increased their dynamic efficiency. Table 2-3 shows 
that the number of hours they are open per week has increased slightly from 51 in 
1996 to 52.5 in 2001. In addition many new forms of child care have been 
developed, such as flexible day care, child care during holiday periods and child 
care for teenagers (Statistics Netherlands 2001; MO Groep 2002).   
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The necessity of increasing efficiency is, however, not the same for all child-
care organisations. Although all child-care organisations are confronted with the 
same transition from a welfare to a market sector, the extent to which child-care 
organisations are affected by this transition varies. The introduction of market 
forces has a much bigger impact on child-care organisations with a welfare 
tradition than on child-care organisations that have always been strongly market 
orientated. The child-care organisations that recently entered the child-care sector 
in particular can be characterised by a strong market orientation. Of the child-care 
organisations that entered the child-care sector between May 2000 and April 2002, 
70% could not rely on subsidies (Netwerkbureau Uitbreiding Kinderopvang 
2001;2002). Most of these new child-care organisations are very small, supply a 
flexible form of child care and already make a profit (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
2003). These child-care organisations are characterised by a high level of efficiency. 
The situation is different for child-care organisations that have always relied on 
government subsidies. These organisations used to lack solid financial 
management and were not always able to make a profit from supplying child care 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2003). These welfare-oriented child-care organisations in 
particular have to change their organisational structure in order to be able to 
survive in the new environment. 
2.4.2 Effects for customers of child care 
The introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector does not only 
affect the child-care providers, but may also affect the child-care customers. 
Hereafter, we will describe the extent to which child-care customers are affected by 
the transition in the child-care sector in terms of choice, costs and quality of care. 
 
Choice 
As explained in section 2.2, the supply of child care has increased enormously in 
the past few years. Therefore, over the years, parents have received more 
possibilities of choice with regard to where to consume child care. Yet, despite the 
large increase in supply some parents are still confronted with limited freedom of 
choice with regard to where to consume child care. In 2004, 12% of the parents 
reported that there was no day-care centre available within 10 minutes travelling 
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distance. For 19% of the parents only one day-care centre was available. Moreover, 
the parents reported that 61% of the day-care centres had a waiting list. Because of 
the waiting lists, 12% of the parents were restricted in their choice of hours. For 9% 
of the parents there was no possibility at all to consume day care at the moment 
they needed it in the day-care centre of their choice. In total, 35% of the parents 
reported that they did not have the possibility to choose between day-care centres. 
For other forms of child care, such as after-school care, there is even less choice 
(SEO 2005). Currently many child-care customers, especially in rural areas, thus 
still have limited freedom of choice in the Netherlands with regard to where they 
want to bring their child to.1 
Moreover, due to the emotional stress for the children involved, parents 
are very reluctant to switch day-care centres once a decision is made. In the 
research done by SEO (2005) parents were asked whether or not they have 
considered switching day-care centres: 86% have not considered switching, 10% 
have considered switching but did not follow through, and only 4% of the parents 
actually switched day-care centres in or before 2004. There are multiple reasons for 
switching day-care centres. The quality, distance, or costs can be a reason for 
switching, but there can also be personal reasons such as moving.    
 
Costs 
Although differences in price between day-care centres can be a reason for parents 
to change day-care centres, not many parents actually switch day-care centres for 
reasons of cost. According to research done by SEO (2005), in 2004 only 11% of the 
parents would consider switching day-care centres if a competing provider offered 
a lower price, whereas 6% of the parents actually switched day-care centres for 
reasons of cost. Apart from the emotional costs involved (Marangos and Plantenga 
2005) an explanation might be that the differences in prices are currently not 
attractive enough for parents to switch day-care centres, especially given the fact 
that the parents only have to pay part of the price difference (SEO 2005).  
                                                 
1 It is important to mention that the research done by SEO (2005) investigates the number of day-care 
centres that are available and not the number of child-care organisations. The choice is more restricted if 
the day-care centres are part of the same child-care organisation.   
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Nevertheless, the costs of child care are an often-heard subject of 
complaints. In this respect it is important to distinguish between the selling price 
and the consumer price of child care: the price that is demanded by child-care 
providers and the price that the parents actually have to pay. Due to the 
introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector, the sector is expected 
to become more attractive for new providers and to provide real choice for parents. 
As a result, the selling prices of child care are expected to decrease (Ministry of 
Health, Ministry of Social Affairs & Employment and Ministry of Finances 2000). It 
turns out, however, that the selling prices in the child-care sector have not 
decreased but increased instead over time.  
That the prices of child care have increased over time might be partly due 
to the fact that the selling prices have been too low in previous years (MO Groep 
2002; Ministry of Social Affairs & Employment 2003). In the past subsidised child-
care organisations offered child care for a price lower than the cost price, which 
was possible if budget deficits of child-care organisations were compensated for by 
exploitation subsidies. In anticipation of the introduction of the system of demand 
financing in the child-care sector municipalities have, however, replaced 
exploitation subsidies by budget subsidies, which forced child-care organisations 
and day-care centres to increase the selling prices to the level of the cost price. 
Furthermore, the introduction of the system of demand financing has raised the 
corporate risk of the child-care organisations. In order to be able to deal with this 
increase in company risks, child-care organisations needed to raise the equity of 
their company (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2003). A final reason for the increase in 
selling prices is the increase in personnel costs over time (Deloitte 2004). 
Although the selling prices have increased over time, the differences in 
selling prices among child-care organisations have, interestingly enough, become 
smaller. In 2002 the prices for day-care ranged between 3.34 and 8.18 euros per 
hour, with an average of 4.64 euros. By the year 2004 the average hourly rates had 
increased to 5.26 euros, but the differences in prices had decreased with rates 
varying between 4.10 and 6.73 euros an hour (Deloitte 2002;2004). A further decline 
in price differences can be expected for 2005, since the Dutch government has set a 
cap on the compensation on costs. In 2005, the government compensated parents 
for the consumption of child care up to a maximum of 5.68 euros per hour of day 
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care. Given that the prices parents pay for child care depend heavily on the 
compensation they receive from the government and the employer, due to this 
rule, a selling price higher than 5.68 euros an hour would become rather 
unattractive for the parents and might be a reason not to choose a certain child-care 
organisation. As a result, child-care organisations can be expected not to demand 
selling prices that are much higher than 5.68 euros an hour.  
Due to the increase in selling prices over time, the child-care customers are 
confronted with an increase in the costs they have to pay if the increase in selling 
price is not accompanied by an increase in financial compensation. As explained in 
section 2.3, with the introduction of the new Act on Child Care the financial 
organisation of the child-care sector changed from a system of supply-financing to 
a system of demand-financing. With the introduction of the system of demand-
financing, the parents no longer pay a parental contribution for child care. Instead, 
they now have to pay the full price for child care and receive part of the costs back 
from the government and the employer.  
The compensation parents receive from the government depends on the 
child-care costs and household income. The higher the household income, the 
lower the financial compensation from the government. In practice, the system of 
demand financing has led to a decrease in consumer prices for parents with low 
incomes and to an increase in consumer prices for high income groups (Plantenga 
et al. 2005; Verschuur 2005). Moreover, the financial compensation of the 
government is based on the assumption that parents receive one third of the costs 
of child care from their employer. However, not all parents actually receive this 
compensation from their employer, since the employers are not obliged to pay 
their share of the costs. Although the government currently offers a partial 
compensation to parents that do not receive a financial contribution from their 
employer, the lack of an employer contribution may add substantially to the price 
customers have to pay (Plantenga et al. 2005). 
 
Quality of child care 
Finally, we will describe the extent to which the child-care customers are affected 
by the transition in the child-care sector in terms of the quality of care. On average, 
the parents are very satisfied with the quality of child care (SEO 2005). With regard 
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to the development of the quality of child care over time, the majority of the 
parents (82%) report that the quality of child care has not changed after the 
introduction of the new Act on Child Care, 16% report a decrease in quality and 
2% an increase (FNV 2005a). Given the fact that parents rate the quality of child 
care differently than experts do (Blau 1991) it is important to know how experts 
perceive the development of quality in the child-care sector over time. 
Experts define the quality of child care as those aspects that contribute to 
the social, emotional and cognitive development of the child (Goossens 1995). 
Usually a distinction is made between structural, process and contextual aspects of 
child care. Structural aspects are aspects of the environment that can be regulated 
by the local government. Examples of this are  the group size, the staff-to-child 
ratio, the number of square metres a day-care centre must have per child, the 
education of the childminders, and safety regulations. Process aspects concern 
aspects of the group itself. Examples are a varied selection of activities and the 
interaction between the childminders and the children. Finally, contextual aspects 
concern the broader environment, such as the quality of the care provided at the 
day-care centre in comparison with care received at home. Structural and 
contextual aspects are assumed to influence process quality, which in turn 
influences the development of the children. 
With regard to the structural aspects of child care in particular, the child-
care providers used to have to meet the requirements set by the government. Over 
time, however, a transition is taken place from a situation in which quality rules 
are enforced top-down, towards a situation in which the child-care sector itself is 
stimulated to impose quality rules bottom-up (Verschuur 2005). Since 1999 the 
child-care sector has had its own quality certificate (VOG 1999). Since then, many 
child-care organisations have met the requirements necessary for receiving the 
quality certificate or are in the process of receiving a quality certificate. With the 
introduction of the Act on Child Care on 1 January 2005 the responsibility for the 
quality of child care has been handed over to the child-care organisations, which 
have signed a covenant that states the minimum quality requirements for the 
Dutch child-care sector (BOinK, Branchevereniging Ondernemers in de 
Kinderopvang and MO Groep 2004). Some requirements with regard to the 
structural aspects of child care are, however, still established in the collective 
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labour agreements (Verschuur 2005). Moreover, the quality of the child care that is 
supplied remains to be monitored by the government (OECD 2002).  
The Dutch child-care sector is known for its high quality of care (Van 
IJzendoorn, Tavecchio and Riksen-Walraven 2004). The differences between child-
care organisations with regard to the quality of care are small. Between 1995 and 
2005 the Dutch child-care sector, however, has been confronted with a decline in 
health aspects, safety and activities that stimulate the development of the children. 
The quality of the interaction between the childminders and the children, which is 
very important for the development of the children and is considered to be an 
important aspect of quality by the parents, however, has remained stable in this 
period (Vermeer et al. 2005). Although the quality of the interaction between the 
childminders and the children is still high, research conducted by the largest Dutch 
Trade Union Federation (FNV 2005b) shows that many childminders perceive an 
increase in work pressure: one third of the childminders in the sample perceive an 
increase in the number of tasks they have to conduct and more than 50% of them 
perceive an increase in work pressure. Earlier research already indicated that the 
most important factors that cause work pressure are working alone on the group 
and the increase in number of tasks that the childminders have to perform (Van 




The Dutch child-care sector is undergoing profound changes. In the first place, the 
supply of formal child care has grown enormously over the past years in the 
Netherlands, from 20,000 child places in 1989 to over 200,000 child places in 2004. 
Secondly, parallel to this increase, the Dutch child-care sector has been confronted 
with a transition from a welfare sector to a market sector. The last step in this 
transition took place with the introduction of a new Act on Child Care on 1 
January 2005. With the introduction of this new act (‘Wet Kinderopvang’) the 
financial organisation of the child-care sector has changed from a system of 
supply-financing to a system of demand-financing.  
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The transition of the child-care sector from a welfare sector to a market 
sector has affected the financing structure of the child-care sector and the 
organisational structure of the child-care organisations. Instead of being a non-
profit company that can fall back on government subsidies, the introduction of 
market forces and the changes in subsidies have forced child-care organisations to 
become independent businesses, that are able to make a profit from the services 
that they are selling.  
The child-care customers are affected by the transition in the child-care 
sector in terms of choice, costs and quality of care. Over the years, parents have 
received more possibilities of choice with regard to the where to consume child 
care. Despite the large increase in the number of child places some parents, in rural 
areas especially, are, however, still confronted with limited freedom of choice with 
regard to where to consume child care. Furthermore, the child-care customers are, 
contrary to what was expected, confronted with an increase in the prices they have 
to pay. With regard to the quality of child care there is a transition over time from a 
situation in which quality rules are enforced top-down, towards a situation where 
the child-care sector itself is stimulated to impose quality rules bottom-up. 
Given the importance of the interaction between the childminders and the 
children for the development of the children, it is important to gain a better 
understanding of the effects of the introduction of market forces on the motivation 
and performance of the childminders. As was mentioned earlier, these effects will 
be investigated in great detail in this research. Chapter 3 pays attention to the 
theory on employee motivation and performance. Chapter 4 focuses on the 




3 Explaining employee governance, 





This chapter presents the theoretical model that explains the effects of the 
introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on employee 
governance, motivation and performance. Section 3.2 presents the research 
questions of this research. Section 3.3 explains how the introduction of market 
forces in the Dutch child-care sector influences the employee governance of child-
care organisations. Section 3.4 focuses on the effects of the introduction of market 
forces in the Dutch child-care sector on employee motivation. In section 3.5 
hypotheses are derived with regard to the effects of employee motivation on 
employee performance. Finally, section 3.6 gives a summary of this chapter. 
 
3.2 Research questions 
 
The aim of this research is to describe and explain the effects of the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on employee governance, motivation 
and performance. These effects are studied using a structure-conduct-performance 
approach. This type of approach, originating from the study of industrial 
organisations, assumes that an industry’s performance depends on the conduct or 
behaviour of the firms, which, in turn, depends on the structure of the market 
(Carlton and Perloff 1994). In this research, employee motivation and performance 
are assumed to be dependent upon the employee governance of child-care 
organisations, which, in turn, is assumed to be dependent upon the strength of the 





The following research questions are formulated:  
 
1. To what extent does the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care  
 sector influence the employee governance of child-care organisations?  
2. If the employee governance of child-care organisations changes, to what extent 
do these changes influence employee motivation? 
3. If employee motivation changes, to what extent do these changes influence  
 employee performance? 
 
 
Sector level  Market forces 
 
………………………………………………………………………………....……………
    1 
Organisation level Employee governance  
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………...…
    2  3 
Employee level Employee motivation      Employee performance 
 
Figure 3-1: Graphical representation of research questions 
 
3.3 How market forces affect employee governance   
 
According to the structure-conduct-performance approach, the conduct or 
behaviour of organisations depends on the structure of the market (Carlton and 
Perloff 1994). Thus, organisations are assumed to adapt their behaviour in response 
to changes in the market structure. With our first research question, we investigate 
the extent to which changes in the market structure of the Dutch child-care sector, 
i.e. the introduction of market forces, affect the employee governance of Dutch 
child-care organisations. 
As described in Chapter 2, the Dutch child-care sector is confronted with a 
transition from a welfare sector to a market sector. The changes in the market 
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structure of the Dutch child-care sector are expected to affect child-care 
organisations. Instead of being a non-profit company that can rely on government 
subsidies, the introduction of market forces necessitates child-care organisations to 
become independent businesses that are able to make a profit from the services 
they are providing.  
In order to adjust to the demands of the market and to improve their 
financial position, child-care organisations have different strategies at their 
disposal. Child-care organisations can adjust to the demands of the market by 
offering services that other organisations do not offer such as longer or flexible 
opening hours or other services besides child care  (Dekker, Plantenga and Siegers 
2001). In doing this, child-care organisations expect to improve their market share 
and financial position. Other strategies that child-care organisations have at their 
disposal to improve their financial position are, for example, raising the prices of 
child care or decreasing costs by increasing efficiency (Turksema 2000). Since 
personnel costs are the most important cost factor in the labour-intensive child-care 
sector (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2005) an increase in focus on the cost price forces 
child-care organisations to use personnel more efficiently.  
This book focuses on the extent to which child-care organisations react to 
the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector by increasing 
personnel efficiency. In order to increase efficiency, child-care organisations need 
to redefine the way in which they govern their employees. The term ‘governance 
structure’ was introduced by Williamson (1985) and represents the way the 
employer has structured the organisation in order for the employees to be able to 
carry out their work. We assume that employee governance can be described by 
four elements: employment contracts, job design, reward system and career 
system.2 With regard to the reward and career system, we make a distinction 
between the focus on pay-for-performance and the attractiveness of the reward 
and career system. Thus, child-care organisations are expected to change their 
employment contracts, job design, reward and career system in order to increase 
personnel efficiency. 
                                                 




An important efficiency measure in the child-care sector is the extent to 
which the number of childminders is adjusted to the number of children present in 
the day-care centre. Since the number of children that are present in the day-care 
centre is not stable throughout the week, the number of childminders that is 
necessary to look after these children needs to be flexible in order to realise high 
personnel efficiency. By working with flexible employment contracts childminders 
can, for example, be scheduled in on busy days. Also by raising the tightness of the 
job design, efficiency can be increased. Whenever there are less children present 
than expected, and therefore more childminders are present on the group than 
required by law, requiring childminders to take the day off or to work on different 
groups or at different locations will, for example, result in a more efficient use of 
the available employees.  
By changing the employment contracts and job design, child-care 
organisations are therefore able to increase personnel efficiency. An increase in 
efficiency, however, requires flexibility and effort from the childminders. In order 
to motivate childminders to work hard, child-care organisations can be expected to 
use performance-related pay (Delfgaauw 2005). In addition, child-care 
organisations can be expected to increase the attractiveness of their reward and 
career system to attract and motivate personnel, for example, by offering higher 
wages than necessary according to the collective labour agreement or by offering 
childminders the possibility to develop themselves in their work. 
All in all, the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector, 
and the accompanying pressure to increase efficiency is expected to affect the 
employee governance of child-care organisations. The introduction of market 
forces in the Dutch child-care sector is expected to have a positive effect on the: 
flexibility of employment contracts, tightness of the job design, focus on pay-for-
performance in the reward and career system, and attractiveness of the reward and 






Explaining employee governance, motivation and performance 
33  








































1 +: positive effect, -: negative effect. 
 
3.4 How employee governance affects employee motivation   
 
In the preceding section, we explained how Dutch child-care organisations are 
expected to adapt to the changes in the market structure of the sector. In order to 
increase personnel efficiency, child-care organisations are expected to alter the way 
in which they govern their employees. The changes in employee governance are, in 
turn, expected to affect the performance of the childminders. Given the importance 
of employee motivation for the understanding of employee performance, which is 
explained in section 1.3.1, we will first focus on employee motivation before 
paying attention to employee performance in section 3.5. Section 3.4.1 presents a 
review of the literature on employee motivation. In section 3.4.2, the theoretical 
model that is used in this research to explain employee motivation is developed. 
Finally, section 3.4.3 discusses how, on the basis of our theoretical model, changes 
in the employee governance of child-care organisations can be expected to affect 
employee motivation.  
3.4.1 Review of the literature on employee motivation  
The concept of employee motivation has been the subject of study in many 
different disciplines. In this research, elements from economics, psychology and 
sociology are combined and incorporated into the analysis in order to obtain a 
better understanding of the effects of external interventions on employee 
motivation. 
Mainstream economic theory assumes that people are rational maximisers. 
They are assumed to make decisions that maximise a given end, usually referred to 
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as the maximisation of utility. Given the assumption that people try to maximise 
utility and that preferences neither change nor differ significantly from person to 
person, differences or changes in behaviour can be explained by differences in 
constraints, usually measured as differences in relative prices (Stigler and Becker 
1977).3 All the decisions that people make, be it whether to buy a hamburger, 
whether to vote, or whether to perform well on a job, are supposed to be 
analysable within this mainstream economic framework of rational choice (Becker 
1976).  
Mainstream economic theory also assumes that employees choose their level 
of performance by considering the rewards as well as the costs of performing, with 
the costs being mainly the opportunity costs of foregone leisure. This theory rests 
on the proposition that work is a source of disutility and that only an extrinsic 
reward to compensate for this disutility will induce individuals to work (Elliott 
1991).  
While economic theory attributes changes in behaviour to changes in relative 
prices, psychology generally focuses on people’s preferences (Frey and Benz 2002). 
Psychologists have argued for a long time that people are not only motivated to do 
things because of benefits from the outside. According to these psychologists, 
people can also be motivated to do things even though there is no external reward 
but the behaviour itself. In this case people are said to be intrinsically motivated 
(Deci 1975). 
According to the cognitive evaluation theory of Deci (1975), intrinsically 
motivated behaviour is based on people’s need to feel competent and self-
determined. People are said to be intrinsically motivated to conduct a certain 
activity when they are ‘freely engaging in activities that they find interesting, that 
provide novelty and optimal challenge’ (Deci and Ryan 2000, p. 235). Intrinsic 
motivation is therefore usually connected to rewards that are intrinsic to the 
person, while extrinsic motivation is connected to rewards that are extrinsic to the 
person, such as money, gifts, ribbons or praise (Sansone and Harackiewicz 2000). 
                                                 
3 The assumption that differences in behaviour can be explained by focusing on differences in 
constraints is used as a heuristic to simplify reality. This is not to say that other factors might not be of 
importance also (Nicholson 1995). 
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Over the years, two strands of literature have evolved with regard to 
intrinsic motivation. First, there is the task characteristics literature that claims that 
intrinsic motivation at work ‘may actually have more to do with how tasks are 
designed and managed than with the personal dispositions of the people’ 
(Hackman and Oldham 1980, p. 76-77). Over the years, much evidence has been 
found that jobs that offer skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy 
and direct feedback do indeed enhance the intrinsic motivation of employees.4 A 
second branch of literature focuses on the interrelatedness between extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation. The assumption that certain activities provide their own 
inherent reward raises the question of how extrinsic rewards will affect people’s 
intrinsic motivation for these activities (Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999).  
The cognitive evaluation theory is an example of the second branch of the 
literature. Cognitive evaluation theory assumes that the effect that extrinsic 
rewards have on intrinsic motivation is dependent on how the recipients interpret 
the rewards: people may perceive an external reward as controlling or as 
informational. If the recipient perceives the reward as informational, more self-
determination and competence will be derived from conducting the activity and 
intrinsic motivation will increase. If, on the other hand, the recipient perceives the 
reward as controlling, less self-determination and competence will be derived from 
conducting the activity and the intrinsic motivation will decrease (Ryan and Deci 
2000). 
The social-psychological model of the interaction between extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation was introduced in economics by Frey (1992) as the crowding 
theory. Frey assumes, in line with Deci (1975), that intrinsic motivation increases if 
individuals perceive an external intervention as supportive. In this case, a 
crowding-in effect is said to occur. However, if individuals perceive an external 
intervention as controlling, intrinsic motivation decreases and a crowding-out 
effect is said to occur (Frey 1997a).  
The important message that has been brought forward by psychologists like 
Deci (1975) and introduced in the economic discipline by Frey (1992) is that 
extrinsic motivation and intrinsic motivation do not function independently of one 
                                                 
4 See for example Jansen et al. (1996), Laamanen et al. (1999) and Houkes (2002). 
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another. Therefore, an employer can not simply maximise employee motivation by 
motivating ‘a member of staff intrinsically by making his or her job as interesting 
as possible and extrinsically by promising a bonus’ (Frey and Osterloh 2002, p. 9).  
An example of a crowding-out effect, where the introduction of a financial 
incentive resulted in behaviour that was the opposite of what was intended, is the 
following. Parents are often late when picking up their children from child-care 
facilities. By introducing a fine, the management of a child-care centre wanted to 
give the parents an incentive to pick up their children on time, hoping that the 
number of parents arriving late would decrease. The introduction of the fine, 
however, had the opposite effect: more parents were late when picking up their 
children (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). Instead of feeling guilty when they arrived 
late, parents now paid a fine which, in comparison with the guilt they felt before, 
was considered a smaller price to pay. Moreover, when the new system was 
cancelled, the number of parents failing to collect their children on time did not 
return to the former level: once the intrinsic motivation was crowded-out, the 
withdrawal of the fine proved to be insufficient to restore the original level of 
intrinsic motivation.      
3.4.2 Explaining employee motivation  
With this research we will try to contribute to a better understanding of what the 
theoretical construct of intrinsic motivation in the context of paid work comes 
down to. In order to be able to distinguish between levels of extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation we will focus on the different types of rewards that employees receive 
from performing an activity. By doing this, the risk of having to distinguish 
between activities that are conducted out of an extrinsic motivation and those that 
are intrinsically motivated is avoided (Vinke 1996; Thierry 1990). Psychologists 
usually define activities as being extrinsically motivated when an individual 
attributes the driving force behind the activity to an external cause - usually a 
financial reward - and intrinsically motivated when an individual attributes the 
motivation to carry out the activity to oneself (Lepper and Greene 1978; Sansone 
and Harackiewicz 2000). However, it turns out that in reality this distinction is not 
that cut and dry. It is almost impossible to distinguish between rewards that are 
internal or external to the person (Frey 1997a). Furthermore, one cannot say that a 
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person is either completely intrinsically motivated or entirely extrinsically 
motivated. Often behaviour is pursued for the internal as well as the external 
rewards that may be received and therefore both types of motivation influence 
behaviour. 
Due to the difficulties that arise when trying to distinguish between 
rewards that are external and internal to the person, in this research we will focus 
on rewards that are internal and external to the activity (Ryan and Deci 2000). Ever 
since the first discussions on intrinsic motivation, financial rewards have been at 
the heart of the external rewards, while the enjoyment or fun one derives from an 
activity has been considered one of the most important internal rewards (Deci 
1975). Over time, the status and behavioural confirmation that one may receive 
from others for conducting a certain task are, however, regarded as external 
rewards also while the internal rewards that people might derive from performing 
a task are broadened in such a way that these also incorporate a work morale (Frey 
1993;1997a). 
The social production function approach introduced by Lindenberg 
(1991;1996;2001) offers a framework that enables one to explain how work rewards 
affect employee motivation. The social production function approach assumes that 
people have one universal goal in life: subjective well-being. Subjective well-being 
consists of two components: physical well-being and social well-being. In addition, 
the social production function approach specifies two lower level goals that 
produce physical well-being and three lower level goals that produce social well-
being. Physical well-being can be produced by comfort and stimulation, and social 
well-being can result from affection, status and behavioural confirmation from 
yourself and others.  
Having a job is one of the factors that can lead to the production of well-
being: a job provides employees with extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, or so-called 
production factors, for the production of well-being. The higher the level of well-
being employees are able to produce with the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards they 
derive from their job, the higher their level of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation is 
assumed to be.  
On one hand, the extrinsic rewards offer the employees the possibility of 
directly producing status and behavioural confirmation from others and indirectly 
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producing comfort, stimulation, affection, status and behavioural confirmation 
from oneself and from others. Feedback from the employer, for example, offers the 
employee the possibility of directly producing behavioural confirmation from 
others. The financial rewards employees receive from work may also be a factor in 
the direct production of well-being, since a financial reward may directly produce 
status: a well-paid job may, for example, provide a higher status than a low-paid 
job. In addition, financial rewards also offer employees the possibility to indirectly 
produce comfort, stimulation, affection, behavioural confirmation from yourself 
and others, and status. Money is required to be able to buy a house for comfort or 
to go to the movies for stimulation, for instance. The financial rewards employees 
receive from their job therefore also provide them with the resources that are 
needed to produce these goals outside of their work. 
The intrinsic rewards, on the other hand, offer employees the possibility of 
directly producing comfort, stimulation, affection and behavioural confirmation 
from oneself. With the appreciation the childminders receive from the children, the 
attention that can be given to the children and the possibilities for development 
that are offered by the job, the childminders will be able to produce affection, 
comfort, stimulation and behavioural confirmation from themselves. Spending 
time with the children and feeling that they appreciate that produces affection; 
comfort is produced if there is enough time to pay attention to the children and not 
too much stress; stimulation results from seeing the children develop over time, 
your assistance in this process, and the possibility of becoming better at your job 
by the opportunities for development it offers; and behavioural confirmation from 
yourself springs from the experience that the children enjoy themselves, are in 
good hands with you and are being looked after in a professional way.  
Together the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards offer the employees the means 
for the production of well-being. The extent to which employees are able to 
produce well-being with the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards they receive from their 
job is, however, neither the same for all employees nor stable over time, but 
depends on how effective the rewards are in producing subjective well-being. 
Since different people face different constraints in life, the extent to which rewards 
are effective in producing of comfort, stimulation, affection, status and behavioural 
confirmation (both from themselves and from others) may differ from person to 
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person. Consequently, different people may have different production functions 
that lead to their maximum well-being. In other words, although everyone is 
assumed to have only one universal goal in life, there might be different routes for 
different people that lead to fulfilling that universal goal of subjective well-being 
(Lindenberg 1991). If a paid job gave, for example, more social status to men than 
to women, it would be more efficient for men to take the route of having a paid job 
to reach the universal goal of subjective well-being than it would be for women. In 
this respect it is important that the social production function approach assumes 
that the extent to which people can actually produce well-being with the rewards 
they derive from conducting a certain activity, as reflected by the productivity of 
the factors of production, is influenced by the values that are assigned to these 
rewards by the society in which the person lives. The extent to which employees 
are able to produce comfort, stimulation, affection, behavioural confirmation and 
status therefore does not depend on subjective judgements alone but is affected by 
society as well. 
The extent to which the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards are able to produce 
subjective well-being in people’s jobs, therefore, depends not only on the extrinsic 
and intrinsic rewards they receive from their job but also on the productivity of 
these rewards. Given that the productivity of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards may 
differ amongst employees, extrinsic and intrinsic rewards may have different 
effects on the production of well-being and, as a consequence, on employee 
motivation. Both the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards employees derive from their 
job are assumed to have a positive influence on employee motivation. In addition, 
it is assumed that the higher the productivity of a certain reward, the stronger the 
effect on employee motivation will be.  
Because employee motivation is assumed to be influenced by the rewards 
as well as by the productivity of these rewards, changes in rewards or their 
productivity will affect employee motivation. External interventions are assumed 
to affect extrinsic and intrinsic motivation by influencing the extrinsic and intrinsic 
rewards employees derive from their job. In addition, the intrinsic motivation of 
the employees is assumed to be influenced by the way in which an external 
intervention is perceived. On one hand, if an external intervention is perceived as 
controlling, the productivity of the intrinsic rewards that are derived from 
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conducting the activity decrease and intrinsic motivation will be crowded-out. On 
the other hand, if an external intervention is perceived as being supportive, the 
productivity of the intrinsic rewards that are derived from performing the activity 
will increase and intrinsic motivation will be crowded-in. 
A famous example in which an increase in extrinsic rewards was found to 
decrease intrinsic motivation is the example of paying people for donating blood, 
put forward by Titmuss (1970). He argued that the introduction of a financial 
compensation for donating blood in a situation where donors previously did not 
receive a payment, would lead to a decrease in blood donations rather than an 
increase. In terms of the social production function approach, a decrease in blood 
donations can be explained as follows. A small increase in extrinsic rewards can be 
expected to have very little effect on extrinsic motivation, while it may decrease the 
productivity of the intrinsic rewards that are derived from giving blood and thus 
lead to a lower production of intrinsic motivation. Over the years, many more 
examples have been found in which the introduction of a financial payment was 
found to decrease rather than increase intrinsic motivation.5  
A financial reward may, however, also be perceived positively; in this case 
a crowding-in effect is said to occur. For activities that involve large sacrifices, 
some form of financial payment might be valued ‘both as a form of recognition and 
as a partial compensation for the costs involved’ (Le Grand 2003, p. 46). However, 
the financial payment should never be so large that it fully compensates for the 
sacrifice, because in that case there will again be no room to derive behavioural 
confirmation from oneself in conducting the activity.  
The fact that external interventions may influence the productivity of the 
intrinsic rewards forces employers to consider the possible effects that an external 
intervention may have on intrinsic motivation before intervening. Moreover, the 
fact that a decrease in the productivity of intrinsic rewards may have lasting effects 
on employee motivation is all the more reason for employers to take the possible 
effects on intrinsic motivation into account when considering an external 
intervention. While the effects on employee motivation of a decrease in extrinsic or 
intrinsic rewards can be made undone immediately by withdrawing the changes 
                                                 
5 See for example Jordan (1986); Wiersma (1992); Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999); Frey and Jegen (2001).    
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that have been made, a change in employee motivation through a decrease in the 
productivity of intrinsic rewards can’t be reversed immediately. It is known, for 
example, that ‘the process of building up of work morale is certainly slower than 
destroying it’ (Frey 1997b, p. 430). 
Finally, a decrease in the productivity of intrinsic rewards in one situation 
may spill over to other situations (Frey 1997a). In the case of donating blood, the 
decrease in the productivity of the intrinsic rewards that leads to a lower 
production of intrinsic motivation, may spill over to other areas in which a sacrifice 
is made for the common good. The financial compensation that is received for 
giving blood, in this case, devalues a sacrifice in general. Therefore, in all possible 
situations in which a sacrifice is made for the common good the behavioural 
confirmation that is received from that sacrifice will decrease or even vanish. Given 
that a decrease in the productivity of intrinsic rewards especially may have a large 
and long lasting effect on the intrinsic motivation of employees, external 
interventions therefore need to be employed with care. 
3.4.3 Employee motivation in child care 
In section 3.3 the expected effects of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch 
child-care sector on the employee governance of child-care organisations were 
discussed. In the preceding section, we have explained how external interventions 
can affect employee motivation. On the basis of the theoretical model that was 
developed in the preceding section, in this section hypotheses are formulated with 
regard to the expected effects of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch 
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Figure 3-2: The effects of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on the 
employee motivation of childminders.  
 
Expected effects on extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
As has been explained in section 3.3, the introduction of market forces in the Dutch 
child-care sector forces child-care organisations to increase efficiency. In order to 
realise high personnel efficiency, child-care organisations are expected to redefine 
the way in which they govern their employees. By increasing the flexibility of 
employment contracts and the tightness of the job design, child-care organisations 
will be better able to link the number of childminders working each day to the 
number of children present in the day-care centre. As a result, the children in the 
day-care centre can be looked after by a smaller group of childminders. Thus, an 
increase in personnel efficiency increases cost efficiency, which improves the 
financial position of the child-care organisation.   
The expected effects of an increase in the flexibility of employment 
contracts and tightness of the job design on the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
childminders derive from their jobs are, however, less positive. An increase in the 
flexibility of employment contracts is expected to negatively affect the extrinsic 
Explaining employee governance, motivation and performance 
43  
rewards childminders derive from their job since it lowers job security, which has a 
negative effect on the production of status and the possibilities of producing well-
being outside work. An increase in the flexibility of employment contracts is also 
expected to negatively affect the intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their 
job, since it requires an increase in flexibility and effort from the childminders, 
which is accompanied by an increase in work pressure and less time for giving 
special attention to the children, and decreases the possibilities of producing 
comfort, stimulation, affection and behavioural confirmation from oneself. For 
similar reasons, an increase in the tightness of the job design is expected to 
decrease the intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job. It is not expected 
to influence the extrinsic rewards of the job, since there is no direct relation 
between job design and extrinsic rewards.  
An increase in focus on pay-for-performance in the reward or career 
system is expected to positively affect the extrinsic rewards and negatively affect 
the intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job. An increased focus on 
pay-for-performance may increase the financial rewards childminders derive from 
their job, which increases the production of status and raises the possibilities of 
producing well-being outside work. Intrinsic rewards are expected to decrease, 
however, since an increase in focus on pay-for-performance requires more effort 
from the childminders and an increase in effort can be accompanied by an increase 
in work pressure and less time for paying special attention to the children, which 
decreases the possibilities of producing comfort, stimulation, affection and 
behavioural confirmation from oneself. 
Finally, the attractiveness of the reward system is expected to affect the 
extrinsic rewards positively, whereas the attractiveness of the career system is 
expected to do the same for both the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards of the job. An 
increase in attractiveness of the reward and career system is expected to increase 
financial rewards, which raises the production of status and the possibilities of 
producing well-being outside work. Intrinsic rewards are only expected to be 
influenced by the attractiveness of the career system, since an increase in 
possibilities for personal development means more possibilities for producing 
stimulation and behavioural confirmation from yourself.  
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The expected effects of employee governance on the extrinsic and intrinsic 
rewards are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3-2. The data in Table 3-2 show 
that employee governance is expected to have both positive and negative effects on 
the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job. Therefore, 
the overall effect of the introduction of market forces on the extrinsic and intrinsic 
rewards that childminders derive from their jobs is uncertain. 
 
Table 3-2: Expected effects of market forces and employee governance on employee motivation1    
 Extrinsic 
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1 +: positive effect, -: negative effect, 0: no effect. 
 
Expected effects on the productivity of  intrinsic rewards 
As stated in section 3.4.2, in order to be able to understand how the changes in 
employee governance affect employee motivation it is not enough to focus only on 
changes in rewards, because external interventions are not only assumed to 
directly influence extrinsic and intrinsic motivation by affecting the extrinsic and 
intrinsic rewards employees derive from their job, but also to indirectly influence 
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the intrinsic motivation of the employees by the way in which an external 
intervention is perceived. In addition to the effects of employee governance on the 
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job, employee 
governance is therefore expected to indirectly influence the intrinsic motivation of 
the childminders by affecting the productivity of the intrinsic rewards (see column 
3 of Table 3-2).  
First of all, the productivity of the intrinsic rewards is expected to be 
affected by how the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector is 
perceived. The transition of the Dutch child-care sector from a welfare sector to a 
market sector is expected to be perceived as being negative by the childminders, 
since financial considerations are the driving force behind the transition and the 
position of the childminder has not been the focal point of the transition. The 
introduction of market forces is therefore expected to negatively affect the 
productivity of the intrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their job.  
Second, the productivity of the intrinsic rewards is expected to be affected 
by changes in the employee governance of child-care organisations. An increase in 
the flexibility of employment contracts is expected to be perceived as controlling 
since it may indicate that the child-care organisation is more interested in 
personnel efficiency than in the interests of the childminders. Due to the increase in 
the flexibility of employment contracts, the productivity of the intrinsic rewards is 
therefore expected to decrease and childminders are expected to be able to produce 
less comfort, stimulation, affection and behavioural confirmation from themselves 
with the intrinsic rewards they receive from their job. For similar reasons, an 
increase in the tightness of the job design is expected to be perceived as controlling 
and to decrease the productivity of the intrinsic rewards.  
An increase in focus on pay-for-performance in the reward and career 
system is expected to be perceived differently by childminders depending on 
whether or not they are rewarded for displaying an above average work effort. An 
increase in focus on pay-for-performance in the reward and career system is 
expected to be perceived as being positive by the childminders who are actually 
rewarded for their work effort. For these childminders the reward, in terms of a 
financial bonus or promotion, is regarded as a recognition for the sacrifices they 
put into work and the productivity of the intrinsic rewards is expected to increase. 
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However, an increase in the focus on pay-for-performance in the reward and 
career system is expected to be perceived as being negative by the childminders 
who are not rewarded for their work effort, since the sacrifices of these 
childminders are not acknowledged. For the childminders who are not rewarded, 
an increase in focus on pay-for-performance is therefore expected to have a 
negative effect on the productivity of the intrinsic rewards. Taking into account 
that pay-for-performance is still a rather unusual concept in the care sector (Gielen, 
Kerkhofs and Van Ours 2006), it seems likely that the group of childminders who 
will actually be rewarded for displaying an above average work effort will be 
smaller than the group of childminders who will not be rewarded. Overall, an 
increase in pay-for-performance is therefore expected to decrease the productivity 
of intrinsic rewards. 
Finally, an increase in the attractiveness of the reward system is expected 
to be perceived as controlling whereas an increase in the attractiveness of the 
career system is expected to be perceived as stimulating. An increase in the 
attractiveness of the reward system on one hand, is expected to be perceived as 
controlling because an increase in financial rewards may increase the focus on the 
financial rewards at the expense of the intrinsic rewards that can be received from 
the job. An increase in the attractiveness of the reward system is therefore expected 
to decrease the productivity of the intrinsic rewards. An increase in the 
attractiveness of the career system, on the other hand, is expected to be perceived 
as stimulating because an increase in attractiveness of the career system might be 
viewed by the childminders as a sign that the child-care organisations care about 
their interests (Mühlau and Lindenberg 2003) . An increase in the attractiveness of 
the career system is therefore expected to increase the productivity of intrinsic 
rewards.  
 
Expected effects on extrinsic and intrinsic motivation 
To summarise, the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector is 
expected to influence both the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that childminders 
receive from their job as well as the productivity of the intrinsic rewards. Both the 
changes in the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards as well as the extent to which 
childminders are able to produce well-being with the given level of rewards are 
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assumed to affect the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the childminders. On the 
basis of the expected changes in extrinsic and intrinsic rewards and the 
productivity of intrinsic rewards, the changes in employee governance are 
expected to have contrasting effects on the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the 
childminders (see columns 4 and 5 of Table 3-2).   
An increase in the flexibility of employment contracts is expected to 
decrease the extrinsic rewards and thereby to decrease the extrinsic motivation of 
the childminders. An increase in the flexibility of employment contracts is also 
expected to decrease the intrinsic motivation of the childminders, because an 
increase such as this is expected to decrease both the intrinsic rewards that 
childminders derive from their job and the productivity of the intrinsic rewards. 
An increase in the tightness of the job design is expected to be unrelated to the 
extrinsic rewards and therewith to the extrinsic motivation of the childminders. 
Since an increase in the tightness of the job design is expected to decrease both the 
intrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their job and the productivity of 
these rewards, an increase in the tightness of the job design is expected to 
negatively influence the intrinsic motivation of the childminders. An increase in 
focus on pay-for-performance in the reward and career system is expected to 
increase the extrinsic motivation by increasing the extrinsic rewards, and to 
decrease the intrinsic motivation of the childminders. Intrinsic motivation is 
expected to be negatively affected by an increase in pay-for-performance in the 
reward and career system, since pay-for-performance is expected to decrease both 
the intrinsic rewards and the productivity of the intrinsic rewards. An increase in 
the attractiveness of the reward and career system is expected to increase the 
extrinsic motivation by increasing the extrinsic rewards childminders derive from 
their job. An increase in the attractiveness of the reward system is expected to have 
no effect on the intrinsic rewards but is nevertheless expected to have a negative 
effect on intrinsic motivation because it is expected to decrease the productivity of 
intrinsic rewards. Finally, an increase in the attractiveness of the career system is 
expected to increase intrinsic motivation since it is expected to increase both 
intrinsic rewards and the productivity of intrinsic rewards.   
In conclusion, the introduction of market forces in the child-care sector is 
expected to influence the employee governance of child-care organisations, which, 
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in turn, is expected to affect employee motivation. Since the changes in employee 
governance are expected to have both positive and negative effects on the extrinsic 
and intrinsic motivation of the childminders, the overall effect of these changes is 
not clear in advance. Most changes in employee governance are, however, 
expected to have positive effects on the extrinsic motivation and negative effects on 
the intrinsic motivation of the childminders.  
 
3.5 How employee motivation affects employee performance   
 
Finally, we will focus on the effects of the introduction of market forces in the 
Dutch child-care sector on the performance of the childminders. If the introduction 
of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector affects the motivation of the 
childminders - either directly or through a change in employee governance - how 
will the changes in employee motivation affect the performance of the 
childminders? Section 3.5.1 focuses on explaining employee performance and 
section 3.5.2 discusses how the changes in employee motivation can be expected to 
affect employee performance. 
3.5.1 Explaining employee performance 
In section 3.4.2 we explained that the extent to which employees are motivated in 
their work depends on the well-being that employees are able to produce in their 
job. The higher the level of well-being childminders are able to produce with the 
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards they derive from their job, the higher their level of 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation is assumed to be. Employee motivation is, in 
turn, expected to affect employee performance.  
The link between the level of well-being the employee is able to produce in 
the job and the level of employee performance is based on the mutual-investment 
model, which defines the relationship between employee and employer as a social 
exchange relationship and claims that the employer will invest in the employee 
whereas the employee will respond by displaying a high level of performance 
(Tsui et al. 1997). According to the mutual-investment model offering a high level 
of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, which leads to a high level of well-being, will be 
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reciprocated by the employee. Empirical analyses confirm the hypothesis that if an 
employer has invested in an employee, the employee will react by displaying more 
cooperative behaviour (Akerlof 1982; Lambooij 2005). 
It might be argued that as long as one is not interested in the differences 
between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation as such, but only in the effect of 
employee motivation on employee performance there is no problem when intrinsic 
motivation is substituted by extrinsic motivation. Empirical evidence has shown, 
however, that work governed by intrinsic motivation is associated with better 
mental and physical health than work governed by extrinsic motivation. 
Employees who are characterised by a high level of intrinsic motivation show a 
higher work and life satisfaction than employees who are characterised by a high 
level of extrinsic motivation (Frey 1997a). Having a high level of intrinsic 
motivation is therefore in itself valuable for employees and a decrease in intrinsic 
motivation might affect employees negatively even if the decrease in intrinsic 
motivation is offset by an increase in extrinsic motivation.  
Moreover, the effects of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation on employee 
performance have been found to differ from one another. For the employer, having 
employees who are partly extrinsically motivated is important for guiding them. 
With regard to the unpleasant aspects of a job especially, using financial rewards 
works very well. Therefore, in simple repetitive manufacturing jobs extrinsically 
motivated employees will work the hardest and the use of financial rewards can be 
recommended. Intrinsic motivation, on the other hand, is important too. First of all, 
intrinsically motivated employees have been found to have a higher learning 
capacity than extrinsically motivated employees. Furthermore, laboratory 
experiments suggest that cognitively difficult tasks are carried out better by 
intrinsically than extrinsically motivated employees. Finally, less money is spent 
on disciplining intrinsically motivated employees. In particular in jobs that 
demand a high level of creativity from the employees and where monitoring costs 
are high, intrinsic motivation is valuable (Frey 1993).  
The effects of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation differ with regard to the 
quantity and quality of employee performance as well. First of all, the learning 
capacity and ability to perform cognitive difficult tasks are usually more important 
for the quality than for the quantity of work performance. Second, the quantity of 
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work performance usually is easier to monitor than the quality of work 
performance. In the child-care sector, the employer can, for example, evaluate 
rather easily how many children the childminders have been looking after on 
average, while the quality with which they have cared for the children is less easy 
to determine. Therefore, due to the differences in monitoring possibilities the 
employer can influence the quantity of the work performance more easily than the 
quality of the work performance. Consequently, employees have more control over 
the quality of work performance than over the quantity of work performance. 
Given that intrinsic motivation is known to be especially valuable in jobs that 
demand a high level of initiative and creativity from the employees and where 
monitoring is difficult, intrinsic motivation is therefore extremely important for 
ensuring high quality performance. 
3.5.2 Employee performance in child care 
In order to assess the quality of child care one usually distinguishes between 
structural and process quality (Goossens 1995; Vermeer et al. 2005). The structural 
quality of child care is regulated by the law and defines the standards that child-
care organisations have to meet with regard to, for example, group size, staff-to-
child ratio, the number of square metres per child, the education of the 
childminders, and safety regulations. The structural quality of child care thus 
provides the means to deliver high quality and is therefore assumed to have a 
positive effect on process quality.  
Process quality concerns the quality of care within the group itself, which 
results, among other things, from the interaction between childminders and 
children and the supply of a varied amount of activities that stimulates the 
development of the children. Whereas the performance of the childminders is 
almost totally unrelated to structural quality, process quality is heavily influenced 
by employee performance. Therefore, in this research we will focus on the 
performance of the childminders that influences process quality. This performance 
we will label quality performance. 
Market forces, employee governance and employee motivation are 
expected to affect the quality of the performance of the childminders in the way 
that is presented in Table 3-3. Both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation are expected 
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to have a positive effect on quality performance. Increases in the flexibility of 
employment contracts and tightness of the job design are expected to decrease the 
quality of work performance because these employee governance aspects are 
expected to negatively affect employee motivation. The effect of an increase in 
focus on pay-for-performance in the reward and career system on employee 
performance is not clear beforehand, since an increase in focus on pay-for-
performance is expected to positively affect extrinsic motivation and to negatively 
affect intrinsic motivation. For similar reasons, the effect of an increase in the 
attractiveness of the reward system is expected to have mixed effects on the quality 
of performance. Finally, an increase in attractiveness of the career system is 
expected to increase the quality of performance, because it is expected to increase 
both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation.  
 
Table 3-3: Expected effects of market forces, employee governance and employee motivation on 
employee performance1    
 Quality of employee performance (low .. high) 
 
Market forces (low .. high) +/- 
 
Flexibility contracts (low .. high) - 
 
Tight job design (low .. high) - 
 
Pay-for-performance reward system (low .. high) +/- 
 
Pay-for-performance career system (low .. high) +/- 
 
Attractive reward system (low .. high) +/- 
 
Attractive career system (low .. high) + 
 
Extrinsic motivation (low .. high) + 
 
Intrinsic motivation (low .. high) 
 
+ 
1 +: positive effect, -: negative effect. 
 
In conclusion, the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector is 
expected to influence employee motivation, which, in turn, is expected to affect 
employee performance. Since the introduction of market forces is expected to have 
mixed effects on the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the childminders, the 
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effect of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on the 




This chapter presented the theoretical model that explains the effects of the 
introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on employee 
governance, motivation and performance. In section 3.3 we have explained how 
the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector influences the 
employee governance of child-care organisations. On the basis of the assumptions 
presented, the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector is 
expected to have a positive effect on the flexibility of employment contracts, 
tightness of the job design, focus on pay-for-performance in the reward and career 
system, and attractiveness of the reward and career system.  
In section 3.4 we focused on the effects of the introduction of market forces 
in the Dutch child-care sector on employee motivation. The literature regarding 
intrinsic motivation, which is reviewed in section 3.4.1, shows that in order to be 
able to understand behaviour it is necessary to take both the concepts of extrinsic 
and intrinsic motivation into consideration. By combining the social production 
function approach and crowding theory, we have explained how external 
interventions may affect the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of employees.  
On the basis of the theoretical model developed in section 3.4.2, we have 
formulated hypotheses in section 3.4.3 with regard to the expected effects of the 
introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on the extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation of the childminders. The introduction of market forces in this 
sector is expected to affect the employee governance of child-care organisations 
which, in turn, is expected to influence the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the 
childminders. Since the changes in employee governance are expected to have both 
positive and negative consequences for the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the 
childminders, the overall effect of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch 
child-care sector on the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the childminders is 
uncertain. Most changes in employee governance are, however, expected to have 
Explaining employee governance, motivation and performance 
53  
positive effects on the extrinsic motivation and negative effects on the intrinsic 
motivation of the childminders. 
Finally, in section 3.5 we have formulated hypotheses with regard to the 
expected effects of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector 
on the performance of the childminders. Here, we have focused on the quality of 
employee performance. Both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation are expected to 
have a positive effect on quality performance. Since the introduction of market 
forces in the Dutch child-care sector is expected to have mixed effects on the 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the childminders, its effect on the quality  











In Chapter 2, a description was given of the Dutch child-care sector and the 
changes this sector is confronted with. In Chapter 3 hypotheses were derived with 
regard to the possible effects of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch 
child-care sector on the employee governance of child-care organisations, and on 
the employee motivation and performance of the childminders. In order to test the 
hypotheses put forward in Chapter 3, data were collected from 30 Dutch child-care 
organisations. Section 4.2 describes the data collection. Section 4.3 presents the 
operationalisations of the variables. Section 4.4 presents the statistical models that 
are used to test the hypotheses and section 4.5 summarises this chapter. 
 
4.2 Data 
4.2.1 Procedure of data collection 
For this research data have been collected from 30 Dutch child-care organisations. 
Information regarding the year 2003 was collected at the levels of child-care 
organisations, day-care centres and childminders. In addition to collecting 
information on the actual situation in the year 2003, we measured how changes 
over time have been perceived. The perceived changes over time have been 
measured both retrospectively - i.e. how certain aspects have changed over the 
past three years - and prospectively - i.e. how certain aspects are expected to 
change in the coming three years.   
The data collection procedure involved four stages. During the first stage, 
questionnaires were constructed on the basis of the theoretical model. One 
questionnaire was set up for the child-care organisation and one questionnaire was 
set up for the childminders. During the second stage of the data collection, the 
questionnaires were tested in a small pilot study, which was conducted in 
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February 2003 within one child-care organisation. The manager of the child-care 
organisation and the childminders working in the day-care centres of the child-
care organisation were asked to participate in the pilot study. On the basis of the 
pilot study, the questionnaires and set-up of the study were improved. In the third 
stage of the data collection, the improved questionnaires and set-up of the study 
were discussed with experts in the field of child care. The last stage of the data 
collection procedure involved the final data collection, which took place from 
March to September 2004.  
4.2.2 Sample 
In order to be able to explain how the transition of the Dutch child-care sector from 
a welfare sector to a market sector affects the employee governance of child-care 
organisations and the employee motivation and performance of childminders, it is 
necessary to have a sample of organisations that represents child-care 
organisations in different phases of the transition process from a welfare to a 
market organisation.  
First, the extent to which child-care organisations are confronted with 
market forces is influenced by the extent to which they are financially dependent 
on the government. It is important, therefore, that both child-care organisations 
that are financially dependent and child-care organisations that are financially 
independent from the government are included in the sample. The sample that is 
used in this research contains 7 (23%) child-care organisations that have no 
financial relationship at all with the government. Of the child-care organisations 
that do have a subsidy relationship with the government, 15 (50%) are moderately 
dependent and 8 (27%) are highly financially dependent on the government since 
they receive housing subsidies or are currently part of a welfare organisation (see 
Table 1 of Appendix A for the operationalisation).6  
                                                 
6 Since the extent to which child-care organisations are financially dependent on the government is not 
known for the Dutch child-care sector as a whole, it is not possible to test whether or not the child-care 
organisations in our sample in this respect are representative for the population. The percentage (23%) 
of child-care organisations in our sample that have no financial relationship at all with the government, 
i.e. organisations that do not offer subsidised child places, is however similar to that in a research 
conducted in 2003 among 83 Dutch child-care organisations (Pannekoek 2003). In this research, 27% of 
the child-care organisations in the sample do not offer subsidised child places.    
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Second, it can be expected that the extent to which child-care organisations 
are confronted with market forces depends on the area in which they operate. The 
more urbanised the area in which the child-care organisation is operating, the more 
the organisation can be expected to be affected by competition from other child-
care providers and therefore the more the child-care organisation is confronted 
with market forces. The sample is divided into three categories: the urbanised 
western part of the Netherlands, the so-called Randstad (n=12), urban (outside the 
Randstad, n=9) and non-urban (outside the Randstad, n=9) areas. Within these 
three categories a division according to post code areas has been made. The child-
care organisations that have a post code starting with 1, 2 or 3 - which corresponds 
to the western part of the Netherlands - have the highest level of urbanity and are 
categorised as ‘Randstad’. The area in which child-care organisations operate is 
denoted as urban if they operate in an urban environment and have a post code 
other than 1, 2 or 3. Finally, child-care organisations with a post code other than 1, 
2 or 3 that are operating in a non-urban environment have the lowest level of 
urbanity and are denoted as ‘non-urban’.7  Table 4-1 shows that the division of the 
child-care organisations in the sample is representative for the geographically 
spread of all child-care organisations in the Netherlands.8 
 
Table 4-1: Comparison of sample and population with regard to the geographical spread of the child-
care organisations (post code of the main location of the child-care organisation) 
 











































































Source: MO Groep (2002). 
                                                 
7 It is important to note that the urbanity of the child-care organisation is not necessarily the same as the 
urbanity of the day-care centres that are part of the child-care organisation. Child-care organisations 
that have day-care centres all over the Netherlands may for example have their main office in the 
western part of the Netherlands while one of the day-care centres that is included in the sample may be 
operating in a non-urban environment. In the empirical analyses both the urbanity of the child-care 
organisation and the urbanity of the day-care centre will therefore be taken into consideration. 
8 Chi-square analysis corroborates the hypothesis that the distribution of the organisations in the sample 
of this research is similar to the distribution of the population in general. 
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Finally, the size of the child-care organisation may affect the extent to which the 
organisation is confronted with market forces. Very small child-care organisations 
may have an advantage in comparison with large organisations with regard to 
being able to supply child care for a small niche. On the other hand, very large 
organisations may profit from economies of scale and/or economies of scope. 
Therefore, the size of the organisation might influence the extent to which child-
care organisations are confronted with market forces. In the sample, child-care 
organisations with less than 80 day-care and after-school-care child places are not 
taken into account. These small organisations often do not work with a formally 
defined governance structure, but operate foremost on an informal basis, which 
makes it very difficult to investigate the effects of the employee governance of 
these organisations on employee motivation and performance. The sample is 
therefore divided into three size groups: child-care organisations with 80-250 (n=8), 
250-600 (n=11), and more than 600 (n=11) day-care and after-school-care child 
places. Table 4-2 shows that in the sample the large organisations of the population 
are over-represented and the small ones are under-represented.9 
 
Table 4-2: Comparison of sample and population with regard to the number of locations of the child-
care organisations 
 
Number of day-care 
























































Source: Netwerkbureau Uitbreiding Kinderopvang (2003b). 
 
Since the sample contains many large child-care organisations, the 30 child-care 
organisations in the sample cover a large part of the total supply of the Dutch 
child-care sector. Table 4-3 shows that the child-care organisations included in the 
sample cover 11% of the day-care child places and 12% of the day-care and after-
                                                 
9 Chi-square analysis does not corroborate the hypothesis that the distribution of the organisations in 
the sample of this research is similar to the distribution of the population in general. 
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school-care child places of the total population. Given the set-up of the sample and 
the amount of child places it covers, the sample of child-care organisations that 
was chosen in this research is considered to be able to give a representative view of 
the effects that the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector has 
on the employee governance of child-care organisations, and on the employee 
motivation and performance of the childminders working in day care. 
 




Capacity day care   
in child places (2003) 
Capacity day care and after-school care   





2.364 (11 %) 
 
21.053 (12%) 
Total population 110.932 176.623 
Source: Statistics Netherlands (2005) 
4.2.3 Response 
For the final data collection 38 child-care organisations were approached, 
differentiated with regard to the extent to which they are financially dependent on 
the government, the urbanity of the area in which they are located and their size. 
The child-care organisations were selected on the basis of information about these 
three selection criteria, which was available through discussions with child-care 
experts, internet searches and information from the child-care database of the 
Dutch organisation of employers in the welfare and child-care sector (MO Groep). 
 Of the 38 child-care organisations that were approached, 35 were initially 
willing to participate in the study. The three child-care organisations that were not 
willing to participate in the study mentioned lack of time as the most important 
reason for not participating. Of the other 35 child-care organisations, in the end 5 
were not able to find the time to participate in the study and withdrew their 
participation. Of the 38 child-care organisations that were originally approached, 
30 were included in the final sample, therefore, which corresponds to a response of 

























































The managers of the 30 child-care organisations included in the sample were sent a 
written questionnaire about the employee governance of the child-care 
organisation. If the manager was willing to do this, the answers given in the 
questionnaire were discussed in a face-to-face interview. In total, the managers of 
20 of the child-care organisations agreed to conducting a face-to-face interview. 
During a visit to these 20 child-care organisations, the questionnaire and the 
answers given to it were discussed with the manager. In addition, in consultation 
with the managers of the child-care organisations, 1 to 4 day-care centres were 
selected within each child-care organisation. The 10 child-care organisations that 
did not agree to a face-to-face interview returned the completed questionnaire by 
post.10 For these child-care organisations the selection of the day-care centres was 
done by telephone.  
Within the 30 child-care organisations included in the sample, 68 day-care 
centres were selected in total. The location managers of these day-care centres were 
sent a written questionnaire about the employee governance of the day-care centre. 
                                                 
10 One of the child-care organisations did not send the completed questionnaire back. Since this 
organisation’s questionnaires on the levels of the day-care centres and the childminders were received 
back, it was kept in the sample. The questionnaire on organisation level could partially be completed by 
using information that was available through other sources such as the internet and the questionnaires 
of the day-care centres.  
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They were asked to complete the written questionnaire and return it by post. In 
total, 63 day-care managers sent back their completed questionnaire.11 
In addition to completing their questionnaire, the managers of the day-care 
centres were asked to distribute questionnaires amongst the childminders working 
in their day-care centre. A total of 1046 questionnaires about the employee 
motivation and performance of the childminders were distributed among 
childminders working in the 68 selected day-care centres. Of the 1046 
questionnaires that were distributed, 477 were completed and returned, which 
corresponds to a response of 46%.12 It is likely, however, that the actual response 
was slightly higher. In the case of most day-care centres, the manager of the child-
care organisation estimated the number of childminder questionnaires needed for 
the different day-care centres. The estimated number of questionnaires were 
handed over to the manager of the child-care organisation during the face-to-face 
interview or, if preferred, sent directly to the different day-care centres. It is quite 
possible that not all questionnaires that were sent to the day-care centres were 
actually distributed among the childminders. 
The final sample consists of 6 male and 471 female respondents. The 
average age of the childminders is 32 (sd 9.9). On average, the childminders are 
working 4.9 years for the present employer (sd 4.5) and have a contract for 27 
hours a week (sd 7.2). Most of the childminders have a middle-level education 
(81%), 1% of them have a lower education and 18% a higher education. Of the 
childminders 38% have children living at home, and 68% of them have a partner.  
Finally, questionnaires were distributed among childminders who worked 
for a child-care organisation included in the sample but left their job in the years 
2002, 2003 or 2004. By comparing the employee motivation and performance of 
childminders who are currently working in the child-care sector with the employee 
                                                 
11 The missing questionnaires could partially be completed by using information that was available 
through other sources such as the internet and the questionnaires of the organisation and other day-care 
centres within the organisation.  
12 The response ranges from 16% to 71% per child-care organisation with a standard deviation of 12.6. 
Most child-care organisations have a response between 40% and 60%, 8 organisations have a response 




motivation and performance of childminders who have left the sector during the 
past three years, we expect to improve the understanding of the effects of the 
introduction of market forces in the child-care sector on the employee motivation 
and performance of childminders. In total, 10 child-care organisations in the 
sample were willing to approach childminders who used to work for their 
organisation. Questionnaires for the former childminders were sent to the child-
care organisations which distributed the questionnaires among all childminders 
who resigned during the years 2002, 2003 or 2004 or, if preferred, to a selection of 
former childminders who agreed to fill in the questionnaire. In total, 110 
questionnaires were distributed among childminders who worked for a child-care 
organisation in the sample and left their job in the period 2002-2004. Of these 
questionnaires, 36 were received back, which is a response of 33% (see Table 4-4).13 
The final sample of former childminders only consists of female 
respondents. The average age of the former childminders is 36 (sd 11.7). On 
average, the former childminders were working 4.7 years for their last employer 
(sd 4.2) and had a contract for 23 hours a week (sd 8.7). Most of the former 
childminders have a middle-level education (58%), 3% of them have a lower 
education and 39% a higher education. Of the former childminders 47% have 
children at home and 75% have a partner. The most important reasons for the 
former childminders to quit their jobs were: personal reasons such as the birth of 
children and move to another town, lack of development possibilities, and lack of 
fulfilment from the job. After resigning, 78% of the former childminders continued 
a professional career: 36% in the child-care sector, 36% in the care sector, 14% in 




In this research, the effects of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-
care sector on employee governance, motivation and performance are studied. The 
introduction of market forces is expected to affect the employee governance of 
                                                 
13 The response ranges from 0% to 100% per child-care organisation with a standard deviation of 30.7.  
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child-care organisations, which in turn is expected to affect the employee 
motivation and performance of the childminders. Section 4.3.1 describes the 
operationalisation of the extent to which child-care organisations are financially 
independent from the government. Section 4.3.2 presents the operationalisation of 
the employee governance of child-care organisations. In section 4.3.3 the 
operationalisation of the intrinsic and extrinsic rewards childminders receive from 
their job is given. Section 4.3.4 describes the operationalisation of the employee 
motivation of the childminders and section 4.3.5 discusses the operationalisation of 
the employee performance of the childminders. Finally, section 4.3.6 presents the 
operationalisation of the control variables included in the analyses. In order to test 
whether single items form a consistent scale, reliability analysis and Mokken scale 
analysis are conducted.14    
4.3.1 Financial independence  
The extent to which child-care organisations are financially dependent on the 
government is measured by a five-item scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.76 (see 
Table 4-5). The first item in the scale measures whether or not the organisation 
stems from a welfare tradition (no (0) yes; partly (1); yes, fully (2)). The second and 
third item measure whether the child-care organisation currently has a subsidy 
relationship with the government (no (0); yes (1)) and, if so, what percentage of the 
child-places are subsidised, i.e. financed by the municipality. The fourth item in the 
scale measures whether the organisation receives housing subsidies (no (0); yes (1)) 
                                                 
14 Mokken scale analysis is a nonparametric probabilistic version of Guttman scaling. Mokken scale 
analysis displays H-values for the scale as a whole and H(i) coefficients for the separate items. The H(i) 
coefficients indicate how well item i fits the other items for the purpose of ordering respondents. 
Negative H(i)’s are not allowed. H(i) coefficients below 0.3 have weak discrimination power and are 
therefore not considered as part of the scale. As a consequence the H-value - which is a weighted mean 
of the H(i) coefficients - must exceed the value of 0.3 for the items to form a scale. A scale with an H-
value between 0.3 and 0.4 is considered to be a weak scale, a scale with an H-value between 0.4 and 0.5 
an intermediate strong scale and a scale with an H-value > 0.5 a strong scale. For all scales we checked 
whether the assumptions of unidimensionality, local independence, monotonicity, and nonintersection 
are fulfilled. The assumption of unidimensionality states that all items in the test measure the same 
latent trait and local independence requires that an individual’s response to item i is not influenced by 
the responses to other items. The assumption of monotonicity is fulfilled if the probability of giving a 
positive response to an item does not decrease for respondents with increasing values on the latent trait. 
Finally, nonintersection is accomplished if the difficulty order of the item steps is the same for all 
respondents (Sijtsma and Molenaar 2002; Van Schuur 2003).    
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and the last item in the scale measures whether the child-care organisation is 
currently part of a bigger welfare organisation (no (0); yes (1)). Financial 
independence is based on the reciprocal z-scores of the items in the financial 
dependence scale. The descriptives of the financial independence items are given 
in Table 1 of Appendix A. 
 
Table 4-5: Financial independence 
 Cronbach’s alpha1   Mokken H or H(i) value2  
   
Scale financial independence .76 .3 
   
  Welfare background .62 . 
   
  Subsidy relationship .69 . 
   
  Percentage subsidised child-places .68 . 
   
  Housing subsidies .79 . 
   
  Currently part of welfare organisation .77 . 
1  In the columns denoted ‘Cronbach’s alpha’ in section 4.3, the Cronbach’s alpha is given for the total scale and the 
Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted is given for the scale items. 
2 In the columns denoted ‘Mokken H or H(i) value’ in section 4.3, the Mokken H-value is given for the total scale and 
the Mokken H(i)’s are given for the scale items. 
3 No Mokken analysis since the scale is based on z-scores of the items of the scale. 
4.3.2 Employee governance  
The employee governance of child-care organisations is assumed to consist of four 
elements: employment contracts, job design, reward system, and career system. 
The flexibility of employment contracts is measured by the percentage of substitute 
workers within the organisation. The higher the percentage of substitute workers, 
the higher the flexibility of employment contracts. In the analyses, flexibility of 
employment contracts is operationalised as a dichotomous item (lower than 
average percentage of substitute workers (0); higher than average percentage of 
substitute workers (1)). The tightness of the job design of child-care organisations 
is measured by the staff-to-child ratio, which is the number of childminders 
present during opening hours expressed in full-time equivalents per child. The 
lower the staff-to-child ratio, the more children the childminders have under their 
supervision and, thus, the tighter the job design. In the analyses, the tightness of 
the job design is operationalised as a dichotomous item (higher than average staff-
to-child ratio (0); lower than average staff-to-child ratio (1)). With regard to the 
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reward and career system, we distinguish between the focus on pay-for-
performance and the attractiveness of the reward and career system. The focus on 
pay-for-performance in the reward system is measured by asking child-care 
organisations whether or not they sometimes offer childminders a higher wage for 
a better than average performance (no (0); yes (1)). The focus on pay-for-
performance in the career system is measured by asking child-care organisations if 
promotions are based on seniority (0) or performance (1). The attractiveness of the 
reward system is measured by a two-item scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.44 
and a Mokken H-value of 0.59. The two items measure whether childminders are 
being paid according to the requirements laid down in the collective labour 
agreements (0) or receive a higher wage (1), and if the secondary conditions of 
employment are according to (0) or better than (1) the requirements laid down in 
the collective labour agreements. Finally, the attractiveness of the career system is 
measured by a four-item scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.68. The Mokken H-
value of the scale is .43 (see Table 4-6). The first two items in the scale measure to 
what extent the organisations offer childminders possibilities to develop 
themselves through broadening their tasks or following courses (very low (1); very 
high (5)). The third and fourth items in the scale measure how much influence the 
childminders have on the courses that are offered and the policy of the day-care 
centre, respectively (very low (1); very high (5)). The descriptives of the employee 
governance items are given in Table 2 of Appendix A. 
 
Table 4-6: Attractiveness career system  
 Cronbach’s alpha Mokken H or H(i) value 
   
Scale attractiveness career system .68 .43 
   
  Possibilities for broadening tasks .63 .42 
   
  Possibilities for following courses .57 .51 
   
  Influence on courses offered .53 .50 
   
  Influence on policy of day-care centre .72 .30 
4.3.3 Extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
The changes in the employee governance of child-care organisations are expected 
to affect the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards childminders receive from their job. 
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The extrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job are measured by: 
whether or not the childminder has a fixed contract (no (0); yes (1)), whether or not 
the childminder has received a financial bonus for performing well (no (0); yes (1)), 
and the behavioural confirmation childminders receive from others for their work. 
The extent of the behavioural confirmation that childminders receive from others 
for the work they do is measured by a four-item scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.66 and a Mokken H-value of 0.39 (see Table 4-7). Childminders are asked to 
indicate on a five-point scale how much behavioural confirmation they receive for 
their work from the employer, people outside child care, colleagues, and parents 
(very little (1); very much (5)).  
 
Table 4-7: Behavioural confirmation from others 
 Cronbach’s alpha Mokken H or H(i) value 
   
Scale behavioural confirmation from others .66 .39 
   
  Behavioural confirmation from employer .58 .39 
   
  Behavioural confirmation from people outside child care .63 .35 
   
  Behavioural confirmation from colleagues .58 .40 
   
  Behavioural confirmation from parents .58 .41 
 
The intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job are measured by three 
items: the appreciation the childminders receive from the children, work pressure 
(reciprocal measure), and the possibilities for development. The appreciation the 
childminders receive from the children is measured by a single item. Childminders 
are asked to indicate on a five-point scale the amount of appreciation they receive 
from the children (very low (1); very high (5)). Work pressure is also measured by 
a single item. Childminders are asked to indicate on a five-point scale the level of 
work pressure at the day-care centre (very low (1); very high (5)). Finally, the 
possibilities for personal development are measured by a four-item scale with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.74 and a Mokken H-value of 0.47 (see Table 4-8). The first 
two items measure to what extent the childminders have possibilities to develop 
themselves through broadening their tasks or following courses (very low (1); very 
high (5)). The last two items measure the extent to which the childminders are able 
to influence the courses that are offered and the policy of the day-care centre (very 
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low (1); very high (5)). The descriptives of the extrinsic and intrinsic reward items 
are given in Table 3 of Appendix A. 
 
Table 4-8: Possibilities for personal development 
 Cronbach’s alpha Mokken H or H(i) value 
   
Scale possibilities for personal development .74 .47 
   
  Possibilities for broadening tasks .66 .50 
   
  Possibilities for following courses .63 .52 
   
  Influence on courses offered .66 .48 
   
  Influence on policy of day-care centre .75 .37 
4.3.4 Employee motivation  
Extrinsic motivation is measured by a four-item scale taken from Denton et al. 
(2002). The scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.71 and a Mokken H-value of 0.43 (see 
Table 4-9). Childminders are asked to indicate on a five-point scale to what extent 
they agree with the following statements: my benefits are good; my chances for 
promotion are good; my job security is good; and I feel that I am being paid fairly 
(disagree completely (1); agree completely (5)).  
 
Table 4-9: Extrinsic motivation  
 Cronbach’s alpha Mokken H or H(i) value 
   
Scale extrinsic motivation .71 .42 
   
  My benefits are good .58 .49 
   
  My chances for promotion are good .68 .38 
   
  My job security is good .74 .30 
   
  I feel that I am being paid fairly .56 .51 
 
Intrinsic motivation is measured by a two-item scale taken from Denton et al. 
(2002).15 The scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.66 and a Mokken H-value of 0.58. 
                                                 
15 The scale from Denton et al. (2002) originally consisted of three items. One item (my job gives me a 
sense of purpose in life – a reason to get up in the morning) did not scale well and was left out. 
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Childminders are asked to indicate on a five-point scale to what extent they agreed 
with the following statements: My job gives me a sense of fulfilment; and, my job is 
interesting (disagree completely (1); agree completely (5)). The descriptives of the 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation items are given in Table 4 of Appendix A. 
4.3.5 Employee performance 
Finally, we will focus on the effects of the introduction of market forces in the 
Dutch child-care sector on the employee performance of the childminders. In doing 
so we focus on the quality of employee performance. The quality of employee 
performance is measured by four individual measures of employee performance 
and four items that measure the level of performance of the day-care centre the 
childminder works for. 
The first measure of the individual performance items is a self-rating 
measure of employee performance taken from Völker and Flap (2003). The 
performance of the childminder in comparison with that of his or her colleagues is 
measured by a two-item scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.64 and a Mokken H-
value of 0.56. Childminders are asked to indicate on a five-point scale how well 
and how much the childminder works in comparison with his or her colleagues 
(much worse (1); much better (5)). The second measure of the performance of the 
childminders is the extent to which the childminders are willing to conduct tasks 
that are not part of their job description. The items measure the context 
performance of the childminder and are taken from Tyler and Blader (2000). 
Context performance is measured by a two-item scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.52 and a Mokken H-value of 0.37. Childminders are asked to report on a five-
point scale about their willingness to perform additional tasks that are not 
expected from them regularly, and to think constructively about how the 
organisation they work for could be improved (very low (1); very high (5)). The 
last items that measure the performance of the childminders are the number of 
days they were absent in 2003 due to illness (lower than average (0); average (1); 
higher than average (1)) and the childminders’ intention to change jobs (stay (0); 
leave (1)). The descriptives of the individual performance items are given in Table 
5 of Appendix A. 
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In addition to the individual performance items, childminders are asked to 
rate the general level of performance in the day-care centre they work for. The first 
item measures the extent to which a certain number of quality aspects are realised. 
The extent to which day-care centres are able to realise certain quality aspects is 
measured by a six-item scale taken from Turksema (2000). The scale has a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.81 and a Mokken H-value of 0.49 (see Table 4-10). 
Childminders are asked to indicate on a five-point scale what extent the following 
quality aspects are realised: the presence of stimulating toys, varied activities, 
continuity of the relationship between child and childminder, stability of the child 
group, balanced placement policy and signalling developmental disorders (very 
low (1); very high (5)).  
 
Table 4-10: Quality aspects 
 Cronbach’s alpha Mokken H or H(i) value 
   
Scale quality aspects .81 .49 
   
  Stimulating toys .79 .47 
   
  Varied activities .78 .51 
   
  Relationship child and childminder .78 .50 
   
  Stability child-group .76 .54 
   
  Balanced placing policy .79 .50 
   
  Signalling developmental disorders .81 .40 
 
The second item that measures the general level of performance of the day-care 
centres is the extent to which day-care centres pay attention to professionalism and 
quality of care, i.e. the extent to which childminders are able to deliver high quality 
care. This is measured by a two-item scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.86 and a 
Mokken H-value of 0.79. Childminders are asked to report on a five-point scale 
about the level of attention that is paid to professionalism of care and quality of 
care (very low (1); very high (5)). Finally, childminders are asked to report the 
general levels of sick leave and personnel turnover in the day-care centre on a scale 
from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). The descriptives of the items measuring the 
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general level of performance of the day-care centres are given in Table 6 of 
Appendix A. 
4.3.6 Control variables 
In the analyses we control for both organisation, location and childminder 
characteristics. The organisation and location characteristics included are the size 
of the child-care organisation/location measured in terms of number of child places 
(low, medium, high) and the urbanity of the area in which the child-care 
organisation/location is situated (rural (1); urban (2); or the western part of the 
Netherlands (3)). The childminder characteristics included are: age (< 25 (0); 25-39 
(1); > 39 (2)), job tenure (< 5 (0); > 5 (1)), educational level (low (0); high (1)), 
whether or not the childminder has a partner (no (0); yes (1)), whether or not the 
childminder has children at home (no (0); yes (1)), and the number of hours the 
childminder works per week (< 20 (0); 20-34 (1); > 34 (2)). The descriptives of the 
control variables are given in Table 7 of Appendix A. 
 
4.4 Statistical models 
4.4.1 Analyses on organisation level 
The data on the organisation level are analysed to see whether there are, as 
expected, differences in employee governance between child-care organisations 
depending on whether or not they are financially dependent on the government. 
For each employee governance element, linear regression analyses are conducted 
with financial independence as the independent variable. The flexibility of 
employment contracts, the tightness of the job design, and the attention paid to 
pay-for-performance in the reward and career system, are measured with dummy 
variables. Logistic regression analyses are performed, therefore, to explain the 
flexibility of employment contracts, tightness of the job design and focus on pay-
for-performance. Ordinary regression analyses are performed to explain the 
attractiveness of the reward and career system. The urbanity and size of the child-
care organisation are included in the analyses as control variables. Two-sided tests 
are performed at the 0.05 significance level. Cox and Snell R-squares for the logistic 
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regression analyses and adjusted R-squares for the ordinary regression analyses 
are reported 
4.4.2 Analyses on employee level 
Given the hierarchical data structure - the childminders are working in day-care 
centres and the day-care centres belong to certain child-care organisations - it is 
necessary to take into account the influence of the child-care organisation and the 
day-care centre when conducting analyses on employee level. Since multilevel 
analysis acknowledges the hierarchical structure of the data by taking into account 
the variance on different levels, multilevel analysis is used for the analyses on 
employee level.16  
As the first step in the analysis, the empty model is estimated. In the empty 
model the intercept and the variances on organisation, location and employee level 
are estimated. Subsequently, predictors are added to the model. In the analyses, 
only fixed effects are included.17 In addition to individual level predictor variables, 
the organisation and/or location means of predictor variables are included in the 
analysis if these means significantly improve model fit. The significance of the 
predictors is tested by computing the increase in model fit. The increase in model 
fit is represented by the decrease in deviance and follows a chi-square distribution 
with the number of added predictors as degrees of freedom (Goldstein 1995).18 In 
order to prevent a strong increase in degrees of freedom non-significant control 
variables on employee level are excluded from the multilevel analyses. The effects 
of the predictor variables are comparable with regression coefficients in ordinary 
regression (Van Yperen and Snijders 2000). The coefficients reported in the tables 
are unstandardised regression coefficients and the R-squares reported are 
                                                 
16 Multilevel analysis is a type of regression analysis that takes into account the hierarchical structure of 
the data. Multilevel analysis is used because ordinary regression analysis may lead to unreliable results  
when applied to hierarchical data structures (e.g. employees within organisations) because the 
assumption of independent observations is violated (Snijders and Bosker 1999).  
17 The effects of predictor variables are fixed by default, i.e. the effects of predictors are assumed not to 
differ between groups. In a multilevel analysis it is also possible to test if the effects of predictors differs 
between groups, which is done by including random slopes. Since the inclusion of random slopes did 
not lead to a significant improvement of the model, random slopes are not included.   
18 For logistic analyses it is not possible to calculate the deviance. 
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unadjusted R-squares.19 Two-sided tests are performed at the 0.05 significance 
level. Interaction variables are defined as the product of two centered variables. 
Finally, checks of linearity are conducted. For predictor variables that do not 
describe a linear relationship with the dependent variables, categorised variables 
are included in the analyses. 
 Three sets of multilevel analyses are conducted. First, analysis was done on 
the effects of employee governance on the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
childminders derive from their job. Second, the extent to which the extrinsic and 
intrinsic rewards affect the employee motivation of the childminders was analysed, 
and finally the effects of employee motivation on employee performance were 
analysed. In the multilevel analyses we control for both organisation, location and 
childminder characteristics. The size of the child-care organisation and the 
urbanity and size of the child-care location are included in the analyses.20 The 
childminder characteristics included are: age, job tenure, educational level, 
whether or not the childminder has a partner, whether or not the childminder has 
children at home, and the number of hours the childminder works per week.  
4.4.3 Missing values 
In order to solve the problem of missing values in our analyses we created dummy 
variables for child-care organisations or childminders with a missing value on a 
categorical variable or, if possible, we imputed data (Allison 2002). For the 
employee governance elements flexibility of employment contracts, tightness of job 
design, pay-for-performance of the reward system, and attractiveness of the 
reward system, missing values were included in the analyses with the use of 
dummies. For the employee governance elements pay-for-performance of career 
system and attractiveness of career system, there were no missing values. For the 
size of the location, missing values were imputed on the basis of other data sources 
                                                 
19 Adjusted R-squares are not developed for multilevel models. The unadjusted R-squares are calculated 
according to the method of Snijders and Bosker (1999, p. 104 and p. 225).   
20 The size of the child-care organisation and child-care location are uncorrelated and can therefore be 
included simultaneously in the analysis. The urbanity of the child-care organisation and child-care 





such as the number of groups instead of the number of child places. For missing 
values on one item in a scale containing at least three items, the missing item in the 
scale was imputed by using the mean of the other items in the scale. For the scales 
on employee level which measure the possibilities for development, behavioural 
confirmation from others, extrinsic motivation and realisation of quality aspects, 
missing values on one item in the scale were imputed by using the mean of the 
other items in the scale. Finally, for the extrinsic rewards type of contract and 
financial bonus and all control variables on employee level, missing values were 
included in the analyses with the use of dummies. Dummy variables created for 
child-care organisations or childminders with a missing value on a categorical 




This chapter presented the data for analysing the effects of the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on the employee governance of child-
care organisations, as well as the employee motivation and performance of 
childminders. The data were collected from March to September 2004. In total, 
1046 questionnaires were distributed among childminders working in 68 day-care 
centres selected from 30 Dutch child-care organisations and 110 questionnaires 
were distributed among childminders who worked for a child-care organisation in 
the sample and left their job during the years 2002, 2003 or 2004. Of the 1046 
questionnaires distributed among the childminders who are currently working in 
the child-care sector, 477 were returned, which is a response of 46%. Of the 
childminders who quit their job during the past years, 36 returned the 
questionnaire, which is a response of 33%. Section 4.3 presented the 
operationalisations of the variables and section 4.4 presented the statistical models 










In this chapter, we will present the descriptive analyses of the employee 
governance of child-care organisations and the employee motivation and 
performance of childminders. Section 5.2 presents the employee governance of 
child-care organisations. Section 5.3 focuses on the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
childminders derive from their job, and section 5.4 reports on the employee 
motivation of the childminders. Section 5.5 discusses the descriptive analyses of 
the employee performance of the childminders. Section 5.6 focuses on the 
differences between childminders who are currently working in the child-care 
sector and childminders who have left this sector. Finally, section 5.7 summarises 
this chapter.  
 
5.2 Employee governance  
5.2.1 The employee governance of child-care organisations 
As explained in Chapter 3, the employee governance of child-care organisations 
represents the way in which the child-care organisations have been structured in 
order for the childminders to be able to carry out their work. We presume that 
employee governance can be described by four elements: employment contracts, 
job design, reward system, and career system. Child-care organisations are 
expected to change their employment contracts, job design, reward system, and 
career system in order to increase personnel efficiency. The descriptives of the 
employee governance items are given in Table 2 of Appendix A.  
 The flexibility of the employment contracts is measured by the percentage 
of substitute workers within the organisation. The higher the percentage of 
substitute workers, the higher the flexibility of employment contracts, and the 
easier the number of childminders can be adjusted to the number of children 
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present in the day-care centre, i.e. the higher the level of personnel efficiency.21 The 
percentage of substitute workers in the child-care organisations in the sample 
ranges from 0 to 38. On average 15% of the childminders are substitute workers. 
Most childminders working in the child-care sector therefore have a permanent 
position. 
The tightness of the job design of child-care organisations is measured by 
the staff-to-child ratio. The lower the staff-to-child ratio, the more children the 
childminders have under their supervision and the tighter the job design.22 As 
explained in Chapter 2, the staff-to-child ratio is the ratio between the number of 
full-time childminders and the number of children that are present during the 
opening hours at the day-care centre. The collective labour agreements in the child-
care sector state that every certified childminder is allowed to look after a 
maximum number of children at the same time, which is dependent upon the age 
of the children. On average, two childminders are required for a group of twelve 
children between ages 0 and 4 (Ministry of Social Affairs & Employment 2002). The 
average staff-to-child ratio that is required for groups with children of mixed ages 
is therefore 0.17. The staff-to-child ratio of the child-care organisations in the 
sample ranges from 0.11 to 0.31, with an average of 0.21.23 A staff-to-child ratio of 
0.21 means that there is about 1 full-time childminder per 5 children. Therefore, on 
average, the childminders working in the child-care organisations in the sample 
have fewer children under their supervision than the number that is stipulated in 
the staff-to-child ratio requirements.24 
                                                 
21 It is important to note that too much flexibility may decrease the quality of care. From a quality point 
of view it is desirable that groups always have the same childminders.  
22 As has been explained in Chapter 2, a decrease in staff-to-child ratio might increase the efficiency at 
the expense of the quality of care. In making decisions with regard to the staff-to-child ratio, such as 
decisions with regard to the flexibility of employment contracts, child-care organisations therefore need 
to find a balance between efficiency and quality of care. 
23 The staff-to-child ratio is calculated on the basis of the formula of the MO Groep (2002) and equals the 
total childminder occupancy at the day-care centre divided by the number of children present at the 
day-care centre during opening hours. Differences in the staff-to-child ratio due to differences in the 
ages of the children are not taken into consideration.    
24 The outcome of our measurement of the staff-to-child ratio is comparable to the staff-to-child ratio 
found in a recent study by Vermeer et al. (2005). In this research the staff-to-child ratio, which is based 
upon empirical observation, ranges from 0.10 to 0.32, with an average of 0.22.  
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With regard to the reward and career system, we distinguish between the 
focus on pay-for-performance and the attractiveness of the reward and career 
system. The focus on pay-for-performance in the reward and career system is 
measured by asking child-care organisations whether or not they reward according 
to performance and if promotions are based on seniority or performance. Of the 
child-care organisations in the sample, 30% claim to sometimes reward 
childminders for displaying an above average work effort, whereas the chance to 
receive a promotion is primarily determined by performance in 93% of the child-
care organisations. The focus on pay-for-performance is therefore low in the 
reward system and high in the career system of the child-care organisations in the 
sample. 
The attractiveness of the reward system is measured by the extent to which 
child-care organisations reward according to or above the level of the collective 
labour agreement. Of the child-care organisations in the sample, 14% offer 
childminders a reward that is bigger than is necessary on the basis of the collective 
labour agreement, whereas 41% of the child-care organisations offer a package of 
secondary employment conditions that is more extensive than is necessary 
according to the collective labour agreement. The attractiveness of the career 
system is the final element of the governance structure that is measured. The first 
item measures how many possibilities childminders are offered to broaden their 
tasks. Of the child-care organisations in the sample, 10% offer few possibilities, 
57% not few but also not many possibilities and 33% of the child-care organisations 
claim to offer childminders many to very many possibilities to broaden their tasks. 
Furthermore, in 3% of the child-care organisations childminders have few 
possibilities to follow courses, in 37% of the child-care organisations they receive 
not few but also not many possibilities, and in 60% of the child-care organisations 
there are many to very many possibilities to follow courses. The influence that 
childminders have on the courses offered is low in 10% of the child-care 
organisations. In 40% of the child-care organisations their influence is not low but 
also not high, and in 50% of the organisations it is high. Finally, regarding the 
influence that childminders have on the policy of the organisation, 13% of the 
child-care organisations report that it is low, 50% that it is not low but also not 
high, and 37% of the child-care organisations state that the influence is high.  
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5.2.2 Perceived development of employee governance over time 
In addition to measuring the employee governance of the child-care organisations 
at the time of data collection, we asked child-care organisations to report on a five-
point scale (large decrease .. large increase) how they have perceived the 












Figure 5-1: Development employee governance over time (1 = large decrease .. 5 = large increase). 
 
The child-care organisations perceive a trend of increasing flexibility of 
employment contracts over time. They report an increase in the percentage of 
childminders who have a contract for a flexible amount of hours over the past 
three years (3.41), while for the upcoming three years a further increase in 
flexibility of employment contracts is expected (3.60). Further, the child-care 
organisations perceive an increase in focus on pay-for-performance in the career 
system over the past three years (3.34). No change in focus on pay-for-performance 
in the reward system over the past three years is perceived (3.17). For the future, an 
increase in focus on pay-for-performance in both the reward (3.43) and career 
(3.40) system is expected. Finally, the child-care organisations report an increase in 
                                                 
25 The descriptives of the perceived development of employee governance over time, measured by t-
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the attractiveness of the reward (4.10, 3.55) and career (3.45, 3.28) system over time. 
The increase in the attractiveness of the reward system that is expected for the 
future is, however, significantly lower than the increase in the attractiveness of the 
reward system that is perceived to have taken place in the past three years.26 
According to the child-care organisations, the tightness of the job design has not 
changed over time (2.96, 3.07).  
The reason why no change in tightness of the job design is observed might 
partly be due to how the perception of a change in the tightness of the job design 
was measured. This was done by asking child-care organisations how ‘the amount 
of time the staff on the group is incomplete’ has changed over the past three years 
and is expected to change in the coming three years (large decrease .. large 
increase). As explained in Chapter 2, in the Dutch child-care sector there are strict 
requirements with regard to the maximum number of children a childminder is 
allowed to look after. During a restricted amount of time child-care organisations 
are, however, allowed to deviate from this rule. Previously, child-care 
organisations were allowed to deviate from this rule one hour a day at most - after 
opening hours and before closing time - since at those times less children are 
usually present in the group (Ministry of Social Affairs & Employment 2002). Over 
time the possibilities to deviate from the staff-to-child ratio requirements have, 
however, increased from one hour a day to three hours a day (BOinK, 
Branchevereniging Ondernemers in de Kinderopvang and MO Groep 2004). The 
amount of time the staff on the group is allowed to be incomplete has therefore 
increased. Moreover, due to an increasing pressure to raise efficiency, child-care 
organisations can be expected to make use of these possibilities.  
Despite the fact that child-care organisations are legally allowed to deviate 
from the staff-to-child ratio requirements during part of the day, the child-care 
organisations in the sample responded very emotional to the question how ‘the 
amount of time the staff on the group is incomplete’ has changed over time. This 
might be due to the fact that the data were collected at the beginning of 2004, 
before the possibility of deviation from the staff-to-child ratio requirements 
                                                 
26 A paired t-test shows that the difference between perceived and expected development over time is 
significant at 1%.  
Chapter 5 
80 
increased from one hour to three hours a day. Allowing an incomplete staff on the 
group was perceived, by some of the child-care organisations, as illegal and the 
question was therefore dismissed as not relevant since the staff was said to never 
be incomplete on the group. Of the organisations in the sample that did respond to 
the question, the majority reports no change over time. One organisation reports 
that the amount of time the staff on the group is incomplete has increased over the 
past three years and four organisations expect an increase for the coming three 
years in the amount of time the staff on the group will be incomplete. 
Since a tight job design puts pressure on the work of the childminders, we 
could use work pressure as a proxy for the tightness of the job design. Figure 5-2 
displays the perceived development in work pressure that is reported by child-care 
organisations, managers of child-care locations, and childminders. Child-care 
organisations do not perceive a change in work pressure over time (2.97, 3.10). 
Managers of child-care locations (3.61, 3.32) and childminders (3.75, 3.51) do, 











Figure 5-2: Development of work pressure over time (1 = large decrease .. 5 = large increase). 
 
                                                 
27 Paired t-tests show that the increase in work pressure that is expected for the future is significantly 






















All in all, child-care organisations perceive an increase over time in flexibility of 
employment contracts, focus on pay-for-performance in the reward and career 
system, and attractiveness of the reward and career system. Despite the fact that 
the child-care organisations in the sample claim that the tightness of the job design 
and work pressure have not changed over time, the finding that both the managers 
of child-care locations and the childminders perceive an increase in work pressure 
and the fact that the possibilities for child-care organisations to deviate from the 
required staff-to-child ratio have increased over time, suggest that the tightness of 
the job design may have also increased over time.  
 
5.3 Extrinsic and intrinsic rewards  
5.3.1 The extrinsic and intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job 
Differences in employee governance between child-care organisations are expected 
to influence the employee motivation of the childminders. In the first place, 
employee governance is expected to influence the extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation of the childminders by affecting the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that 
they derive from their job.28 
The extrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job are measured by 
whether or not they have a fixed contract, whether or not they have received a 
financial bonus for doing a good job, and the behavioural confirmation they 
receive for their work from others such as their employer, colleagues and parents 
(very low .. very high). Of the childminders in the sample, 85% have fixed contract, 
whereas 7% of them claim to have received a financial bonus for performing well 
on the job. Further, the childminders claim to receive high behavioural 
confirmation from others for the work they do (3.55). 
The intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job are measured by 
three items: the appreciation the childminders receive from the children, work 
pressure (reciprocal measure), and the possibilities for development. Childminders 
are asked to indicate on a five-point scale (very low .. very high) to what extent 
                                                 
28 The descriptives of the extrinsic and intrinsic reward items are given in Table 2 of Appendix B. 
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they derive these three rewards from their job. The childminders in the sample 
report that they receive a lot of appreciation (4.28) from the children. According to 
the childminders the work pressure, however, is high (3.44). Finally, the 
possibilities for development are according to the childminders not low but also 
not high (2.96).  
5.3.2 Perceived development of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards over time 
We also asked the childminders how they perceive the development of extrinsic 
and intrinsic rewards over time. The results are shown in Figure 5-3.29 The 
development of extrinsic rewards over time is measured by the development of 
financial rewards (large decrease .. large increase). According to the childminders 
the financial rewards have, on average, increased over the past three years (3.29). 
For the future, the childminders do not expect a change in financial rewards (2.91). 
The development of intrinsic rewards over time is measured by the development 
of work pressure over time (large decrease .. large increase). According to the 
majority of the childminders, the work pressure has increased over the past three 
years (3.75).30 A further increase is expected in the future (3.51), although this 
expected increase is significantly lower than the increase in work pressure that is 
perceived to have taken place in the past three years.31 Given that work pressure is 
a reciprocal measure of intrinsic rewards, the childminders perceive a decrease in 




                                                 
29 The descriptives of the perceived development of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards over time, measured 
by t-tests of the difference between mean and test value 3 (no change), are given in Table 2 of Appendix 
B. 
30 The increase in work pressure that is perceived by the childminders in the sample is in accordance 
with the results found by the largest Dutch Trade Union Federation, FNV. In 2005 this organisation 
conducted a survey among 193 childminders working in the Dutch child-care sector. According to 58% 
of these childminders, the work pressure increased after the introduction of the new Act on Child Care 
on 1 January 2005 (FNV 2005b).   
31 A paired t-test shows that the difference between perceived and expected development over time is 












Figure 5-3: Development of extrinsic rewards (financial rewards) and intrinsic rewards (work 
pressure) over time (1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase).  
 
5.4 Employee motivation 
5.4.1 The extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the childminders 
The extrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job are expected to positively 
affect extrinsic motivation, whereas the intrinsic rewards are expected to positively 
affect intrinsic motivation. Both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation are measured on 
a five-point scale (very low .. very high) taken from Denton et al. (2002).32 The 
extrinsic motivation of the childminders is measured with a four-item scale. Of the 
childminders in the sample 38% agree with the proposition ‘I make good money’ 
and 22% agree with the proposition ‘My chances for promotion are good’. The job 
security is judged positively by 66% of the childminders. Finally, more than half of 
the people in the sample do not believe they are being paid what they are worth. 
On average the childminders display an extrinsic motivation of 3.21. The intrinsic 
motivation of the childminders is measured with a two-item scale. The 
childminders report a very high intrinsic motivation (4.42): 95% of them receive a 
                                                 
32 See Chapter 4 for the scale analyses and Table 4 of Appendix A for the descriptives of the items in the 
















sense of fulfilment from the job and 90% of the childminders regard their work as 
interesting. 
5.4.2 Perceived development of employee motivation over time 
The childminders are also asked to report the perceived development in employee 
motivation over time (see Figure 5-4).33 The perceived development in extrinsic 
motivation is measured by the development in satisfaction with the financial 
rewards childminders derive from their job (large decrease .. large increase). 
According to the childminders the extrinsic motivation has decreased slightly over 
the past three years (2.86). A further decrease in extrinsic motivation is expected to 
take place in the future (2.87). The perceived development in intrinsic motivation is 
measured by the development in the fulfilment the childminders derive from their 
job (large decrease .. large increase). The childminders report that, on average, over 
the past three years their intrinsic motivation has increased slightly (3.17). For the 











Figure 5-4: Development of employee motivation over time (1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase). 
 
                                                 
33 The descriptives of the perceived development of employee motivation over time, measured by t-tests 
















5.5 Employee performance  
5.5.1 The employee performance of the childminders  
Finally, we will focus on the effects of the introduction of market forces in the 
Dutch child-care sector on the employee performance of the childminders. In doing 
so, we focus on the quality of employee performance. The quality of employee 
performance is measured by four individual measures of employee performance 
and four items that measure the level of performance of the day-care centre the 
childminder works for.34  
The first measure of the individual performance items is a self-rating 
measure of employee performance taken from Völker and Flap (2003). The 
majority of the childminders (58%) report that their performance is comparable to 
that of their colleagues, 2% of them report that their performance is worse than that 
of their colleagues, and 40% of the childminders claim that their performance is 
better or much better than the performance of their colleagues.  
The second measure of the performance of the childminders is the extent to 
which they are willing to conduct tasks that are not part of their job description. 
Childminders are asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (disagree completely) to 5 
(agree completely) how often they conduct tasks that are beyond the scope of their 
job description and how often they actively engage in thinking about how the 
organisation they work for could be improved. The items measure the context 
performance of the childminder and are taken from Tyler and Blader (2000). The 
childminders display a high context performance (4.05).  
The last items that measure the performance of the childminders are the 
number of days they were absent in 2003 due to illness and their intention to 
change jobs. The number of days the childminders were absent in 2003 due to 
illness ranges from 0 to 200 days. On average, the childminders in the child-care 
organisations were absent 8.4 days due to illness. Finally, of the childminders in 
the sample, 16% want to leave the child-care organisation during the coming years.  
In addition to the individual performance items, childminders are asked to 
rate the general level of performance at the day-care centre they work for. The first 
                                                 
34 The descriptives of the employee performance items are given in Table 4 of Appendix B. 
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item measures the extent to which a certain number of quality aspects are realised, 
a scale taken from Turksema (2000). Childminders are asked to report on a five-
point scale (not at all .. to a very high degree) to what extent the following quality 
aspects are realised: the presence of stimulating toys, varied activities, continuity of 
the relationship between child and childminder, stability of the child group, 
balanced placement policy and signalling developmental disorders. According to 
the childminders, all items are realised to a satisfactory degree. On average, the 
childminders report that the extent to which these quality aspects are realised in 
the day-care centre they work at is high (3.54).  
The second item that measures the general level of performance of the day-
care centres is the extent to which day-care centres pay attention to professionalism 
and quality of care. Childminders are asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (very 
little) to 5 (very much) how much attention is paid to professionalism and quality 
of care. Childminders report that a lot of attention is given to professionalism and 
quality of care (4.08).  
Finally, childminders are asked to report the general levels of sick leave 
and personnel turnover at the day-care centre on a scale from 1 (very low) to 5 
(very high). The childminders in the sample state that the levels of sick leave (2.70) 
and personnel turnover (2.76) are rather low. Of the childminders in the sample, 
41% report that the general level of sick leave at the day-care centre is low, 39% say 
that the level of sick leave is not low but also not high, and 20% of the 
childminders indicate that the general level of sick leave at the day-care centre is 
high. The general level of personnel turnover is thought to be low by 34% of the 
childminders, 47% of them report that the turnover is not low but also not high, 
and 19% of the childminders state that the general level of personnel turnover at 
the day-care centre is high.  
5.5.2 Perceived development of employee performance over time 
Finally, childminders are asked to report the perceived development of employee 
performance over time.35 Regarding the individual performance of the 
childminders, we have only measured the perceived development over the past 
                                                 
35 The descriptives of the perceived development of employee performance over time, measured by t-
tests of the difference between mean and test value 3 (no change), are given in Table 5 of Appendix B. 
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three years. The perceived development of the individual performance of the 
childminders is measured by asking childminders to report whether the changes in 
the day-care centre they work for have effected the effort they put into their work 
(decrease (0); no change (1); increase (2)). The majority of the childminders (62%) 
report that the changes have not influenced their work effort, 13% of them say that 
the changes have decreased the effort they put into their work, and 25% state that 
the changes have increased their work effort. On average, the changes in the day-
care centres are perceived, therefore, to have increased the effort that the 
childminders put into work.  
Further, the childminders are asked to report the development of the 
general level of performance at the day-care centre they work for (see Figure 5-5). 
First, childminders are asked to indicate on a five-point scale (large decrease .. 
large increase) how the attention paid to the professionalism and quality of care 
has developed over time. According to the childminders, on average, this attention 
has increased (3.96) over the past three years. A further increase (3.89) in attention 
paid to professionalism and quality of care is expected to take place in the future.36 
Second, the childminders are asked to report the development of sick leave over 
time. They perceive, on average, an increase in the level of sick leave over the past 
three years (3.15). For the future no change is expected (3.03). Finally, the 
childminders are asked to report the development of personnel turnover over time. 
When it comes to this, the childminders signal a small increase over the past three 







                                                 
36 The result from a paired t-test shows that the expected future increase in attention for professionalism 
and quality of care is significantly lower than the perceived increase in attention for professionalism 













Figure 5-5: Development of employee performance over time (1=large decrease ..  5=large increase). 
 
5.6 Present versus former childminders 
5.6.1 Differences between present and former childminders  
Since childminders might have resigned from their job due to the introduction of 
market forces in the child-care sector, focussing on childminders who are currently 
working in the child-care sector alone might not provide a good representation of 
the effects that the transition of the child-care sector has had on the employee 
motivation and performance of childminders. By comparing the employee 
motivation and performance of childminders who are currently working in the 
child-care sector with that of childminders who have left the sector during the past 
three years, a better understanding of the effects of the introduction of market 
forces in the child-care sector on the employee motivation and performance of 
childminders is expected to be achieved. 
 In section 5.6.2 the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that former childminders 
derived from their job are described and the level of rewards of former 
childminders is compared with the level of rewards of the childminders who are 
currently working in the child-care sector.37 Section 5.6.3 focuses on the differences 
                                                 















in employee motivation between present and former childminders, whereas 
section 5.6.4 focuses on the differences in employee performance between present 
and former childminders.38 
5.6.2 Differences in extrinsic and intrinsic rewards  
The extrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job are measured by whether 
or not the childminder has a fixed contract, whether or not the childminder has 
received a financial bonus for performing well on the job, and the behavioural 
confirmation childminders receive from their work from others such as their 
employer, colleagues and parents (very low .. very high). Of the former 
childminders, 77% had a fixed contract, whereas 6% claim to have received a 
financial bonus for doing a good job. Further, the former childminders claim to 
have received high behavioural confirmation  from others for the work they did 
(3.62). Former childminders do not differ significantly from current childminders 
with regard to the extrinsic rewards they claim to have derived from their job. 
The intrinsic rewards the childminders derived from their job are 
measured on a five point scale (very low .. very high). The former childminders 
report that they received a lot of appreciation (4.42) from the children. According 
to the former childminders the work pressure, however, was high (3.56), and the 
possibilities for development were low (2.51). The differences between present and 
former childminders with regard to the intrinsic rewards they claim to derive from 
their job are displayed in Figure 5-6. Analysis of variance shows that former 
childminders claim to have derived significantly fewer possibilities for 




                                                 
38 The descriptives of the employee motivation and employee performance items are given in Tables 8 
and 10 of Appendix B. 
39 The analyses of the variances of the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards of present versus former 













Figure 5-6: Intrinsic rewards present and former childminders (1= very low ..  5= very high). 
 
We also asked the former childminders how they perceived the development in 
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards over the past three years (large decrease .. large 
increase). The development of extrinsic rewards over time is measured by the 
development of financial rewards. According to the former childminders the 
financial rewards have, on average, increased over the past three years (3.41). The 
development of intrinsic rewards over time is measured by the development of 
work pressure over time. According to the majority of the former childminders, the 
work pressure has increased over the past three years (4.32). Given that work 
pressure is a reciprocal measure of intrinsic rewards the former childminders, 
therefore, perceive a decrease in intrinsic rewards over time.  
In Figure 5-7 the differences between present and former childminders 
with regard to the perceived development of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards over 
the past three years are presented. Analysis of variance indicates that former 
childminders perceive a significantly higher increase in work pressure over the 
past three years in comparison with present childminders. Present and former 
childminders do not differ significantly with regard to the perceived development 


























Figure 5-7: Perceived development extrinsic (financial) and intrinsic rewards (work pressure) 
reported by present and former childminders (1=large decrease .. 5=large increase). 
5.6.3 Differences in employee motivation  
The extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the childminders are also measured on a 
five-point scale (very low .. very high). The former childminders report that their 
extrinsic motivation was not low but also not high (2.89). Of the former 
childminders in the sample, only 22% agree with the proposition ‘I made good 
money’ and nobody agrees with the proposition ‘My chances for promotion were 
good’. The security of their former job is, however, judged positively by 69% of the 
childminders. Finally, almost half of the people in the sample do not believe they 
received a fair payment. The former childminders were more strongly motivated 
by the intrinsic rewards they received from their job. They report a high intrinsic 
motivation (3.94): 75% of the former childminders received a sense of fulfilment 
from the job and 64% of them regarded their work as interesting. With regard to 
the perceived development in employee motivation over the past three years, the 
former childminders report no change in their extrinsic and intrinsic motivation.  
Figure 5-8 shows the employee motivation of present versus former 
childminders. Both of these groups report a higher intrinsic motivation than 
extrinsic motivation. The levels of employee motivation reported by former 
childminders are, however, significantly lower than those reported by the 














development in employee motivation over the past three years does not 













Figure 5-8: Employee motivation (1=very low.. 5=very high) & perceived development of employee 
motivation (1=large decrease .. 5=large increase) reported by present and former childminders. 
5.6.4 Differences in employee performance  
The individual performance that former childminders displayed in their job is 
measured by the extent to which the childminders were willing to conduct tasks 
that were not part of their job description. The former childminders report that 
they displayed a high context performance (4.10): 69% of the former childminders 
regularly performed tasks they were not required to do and 83% of the former 
childminders were actively thinking about how to improve the organisation they 
worked for.  
The general level of the performance of the day-care centre the former 
childminders worked for is measured by the extent to which quality aspects were 
realised, the degree to which day-care centres paid attention to professionalism 
and quality of care, and the levels of sick leave and personnel turnover at the day-
care centre. According to the former childminders, all quality aspects were realised 
to a satisfactory degree. On average, the former childminders report that the extent 
                                                 
40 The analysis of the variance of the employee motivation of present versus former childminders is 





































































to which quality aspects were realised in the day-care centres they worked for was 
high (3.30). The attention that was paid to professionalism and quality of care was 
also perceived as being high (3.56). With regard to sick leave and personnel 
turnover, the former childminders report that the levels of sick leave (2.86) and 
turnover (2.94) were not low but also not high. Figure 5-9 displays the differences 
in the reported levels of performance of present versus former childminders. 
Compared to childminders who are currently working in the child-care sector, 
former childminders report significantly less attention for professionalism and 










Figure 5-9: Performance of present and former childminders (1 = very low ..  5 = very high). 
 
The individual performance of the former childminders is measured over time by 
asking them to report whether the changes at the day-care centres they work for 
influenced the effort they put into their work (decrease (0); no change (1); increase 
(2)). The majority of the former childminders report that the changes had no 
influence on the effort they put into their work, 36% of them, however, indicate 
that the changes decreased their work effort and 9% say that the changes increased 
the effort they put into their work. On average, the changes in the day-care centres 
have resulted in a decrease in the effort that former childminders put into work 
                                                 
41 The analysis of the variance of the levels of employee performance of present versus former 











































(.73). Analysis of variance shows that the perceived change in effort differs 
significantly between present and former childminders.  
The former childminders were also asked to report on a five-point scale 
(large decrease .. large increase) about the development of the attention that is paid 
to professionalism and quality of care, sick leave, and personnel turnover. 
According to the former childminders, on average, the attention that is being paid 
to professionalism and quality of care has increased over the past three years 
(3.83). The former childminders do not report an increase in sick leave (3.24) and 
personnel turnover (3.29) over the past three years. Figure 5-10 shows the 
differences between present and former childminders with regard to the perceived 
development of the levels of: attention paid to professionalism and quality of care, 
sick leave and personnel turnover. Analysis of variance shows that when it comes 











Figure 5-10: Perceived development of employee performance over the past three years reported 




In this chapter, the descriptive analyses of the employee governance of child-care 
organisations and the employee motivation and performance of childminders are 






















































way in which the child-care organisations are structured in order for the 
childminders to be able to carry out their work and is described by four elements: 
employment contracts, job design, reward system, and career system.  
The child-care organisations in the sample do not display a high flexibility 
of employment contracts. Most childminders working in the child-care sector have 
a permanent position. The tightness of the job design of child-care organisations is 
measured by the staff-to-child ratio. The lower the staff-to-child ratio, the more 
children the childminders have under their supervision and the tighter the job 
design. The childminders working at the child-care organisations in the sample 
have, on average, fewer children under their supervision than is required by law. 
With regard to the reward and career system, a distinction is made between the 
focus on pay-for-performance and the attractiveness of the reward and career 
system. The focus on pay-for-performance is low in the reward system and high in 
the career system of the child-care organisations in the sample. That is, child-care 
organisations almost never offer childminders a higher wage for a better than 
average performance, while they almost always base promotions on performance 
and not on seniority. 
The attractiveness of the reward system is measured by the extent to which 
child-care organisations give rewards according to or in excess of what has been 
agreed upon in the collective labour agreement. Of the child-care organisations in 
the sample, 14% offer childminders a reward that is higher than is necessary 
according to the collective labour agreement, whereas 41% of the child-care 
organisations offer a package of secondary conditions of employment that is more 
extensive than is necessary according to the collective labour agreement. Finally, 
all elements of the attractiveness of the career system are offered to a satisfactory 
degree. 
In addition to measuring the employee governance of child-care 
organisations at the time of data collection, we asked child-care organisations to 
report how they perceived the development of employee governance over time. 
The child-care organisations report that they perceive an increase over time in 
flexibility of employment contracts, focus on pay-for-performance in the reward 
and career system, and attractiveness of the reward and career system. Despite the 
fact that the child-care organisations in the sample claim that the tightness of the 
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job design and work pressure have not changed over time, the finding that both 
the managers of child-care locations and the childminders perceive an increase in 
work pressure and the fact that the possibilities for child-care organisations to 
deviate from the required staff-to-child ratio have increased over time, suggest that 
the tightness of the job design may have also increased over time.  
Differences in employee governance between child-care organisations are 
expected to influence the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that childminders derive 
from their job. The extrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job are 
measured by whether or not the childminder has a fixed contract, whether or not 
the childminder has received a financial bonus for doing a good job, and the 
behavioural confirmation  childminders receive regarding their work from others 
such as their employer, colleagues and parents. Of the childminders in the sample, 
85% have a fixed contract, whereas 7% of the childminders claim to have received a 
financial bonus for performing well on the job. The childminders also claim to 
receive much behavioural confirmation  from others for the work they do. With 
regard to the intrinsic rewards, the childminders in the sample report that they 
receive a lot of appreciation from the children. According to the childminders the 
work pressure, however, is high. According to childminders the possibilities for 
development are not low but also not high. 
The development of extrinsic rewards over time is measured by the 
development of financial rewards. On average, the childminders perceive an 
increase in financial rewards over the past three years, whereas no change for the 
future is expected. The development of intrinsic rewards over time is measured by 
the development of work pressure. According to the majority of the childminders 
the work pressure has increased over the past three years and for the future a 
further increase is expected. Given the fact that work pressure is a reciprocal 
measure of intrinsic rewards, the childminders therefore perceive a decrease in 
intrinsic rewards over time.  
The extrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job are expected to 
positively affect extrinsic motivation, whereas the intrinsic rewards are expected to 
positively affect intrinsic motivation. The extrinsic motivation of the childminders 
is measured with a four-item scale. Of the childminders in the sample, 38% agree 
with the proposition ‘I make good money’ and 22% agree with the proposition ‘My 
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chances for promotion are good’. The job security is judged positively by 66% of 
the childminders. Finally, more than half of the people in the sample do not believe 
they are being paid fairly. On average the childminders display an extrinsic 
motivation of 3.21. The intrinsic motivation of the childminders is measured with a 
two-item scale. The childminders report a very high intrinsic motivation (4.42): 
95% of the childminders receive a sense of fulfilment from their job and 90% of 
them regard their work as being interesting. The childminders state that, on 
average, their extrinsic motivation has decreased slightly over the past three years. 
In the future, they expect the extrinsic motivation to further decrease. On average, 
the intrinsic motivation of the childminders has increased slightly over the past 
three years. For the future, childminders expect a further increase in intrinsic 
motivation.  
Employee motivation is, in turn, expected to affect the employee 
performance of the childminders. Employee performance is measured by four 
individual measures of employee performance and four items that measure the 
level of performance of the day-care centre the childminder works for. The first 
measure of the individual performance items is a self-rating measure of employee 
performance. The majority of the childminders (58%) report that their employee 
performance is comparable to that of their colleagues. The second measure of the 
performance of the childminders is the extent to which they are willing to perform 
tasks that are not part of their job description. The childminders display a high 
willingness to conduct tasks they are not required to do. The last items that 
measure the performance of the childminders are the number of days the 
childminders were absent in 2003 due to illness and the childminders’ intention to 
switch jobs. On average, the childminders were absent 8.4 days due to illness. 
Finally, of the childminders in the sample, 16% want to leave the child-care 
organisation within the next few years.  
In addition to the individual performance items, childminders are asked to 
rate the general level of performance at the day-care centre they work for. The first 
item measures the extent to which certain quality aspects are realised. According to 
the childminders, all items are realised to a satisfactory degree. The second item 
that measures the general level of performance of the day-care centres is the extent 
to which day-care centres pay attention to professionalism and quality of care. 
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Childminders report that a lot of attention is paid to professionalism and quality of 
care. Finally, childminders are asked to report the general levels of sick leave and 
personnel turnover at the day-care centre. The childminders in the sample state 
that these levels are low.  
With regard to the perceived development of employee performance over 
time, we measured the perceived development of the individual performance of 
the childminders by asking childminders to report whether the changes in the day-
care centres they work for have influenced their work effort. On average, the 
changes in the day-care centres have resulted in a perceived increase in the effort 
childminders put into work. In addition, the childminders are asked to tell how the 
attention that is paid to the professionalism and quality of care has developed over 
time. According to the childminders, on average, the attention that is paid to 
professionalism and quality of care has increased over the past three years. A 
further increase is expected for the future. According to the childminders, the level 
of sick leave has also increased over the past three years. For the future no change 
is expected. Finally, the childminders indicate that they have perceived a slight 
increase in personnel turnover over the past three years. For the future, they expect 
a further increase.  
Since childminders might have resigned from their job due to the 
introduction of market forces in the child-care sector, focussing on the 
childminders who are currently working in the child-care sector alone might not 
accurately reflect how the transition of the child-care sector affects the employee 
motivation and performance of childminders. Finally, the employee motivation 
and performance of childminders who are currently working in the child-care 
sector are, therefore, compared with the employee motivation and performance of 
childminders who have left the sector during the past three years.   
Analysis of variance shows that the childminders who quit their job during 
the past three years do indeed differ from the childminders who are currently 
working in the child-care sector. Former childminders report having had 
significantly fewer chances for development than present childminders. They also 
perceive a significantly higher increase in work pressure over the past three years 
than childminders who are currently working in the child-care sector. In addition, 
the levels of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation reported by former childminders are 
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significantly lower than those reported by present childminders. Former 
childminders also report significantly less attention for professionalism and quality 
of care and the realisation of a significantly lower level of quality aspects than 
childminders who are currently working in the child-care sector. Finally, former 
and present childminders differ with regard to how they perceive the effort they 
put into work has changed over time. Former childminders think that the changes 
in the day-care centres have resulted in a decrease in effort, whereas present 












This chapter tests the extent to which the introduction of market forces in the 
Dutch child-care sector affects employee governance, motivation and performance. 
Employee motivation and performance are assumed to be dependent on the 
employee governance of child-care organisations, which, in turn, is assumed to be 
dependent on the extent of the market forces the child-care organisation is 
confronted with (see Figure 6-1). 
 
The following research questions are formulated:  
1. To what extent does the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care 
sector influence the employee governance of child-care organisations?  
2. If the employee governance of child-care organisations changes, to what extent 
do these changes influence employee motivation? 




Sector level       Market forces  
        
Organisation level  Employee governance  
    * employment contracts 
    * job design 
    * reward system    
    * career system 
Employee level      Employee motivation                          Employee performance
                 
               extrinsic rewards           extrinsic motivation 
                            performance        
              intrinsic rewards           intrinsic motivation 
 
 
Figure 6-1: The effects of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on the 
employee motivation and performance of the childminders.  
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Section 6.2 tests whether the extent to which child-care organisations are 
confronted with market forces influences employee governance. Sections 6.3 and 
6.4 focus on research question 2. In section 6.3 the hypotheses with regard to the 
effects of employee governance on the rewards that childminders derive from their 
job are tested. Section 6.4 tests the extent to which the rewards that childminders 
derive from their job influences their intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Section 6.5 
analyses the extent to which employee motivation affects employee performance. 
Finally, section 6.6 summarises this chapter.  
 
6.2 Effects of market forces on employee governance  
 
The first research question focuses on the extent to which the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector affects the employee governance of 
Dutch child-care organisations. As explained in Chapter 3, the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector, and the accompanying pressure to 
increase efficiency, is expected to increase the flexibility of employment contracts, 
tightness of job design, focus on pay-for-performance in the reward and career 
system, and attractiveness of the reward and career system.  
The effects of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care 
sector are analysed using cross-sectional data. The extent to which the child-care 
organisations in the sample are financially dependent on the government is 
assumed to reflect the development of child-care organisations over time. Child-
care organisations confronted with a high level of market forces are assumed to be 
confronted with a higher pressure to realise high efficiency and are therefore 
characterised by a different employee governance than child-care organisations 
confronted with a low level of market forces. In Table 6-1 an overview of the 
expected and realised effects of market forces on the employee governance of 
child-care organisations is given. 
Table 1 of appendix C presents the realised effects of market forces on 
employee governance. The data reveal that the employee governance of child-care 
organisations is not significantly influenced by the extent to which child-care 
organisations are confronted with market forces. The hypothesis that child-care 
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organisations confronted with strong market forces are characterised by a higher 
flexibility of employment contracts, a tighter job design, more focus on pay-for-
performance in the reward and career system, and a more attractive reward and 
career system, is therefore not confirmed.  
 
Table 6-1: Expected and realised effects of market forces on employee governance1   
Dependent variables:  
Employee governance (low..high) 
Independent variable:  
Market forces (low..high)  
 Expected effects Realised effects2 
   
Flexibility of employment contracts + 0 
   
Tightness of job design + 0 
   
Pay-for-performance in reward system + 0 
   
Pay-for-performance in career system + 0 
   
Attractiveness reward system + 0 
   
Attractiveness career system + 0 
1 +: positive effect, -: negative effect, 0: no effect, α=0.05. 
2 See Table 1 of Appendix C. 
 
Although the analyses do not confirm the predictions, it seems premature to 
conclude that the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector does 
not affect the employee governance of child-care organisations. First of all, the 
reason for not finding significant effects may be due to the small sample size 
(n=30). Second, the employee governance of child-care organisations confronted 
with a low level of market forces may have developed over time parallel to the 
employee governance of child-care organisations confronted with a high level of 
market forces.  
It was expected that child-care organisations confronted with strong 
market forces would differ in employee governance from child-care organisations 
confronted with a low level of market forces, because of the assumption that child-
care organisations confronted with a high level of market forces need to realise a 
higher level of efficiency. All child-care organisations in the Dutch child-care sector 
have, however, been confronted with the same transition from a welfare to a 
market sector. Therefore, all child-care organisations, irrespective of whether or not 
they were being confronted with strong market forces at the time of the data 
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collection, have been forced to increase their efficiency to secure their financial 
position. Even if at the time of the data collection the child-care organisation was 
not confronted with a high level of market forces, the fact that with the 
introduction of the new Act on Child Care on 1 January 2005 the relationship 
between child-care providers and subsidising municipalities would end, forced 
these child-care organisations to transform from a non-profit company that can 
rely on public subsidies to an independent business that can make profit from the 
services it provides. As a result, the differences between the employee governance 
of child-care organisations may have diminished so much over time that at the 
time of the data collection the differences between various types of child-care 
organisations were too small to find significant results. 
In addition to performing cross-sectional analyses we have asked the 
managers of the child-care organisations to report how they perceive the 
developments in employee governance over time. From these findings, which we 
have presented in Chapter 5, we know that child-care organisations perceive an 
increase in flexibility of employment contracts, a stronger focus on pay-for-
performance in the reward and career system, and an increase in the attractiveness 
of the reward and career system over time. According to the child-care 
organisations the tightness of the job design has not changed over time. Therefore, 
they do perceive a change in employee governance over time. Whether this change 
in employee governance is due to the introduction of market forces in the Dutch 
child-care sector remains to be seen. 
 
6.3 Effects of employee governance on extrinsic and intrinsic 
rewards 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the 
childminders are assumed to be influenced by the employee governance of child-
care organisations. Employee governance is expected to influence the extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation of the childminders by affecting the extrinsic and intrinsic 
rewards the childminders derive from their job. Flexible employment contracts are 
expected to have a negative effect on the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that 
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childminders derive from their job. A tight job design is expected not to affect the 
extrinsic rewards and to negatively affect the intrinsic rewards, whereas pay-for-
performance is expected to positively affect the extrinsic rewards and to negatively 
affect the intrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their job. An attractive 
reward system is expected to have a positive effect on the extrinsic rewards and 
not to affect the intrinsic rewards. Finally, an attractive career system is expected to 
positively affect both the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that childminders derive 
from their job. 
The effects of employee governance on the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
that childminders derive from their job are examined with multilevel analyses. 
First, extrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their job are analysed. In the 
first step of this analysis, we test whether child-care organisations, child-care 
locations and childminders differ significantly from one another with regard to 
their views on the extrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job. Table 6-2 
reports the variances for the extrinsic rewards that childminders perceive to derive 
from their job. 
Table 6-2: Variances extrinsic rewards 
Variances  Extrinsic rewards 
  Type of contract Financial bonus Behavioural confirmation 
     
Organisation level (n=30) Variances in % 0 % 5 % 10 % 
     
Location level (n=68) Variances in % 12 % 9 % 1 % 
     
Employee level (n=477) Variances in % 88 % 86 % 89 % 
     
one-level . . 738.01 
    
two-level . . 718.00** 
    
Deviance1   
three-level . . 717.82 
N2    448 448 448 
1 The increase in model fit is tested by the decrease in deviance for each level that is added and follows a chi-square 
distribution with the number of added levels as degrees of freedom. We start at the employee level and add the 
organisation level in a two-level model. In the three-level model the location level is added as well. Given that 
variances are non-negative by definition, the decrease in deviance is tested one-sided. In multilevel models deviance 
tests cannot be conducted for dichotomous dependent variables. 
2 The increase in model fit is tested by the decrease in deviance for each level that is added and follows a chi-square 
distribution with the number of added levels as degrees of freedom. We start at the employee level and add the 
organisation level in a two-level model. In the three-level model the location level is added as well. Given that 
variances are non-negative by definition, the decrease in deviance is tested one-sided. In multilevel models deviance 
tests cannot be conducted for dichotomous dependent variables. 
** p < .01, * p  < .05. 
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As is apparent from the data, the extrinsic rewards that childminders derive from 
their job are not strongly influenced by the child-care organisation and child-care 
location: the rewards contain little variance on organisation and location level. The 
data show that of the extrinsic rewards, the type of contract of the childminders 
differs most amongst child-care locations, whereas the behavioural confirmation 
from others displays the highest variance on organisation level. With regard to the 
behavioural confirmation from others, it is found that a two-level analysis 
increases the model fit in comparison with a one-level analysis. This result 
indicates that the child-care organisations significantly differ from one another 
with regard to the behavioural confirmation the childminders claim to derive from 
others for doing their job. The extent of the behavioural confirmation from others 
that childminders claim to derive from their job therefore depends on the child-
care organisation in which they are working, which makes it necessary to analyse 
the effects with a two-level analysis. A three-level analysis, that includes the 
location level in addition to the organisation level, does not significantly increase 
the model fit. For the rewards ‘type of contract’ and ‘financial bonus’ it is not 
possible to test whether or not a three-level analysis significantly increases model 
fit in comparison with a two-level or one-level analysis due to the dichotomous 
measurement. Even though the results indicate that for the analysis of extrinsic 
rewards a three-level analysis is not necessary, for reasons of uniformity we will 
nevertheless make use of a three-level model to analyse the effects of employee 
governance on extrinsic rewards. 
Table 6-3 presents an overview of the expected and realised effects of 
employee governance on the extrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their 
job. In Table 2 of appendix C the multilevel output of the relationships between the 
employee governance of child-care organisations and the extrinsic rewards that 









Table 6-3: Expected and realised effects of employee governance on extrinsic rewards1    
Employee governance (low .. high) Extrinsic rewards (low .. high)2   
  Type of  contract Financial bonus Behavioural confirmation 
     
Expected  - - - 
    
Flexibility   
employment contracts 
Realised 0 0 - 
     
Expected  0 0 0 
    
Tightness  
job design 
Realised 0 0 0 
     
Expected  + + + 
    
Pay-for-performance   
reward system 
Realised 0 0 0 
     
Expected  + + + 
    
Pay-for-performance   
career system 
Realised 0 .42 0 
     
Expected  + + + 
    
Attractiveness 
 reward system 
Realised 0 0 0 
     
Expected  + + + 
    
Attractiveness  
career system 
Realised + 0 0 
1 +: positive effect, -: negative effect, 0: no effect, α=0.05. 
2 For the realised effects see Table 2 of Appendix C. 
 
From the results presented in Table 2 of appendix C it is clear that the inclusion of 
employee governance and control variables in the analysis of behavioural 
confirmation does not significantly increase the model fit.43 As a result of including 
the variables in the analyses of extrinsic rewards the unexplained variances on 
organisation and location level are, however, no longer significant. Therefore, the 
unexplained variance on organisation level remains significant. The results further 
show that, as expected, flexible employment contracts negatively influence one of 
the extrinsic rewards. Childminders working in child-care organisations that 
feature a higher than average percentage of substitute workers report receiving 
significantly less behavioural confirmation from others than childminders working 
in a child-care organisation that is characterised by a lower than average 
percentage of substitute workers. The tightness of the job design does not, as 
                                                 
42 Due to lack of variance this variable is excluded from the analysis. 
43 We cannot test whether the model fit has increased for the variables ‘employment contract’ and 




expected, have a significant effect on the extrinsic rewards the childminders derive 
from their job. The focus on pay-for-performance and the attractiveness of the 
reward and career system were expected to positively affect extrinsic rewards. No 
significant effects on extrinsic rewards are found for the focus on pay-for-
performance in the reward and career system, and the attractiveness of the reward 
system. An attractive career system is found to have a significant positive effect on 
one of the extrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their jobs. Childminders 
working in child-care organisations characterised by a highly attractive career 
system, significantly more often report having a fixed contract than childminders 
working in child-care organisations characterised by a career system with a low 
attractiveness.  
Next, the effects of employee governance on the intrinsic rewards 
childminders derive from their job are analysed. The variances for the intrinsic 
rewards that childminders claim to derive from their job are presented in Table 6-4. 
 
Table 6-4: Variances intrinsic rewards 
Variances  Intrinsic rewards 






     
Organisation level 
(n=30) 
Variances in % 2 % 2 % 13 % 
     
Location level  
(n=68) 
Variances in % 11 % 6% 13 % 
     
Employee level 
(n=477) 
Variances in % 87 % 92 % 74 % 
     
one-level  921.42 950.26 908.34 
    
two-level 913.37** 944.08** 861.80** 
    
Deviance 
three-level  907.08** 941.70 848.62** 
N  443 445 448 
** p < .01, * p  < .05. 
 
The intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job are, parallel to the 
extrinsic rewards, not strongly influenced by the child-care organisation and child-
care location: the rewards contain little variance on organisation and location level. 
Nevertheless, the deviance tests reveal that for two of the intrinsic rewards a three-
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level analysis increases the model fit in comparison with a one-level or two-level 
analysis. This result indicates that the child-care organisations and child-care 
locations significantly differ from one another with regard to the intrinsic rewards 
that childminders claim to derive from their job. The extent to which a childminder 
claims to derive intrinsic rewards from the job therefore depends on the child-care 
location and child-care organisation where the childminder works, which makes it 
necessary to analyse the effects of employee governance on intrinsic rewards with 
a three-level analysis. 
In the second step of the analysis, the employee governance variables are 
added to the model. In Table 6-5 an overview is given of the expected and realised 
effects of employee governance on the intrinsic rewards that childminders derive 
from their job. 
 
Table 6-5: Expected and realised effects of employee governance on intrinsic rewards1   
Employee governance (low .. high) Intrinsic rewards (low .. high)2 






     
Expected  + - - 
    
Flexibility   
employment contracts 
Realised + 0 0 
     
Expected  + - - 
    
Tightness  
job design Realised 0 - 0 
     
Expected  + - - 
    
Pay-for-performance   
reward system 
Realised 0 0 0 
     
Expected  + - - 
    
Pay-for-performance   
career system 
Realised 0 0 0 
     
Expected  0 0 0 
    
Attractiveness 
 reward system 
Realised 0 0 0 
     
Expected  - + + 
    
Attractiveness  
career system 
Realised - 0 + 
1 +: positive effect, -: negative effect, 0: no effect, α=0.05. 
2 For the realised effects see Table 3 of Appendix C. 
 
Table 3 of Appendix C shows the output of the multilevel analysis.  From the data 
presented in this table, it is apparent that the inclusion of employee governance 
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and control variables in the analyses of intrinsic rewards significantly increases the 
model fit. For the variables ‘work pressure’ and ‘appreciation children’, the 
unexplained variances on organisation and location level are no longer significant, 
whereas for the variable ‘possibilities for development’ the variance between child-
care locations is still significant. 
With regard to the effects of employee governance on intrinsic rewards, the 
results show that flexible employment contracts, as expected, have a significant 
negative effect on one of the intrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their 
job. Childminders working in child-care organisations characterised by a higher 
than average percentage of substitute workers report significantly higher work 
pressure than childminders working in a child-care organisation that features a 
lower than average percentage of substitute workers. As expected, a tight job 
design also negatively influences one of the intrinsic rewards that childminders 
derive from their job. Childminders working in child-care organisations 
characterised by a lower than average staff-to-child ratio, and as a consequence 
have more children under their supervision than average, report receiving 
significantly less appreciation from the children than childminders working in a 
child-care organisation that is characterised by a higher than average staff-to-child 
ratio. The expected negative effect of a strong focus on pay-for-performance in the 
reward and career system is not confirmed. The intrinsic rewards that 
childminders derive from their job are not significantly influenced by the extent to 
which child-care organisations focus on pay-for-performance in their reward and 
career system. The attractiveness of the reward system, as expected, also does not 
significantly influence the intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job. 
Finally, we find that an attractive career system, as expected, has a positive 
influence on the intrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their job. 
Childminders working in child-care organisations characterised by a highly 
attractive career system report significantly lower work pressure and significantly 
more possibilities to develop themselves than childminders working in child-care 
organisations characterised by a career system with a low attractiveness. 
Overall, we can conclude from the multilevel analyses that the hypotheses 
derived in Chapter 3 with regard to the effects of employee governance on the 
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their job are only 
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partly confirmed. We find that employee governance has both negative and 
positive effects on the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards childminder derive from their 
job. Flexible employment contracts negatively influence the extrinsic and intrinsic 
rewards childminders derive from their job, whereas an attractive career system 
positively influences these rewards. In addition, a tight job design negatively 
affects the intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job.  
Thus, from the cross-sectional analyses we can conclude that the employee 
governance of child-care organisations affects the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
that childminders derive from their job. Given the fact that the employee 
governance of child-care organisations is not significantly influenced by the extent 
to which child-care organisations are confronted with market forces, the 
introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector is not found to affect 
the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards through a change in employee governance.  
 
6.4 Effects of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards on employee 
motivation 
 
The preceding section described the extent to which the employee governance of 
child-care organisations affects the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that 
childminders derive from their job. As explained in Chapter 3, changes in 
employee governance are, however, not only expected to affect the extrinsic and 
intrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their job but also the productivity 
of these intrinsic rewards through the way in which the change in employee 
governance is perceived. Given the fact that the effect of intrinsic rewards on 
intrinsic motivation is assumed to be dependent on the productivity of the intrinsic 
rewards, the way in which a change in employee governance is perceived is 
therefore expected to influence the effects that intrinsic rewards have on the 
intrinsic motivation of the childminders. 
An increase in flexibility of employment contracts, a tighter job design, an 
increase in focus on pay-for-performance in the reward and career system, and an 
increase in the attractiveness of the reward system, on one hand, are expected to be 
perceived as controlling and to decrease the productivity of the intrinsic rewards. 
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An increase in the attractiveness of the career system, on the other hand, is 
expected to be perceived as stimulating and to increase the productivity of intrinsic 
rewards. Finally, the transition of the Dutch child-care sector from a welfare sector 
to a market sector is, in addition to the changes in employee governance, expected 
to be perceived as being negative by the childminders and to negatively affect the 
productivity of the intrinsic rewards that they derive from their job.  
The effects of the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that childminders derive 
from their job on employee motivation are examined with multilevel analyses. In 
the first step of the analysis, it is tested if child-care organisations, child-care 
locations and childminders significantly differ from one another with regard to the 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the childminders. Table 6-6 presents the 
variances in employee motivation. 
 
Table 6-6: Variances employee motivation 
Variances  Employee motivation 
  Extrinsic motivation Intrinsic motivation 
    
Organisation level (n=30) Variances in % 11 % 1 % 
    
Location level (n=68) Variances in % 2 % 0 % 
    
Employee level (n=477) Variances in % 87 % 99 % 
    
one-level 1039.53 779.48 
   
two-level 1014.67** 779.43 
   
Deviance 
three-level 1014.33 779.43 
N  446 438 
** p < .01, * p  < .05. 
 
As the data show, child-care organisations significantly differ from each other with 
regard to the extrinsic motivation of the childminders. For the extrinsic motivation 
of the childminders it, therefore, does matter in which child-care organisation one 
works. A two-level analysis increases the model fit in comparison with a one-level 
analysis. With regard to the intrinsic motivation of the childminders the deviance 
tests reveal that a three-level analysis does not increase the model fit in comparison 
with a one-level or two-level analysis. Child-care organisations and child-care 
locations therefore do not significantly differ from one another with regard to the 
intrinsic motivation of the childminders. Seeing that childminders work in a 
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comparable setting with a comparable group of children and that the working 
conditions for childminders do not differ much amongst Dutch child-care 
organisations due to the uniform requirements that prevail in the Dutch child-care 
sector, for example with regard to the staff-to-child ratio, it is not surprising that 
the intrinsic motivation of the childminders does not vary significantly amongst 
the child-care organisations and day-care centres in the sample. Although small 
differences in employee governance exist between child-care organisations, which 
affect the intrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their job as was shown in 
Table 3 of appendix C, these differences are too small in comparison with the large 
similarities in the work content of the childminders and are therefore not able to 
explain differences in the intrinsic motivation of the childminders. Even though the 
results indicate that for the analysis of employee motivation a three-level analysis 
is not necessary, for reasons of uniformity we will nevertheless use of a three-level 
analysis while explaining employee motivation. 
In the second step of the analysis, the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards and 
the productivity of the intrinsic rewards are added to the model. The productivity 
of the intrinsic rewards is operationalised as an interaction effect between 
employee governance and intrinsic rewards on one hand and the extent to which 
child-care organisations are confronted with market forces and intrinsic rewards 
on the other. If a change in employee governance or the transition of the Dutch 
child-care sector from a welfare sector to a market sector is perceived as being 
negative, the interaction effect is expected to have a negative effect on intrinsic 
motivation, whereas the interaction effect is expected to have a positive effect on 
intrinsic motivation for changes that are perceived as being positive. In Table 6-7 
an overview of the expected and realised effects of the extrinsic rewards on the 
extrinsic motivation, and the expected and realised effects of the intrinsic rewards 
and the productivity of intrinsic rewards on the intrinsic motivation of the 







Table 6-7: Expected and realised effects of extrinsic & intrinsic rewards on employee motivation1   
Rewards (low .. high)  Employee motivation (low .. high)2  
Extrinsic rewards  Extrinsic motivation Intrinsic motivation 
    
Expected  + 0 
   
Type of  contract 
Realised 0 . 
    
Expected  + 0 
   
Financial bonus 
Realised + . 
    
Expected  + 0 
   
Behavioural confirmation  
Realised + . 
Intrinsic rewards    
    
Expected  0 - 
   
Work pressure (reciprocal measure) 
 
Realised . - 
    
Expected  0 + 
   
Appreciation children 
Realised . + 
    
Expected  0 + 
   
Possibilities for development 
Realised . + 
Productivity intrinsic rewards    
    
Expected  0 - 
   
Intrinsic rewards * flexibility contracts 
Realised . - 
    
Expected  0 - 
   
Intrinsic rewards * tightness job design 
Realised . . 
    
Expected  0 - 
   
Intrinsic rewards * pay-for-performance 
 reward system 
Realised . . 
    
Expected  0 - 
   
Intrinsic rewards * pay-for-performance 
career system 
Realised . . 
    
Expected  0 - 
   
Intrinsic rewards * attractiveness 
 reward system 
Realised . . 
    
Expected  0 + 
   
Intrinsic rewards * attractiveness  
career system 
Realised . . 
    
Expected  0 - 
   
Intrinsic rewards * market forces 
Realised . . 
1 +: positive effect, -: negative effect, 0: no effect, α=0.05. 




Table 4 of Appendix C shows how the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards affect the 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the childminders. In the first column, the 
effects of extrinsic rewards on extrinsic motivation are presented. From the data 
shown in this table, it is apparent that the inclusion of extrinsic rewards and 
control variables in the analysis of extrinsic motivation significantly increases the 
model fit. Although the unexplained variance on organisation level has decreased, 
the variance between child-care organisations remains significant. The results also 
show that for the extrinsic motivation of the childminders it does not matter 
whether or not the childminder has a fixed contract. The percentage of fixed 
contracts at the child-care organisation the childminder works for, however, has a 
significant positive effect on the extrinsic motivation of the childminder. The 
extrinsic rewards financial bonus and behavioural confirmation from others also 
positively affect extrinsic motivation. Childminders who have received a financial 
bonus for doing a good job display a significantly higher extrinsic motivation than 
childminders who have not received a financial bonus for performing well on the 
job and the behavioural confirmation childminders receive from others, like their 
employer, colleagues, and parents, also significantly influences their extrinsic 
motivation.  
In the second column of Table 4 of Appendix C, the effects of intrinsic 
rewards on intrinsic motivation are presented. The results indicate that the 
inclusion of intrinsic rewards and control variables in the analysis of intrinsic 
motivation significantly increases the model fit. Seeing that there was hardly any 
unexplained variance on organisation and location level for the intrinsic 
motivation of the childminders, the increase in model fit is realised by a decrease in 
the unexplained variance on employee level. With regard to the effects of intrinsic 
rewards on intrinsic motivation, the results show that the intrinsic rewards that 
childminders derive from their job positively influence the intrinsic motivation of 
the childminders, as expected. The lower the work pressure, the higher the 
appreciation from the children and the more possibilities for development, the 
higher the intrinsic motivation of the childminders is found to be. In addition, the 
mean organisation level of appreciation that is received from the children in the 
group also significantly influences the intrinsic motivation of the childminders. 
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Finally, the productivity of intrinsic rewards is included in the analysis of 
intrinsic motivation. The results are presented in the third column of Table 4 of 
Appendix C. Initially, for the three intrinsic rewards interaction effects with the 
extent to which the child-care organisation is confronted with market forces and all 
six elements of employee governance were included in the analysis. Only one of 
the interaction effects turned out to be significant, as indicated by the minus sign of 
the realised interaction effect between intrinsic rewards and flexibility of contracts 
in the second column of Table 6-7. Therefore, in the output we only present the 
analysis including the significant interaction effect between work pressure and 
flexibility of employment contracts.  
The results show that in child-care organisations characterised by a higher 
than average percentage of temporary contracts, the intrinsic rewards that 
childminders derive from their job - measured by the reciprocal factor ‘work 
pressure’ - have a smaller positive effect on the intrinsic motivation of the 
childminders than in child-care organisations that feature a lower than average 
percentage of temporary contracts. This implies that flexibility of employment 
contracts, as expected, has a negative effect on the productivity of the intrinsic 
reward ‘absence of work pressure’, which indicates that an increase in flexibility of 
employment contracts is perceived as controlling and therefore crowds-out 
intrinsic motivation.  
All in all, the hypotheses derived in Chapter 3 regarding the effects of 
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards on the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the 
childminders are mostly confirmed. The results indicate that the extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation of the childminders are, as expected, triggered by the extrinsic 
and intrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their job, respectively. The 
results further show that, except for flexibility of employment contracts, the extent 
to which child-care organisations are confronted with market forces and the 
employee governance of child-care organisations do not influence the effects that 
intrinsic rewards have on intrinsic motivation. Flexible employment contracts, as 
expected, have a negative effect on the productivity of the intrinsic rewards, which 
indicates that an increase in flexibility of employment contracts is perceived as 
controlling and therefore crowds-out intrinsic motivation.  
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Given the findings that extrinsic rewards are important for extrinsic 
motivation, and intrinsic rewards and the productivity of intrinsic rewards for 
intrinsic motivation, what can be said about the effects of the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on employee motivation? As explained 
in section 6.3, on the basis of our cross-sectional analyses we find no significant 
effect of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on the 
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that childminder derive from their job. The results 
presented in this section also show that the way in which the transition in the 
child-care sector is perceived does not influence the effects that intrinsic rewards 
have on intrinsic motivation. Our cross-sectional analyses, therefore, do not 
provide evidence that the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care 
sector affects employee motivation either indirectly by influencing employee 
governance or directly through the way in which the introduction of market forces 
is perceived by the childminders.  
 
6.5 Effects of employee motivation on employee performance 
 
Finally, we will analyse the extent to which employee motivation affects employee 
performance. In doing so, we will focus on the quality of employee performance. 
We believe that in the child-care sector especially it is important to focus on the 
quality of employee performance, since the quality of child care heavily depends 
on the employees who are working in the sector. Besides, the quality of child care 
determines how child care affects the well-being and development of the children 
(Van IJzendoorn, Tavecchio and Riksen-Walraven 2004).  
In child care, the quality of the performance of the childminders is 
influenced by the extent to which the employer provides the means to give quality 
of care such as professional equipment and the amount of time employees are 
given to look after the children. The employees, on the other hand, can influence 
the quality of their performance by being involved in the organisation and being 
alert during their work, by being prepared to help colleagues and doing tasks other 
than the tasks they are required to do, by not calling in sick if that is not absolutely 
necessary, and by having a low level of turnover.  
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In order to understand how the introduction of market forces in the Dutch 
child-care sector may affect employee performance, we first analysed the effects of 
the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on employee 
motivation. As explained in Chapter 3, both the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation 
of the childminders are expected to have a positive influence on the employee 
performance of the childminders. Given the type of work, intrinsic motivation is, 
however, expected to have a higher impact on employee performance than 
extrinsic motivation. 
The effects of the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the childminders on 
employee performance are examined with multilevel analyses. In the first step of 
the analysis, we test whether child-care organisations, child-care locations, and 
childminders differ significantly from each other with regard to the individual 
performance of the childminders, and with regard to the way in which the 
childminders rate the level of performance at the day-care centre they work for. 
The variances for the individual performance items are presented in Table 6-8.  
 
Table 6-8: Variances individual performance 
Variances  Individual performance 
  Performance  comparison Context performance Sick leave Turnover 
      
Organisation level  
(n=30) 
Variances in % 0 % 2 % 0 % 0 % 
      
Location level  
(n=68) 
Variances in % 3 % 4 % 10 % 0 % 
      
Employee level 
(n=477) 
Variances in % 97 % 94 % 90 % 100 % 
      
one-level 628.32 911.52 674.88 . 
     
two-level 627.67 908.30 673.15 . 
     
Deviance44 
three-level 626.53 906.88 666.02** . 
N  441 441 430 443 
** p < .01, * p  < .05. 
 
                                                 
44 The increase in model fit is tested by the decrease in deviance for each level that is added and follows 
a chi-square distribution with the number of added levels as degrees of freedom. Given that variances 
are by definition non-negative, the decrease in deviance is tested one-sided. In multilevel models 
deviance tests cannot be conducted for dichotomous dependent variables. 
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The data show that the individual performance items display little variance on 
organisation and location level. Only the amount of sick leave of the childminders 
significantly differs between day-care centres. Therefore, except for the amount of 
sick leave, child-care organisations and child-care locations do not differ 
significantly from one another with regard to the performance of the childminders.  
The variance of the items that measure the level of performance of the day-
care centres are presented in Table 6-9. The items that measure the level of 
performance of the day-care centres display much variance between organisations 
and locations. The extent to which certain quality aspects are realised differs 
significantly between child-care organisations, whereas the extent to which day-
care centres pay attention to professionalism and quality of care and the general 
level of sick leave and personnel turnover at the day-care centre differs 
significantly between both child-care organisations and day-care centres.  
 
Table 6-9: Variances performance day-care centre 
Variances  Performance day-care centre 
  Quality realisation Attention to quality Sick leave Turnover 
      
Organisation level (n=30) Variances in % 8 % 10 % 12 % 1 % 
      
Location level (n=68) Variances in % 4 % 8 % 13 % 28 % 
      
Employee level (n=477) Variances in % 88 % 82 % 75 % 71 % 
      
one-level 688.82 912.60 1228.76 1133.73 
     
two-level 671.04** 883.40** 1186.74** 1085.69** 
     
Deviance 
three-level 670.26 879.19* 1173.11** 1059.56** 
N  440 440 439 422 
** p < .01, * p  < .05. 
 
Although the results indicate that regarding employee performance a three-level 
analysis is not necessary for explaining the extent to which certain quality aspects 
are realised in the day-care centre, nevertheless, for reasons of uniformity, we will 
make use of a three-level analysis while explaining all employee performance 
items.   
In the multilevel analyses, extrinsic and intrinsic motivation are added to 
the model in order to explain employee performance. An overview of the expected 
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and realised effects of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation on employee performance 
is presented in Table 6-10. 
 
Table 6-10: Expected and realised effects of employee motivation on employee performance1  
Dependent variable:  
Employee performance  
(low .. high)2  
 Independent variable: 
Extrinsic motivation 
(low .. high) 
Independent variable: 
Intrinsic motivation 
(low .. high) 
Individual performance    
    
Expected  + + 
   
Performance comparison 
Realised 0 0 
    
Expected  + + 
   
Context performance 
Realised 0 + 
    
Expected  - - 
   
Sick leave 
Realised 0 0 
    
Expected  - - 
   
Turnover intention 
Realised 0 - 
Performance day-care centre     
    
Expected  + + 
   
Quality realisation 
Realised + + 
    
Expected  + + 
   
Attention to quality 
Realised + + 
    
Expected  - - 
   
Sick leave 
Realised 0 - 
    
Expected  - - 
   
Turnover 
Realised 0 - 
1 +: positive effect, -: negative effect, 0: no effect, α=0.05. 
2 For the realised effects see Tables 5 and 6 of Appendix C. 
 
In Table 5 of Appendix C, the effects of the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the 
childminders on the individual employee performance items are shown. From the 
data in this table it is apparent that the inclusion of employee motivation and 
control variables in the analysis significantly increases the model fit, except for the 
amount of sick leave of the childminders. The amount of sick leave of the 
childminders is still significantly different between child-care locations. In 
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addition, the variance of the context performance of the childminders is significant 
on location level. 
With regard to the effects of employee motivation on individual 
performance, the results show that none of the individual work performance items 
are significantly influenced by the extrinsic motivation of the childminders. The 
intrinsic motivation of the childminders significantly affects individual 
performance. Highly intrinsically motivated childminders report wanting to leave 
the child-care organisation in the upcoming years significantly less often, and the 
higher the intrinsic motivation of the childminders, the higher their context 
performance. In addition, the mean organisation level of intrinsic motivation also 
has a significant negative effect on the childminders’ intention to change jobs. The 
self-rating measure of the performance of the childminder in comparison with his 
or her colleagues and the amount of sick leave of the childminder are not 
significantly influenced by employee motivation.  
Table 6 of Appendix C presents the analysis of the effects of employee 
motivation on the general level of performance of the day-care centres. The 
inclusion of employee motivation and control variables in the analysis significantly 
increases the model fit, except for the general level of sick leave of the 
childminders. Although the unexplained variance has decreased, the variance 
between child-care organisations and child-care locations still remains significant 
for most performance items. The extent to which certain quality aspects are 
realised does not vary significantly anymore between child-care organisations. The 
extent to which day-care centres pay attention to professionalism and quality of 
care does, however, still differ significantly between child-care organisations, 
whereas the general level of sick leave and personnel turnover at the day-care 
centre is still significantly different between both child-care organisations and day-
care centres.      
The data presented in Table 6 of Appendix C further demonstrate, that 
employee motivation has a high impact on the way in which the childminders rate 
the level of performance of the day-care centre they work for. Both the extrinsic 
and intrinsic motivation of the childminders have a significant positive effect on 
the extent to which childminders claim that certain quality aspects are realised in 
the day-care centres they work for and on the extent to which childminders claim 
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that the day-care centre focuses on professionalism and quality of care. In addition 
to the individual level of intrinsic motivation, the mean organisation level of 
intrinsic motivation also significantly influences these two performance items. 
Furthermore, the mean organisation level of extrinsic motivation significantly 
influences the extent to which childminders claim that the day-care centre pays 
attention to professionalism and quality of care. Finally, the intrinsic motivation of 
the childminders significantly affects the general level of sick leave and personnel 
turnover. The higher the intrinsic motivation of the childminder, the lower the 
level of sick leave and the level of personnel turnover that the day-care centre 
exhibits according to the childminder. 
In summary, the data indicate that, as expected, both extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation positively influence employee performance. When comparing the 
effects of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation on employee performance, we find that 
the intrinsic motivation of the childminders significantly affects more employee 
performance items than their extrinsic motivation. Moreover, in terms of both the 
unstandardised coefficients, given in Tables 5 and 6, and the standardised 
coefficients, which can be calculated on the basis of the information given in Table 
4 of Appendix B, the effects of intrinsic motivation on employee performance are, 




In this chapter we tested the extent to which the introduction of market forces in 
the Dutch child-care sector affects the employee governance of child-care 
organisations, and the employee motivation and performance of the childminders. 
The results indicate that, as expected, both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation have a 
positive influence on employee performance. The effects of intrinsic motivation on 
employee performance are, as expected, stronger than the effects of extrinsic 
motivation. 
The results further show that the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the 
childminders are, as expected, triggered by the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that 
childminders derive from their job, respectively. In addition, it appears that, except 
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for flexibility of employment contracts, the extent to which child-care organisations 
are confronted with market forces and the employee governance of child-care 
organisations do not influence the effects that intrinsic rewards have on intrinsic 
motivation. Flexible employment contracts, as expected, show a decreasing effect 
on the productivity of the intrinsic rewards, which indicates that an increase in 
flexibility of employment contracts is perceived as controlling and therefore 
crowds-out intrinsic motivation.  
 With regard to the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards we find that the 
employee governance of child-care organisations, as expected, has both negative 
and positive effects on the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards childminder derive from 
their job. Flexible employment contracts have a negative influence on the extrinsic 
and intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job, whereas an attractive 
career system positively affects the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards childminders 
derive from their job. In addition, a tight job design has a negative effect on the 
intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job.  
Finally, the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector, 
combined with the accompanying pressure to increase efficiency, is expected to 
influence the employee governance of child-care organisations. The data reveal, 
however, that none of the employee governance elements of child-care 
organisations are significantly influenced by the extent to which child-care 
organisations are confronted with market forces. Therefore, on the basis of our 
cross-sectional analyses we find no evidence that the introduction of market forces 
in the Dutch child-care sector affects the employee motivation and employee 
performance of the childminders either indirectly by influencing employee 
governance or directly through the way in which the introduction of market forces 












The aim of this research is to describe and explain the effects of the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on employee governance, motivation 
and performance. Although in discussions regarding the introduction of market 
forces in care work the possible effects for providers and customers are taken into 
consideration, usually no focus is given to the possible effects for care employees. 
The question is whether or not the possible effects on employees are rightly 
dismissed. What if the introduction of market forces in care work affects employee 
motivation and performance? Seeing that care work is highly labour intensive, the 
performance of the care sector depends highly on the willingness and quality with 
which the employees working in this sector apply themselves to their tasks. 
The theoretical model that explains the effects of the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on employee governance, motivation 
and performance is presented in Chapter 3. The effects of the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on employee motivation and 
performance are explained using the social production function approach and 
crowding theory. The social production function approach assumes that all people 
have one universal goal in life: subjective well-being. Having a job is one of the 
sources that people have for the production of well-being: a job provides people 
with extrinsic and intrinsic rewards or so-called production factors for the 
production of well-being. The extrinsic and intrinsic rewards employees derive 
from their job combined with the productivity of these rewards influences the level 
of well-being and therefore the level of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation 
employees display in their job. Given the fact that employee motivation is assumed 
to be influenced by rewards as well as by the productivity of these rewards, 
changes in rewards or their productivity affect employee motivation therefore. 
Crowding theory assumes that the intrinsic motivation of employees is not only 
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affected by changes in intrinsic rewards, but also by the way in which an external 
intervention is perceived. Intrinsic motivation increases if individuals perceive an 
external intervention as supportive. In this case, a crowding-in effect is said to 
occur. If individuals, however, perceive an external intervention as controlling, 
intrinsic motivation decreases and a crowding-out effect is said to occur.  
The introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector is expected 
to affect the employee governance of child-care organisations which, in turn, is 
expected to affect the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards the childminders derive from 
their job. In addition, the way in which the changes in the child-care sector are 
perceived are expected to affect the productivity of the intrinsic rewards. If the 
introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector is perceived as 
controlling, the productivity of the intrinsic rewards that are derived from working 
in child care decrease and intrinsic motivation will be crowded-out. However, if 
the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector is perceived as 
supportive, the productivity of the intrinsic rewards increase and intrinsic 
motivation will be crowded-in. 
Subsequently, the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the childminders are 
expected to affect the performance of the childminders. Both extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation are expected to have a positive effect on the quality of employee 
performance. The link between the level of motivation and the level of employee 
performance is based on the mutual-investment model, which defines the 
relationship between employer and employee as a social exchange relationship and 
claims that the employer will invest in the employee whereas the employee will 
respond by displaying a high level of performance.  
The effects of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care 
sector on employee governance, motivation and performance are analysed using 
cross-sectional data. The data, operationalisations and statistical models used in 
this research are described in Chapter 4. In Chapters 5 and 6, the results of the 
analyses are given. Chapter 5 presents the descriptive analyses and Chapter 6 the 
explanatory analyses. 
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7.2 Results 
7.2.1 To what extent does the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care 
sector influence the employee governance of child-care organisations? (research 
question 1)  
The introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector, combined with 
the accompanying pressure to increase efficiency, is expected to influence the 
employee governance of child-care organisations. The introduction of market 
forces in the Dutch child-care sector is expected to have an increasing effect on the 
flexibility of employment contracts, tightness of the job design, focus on pay-for-
performance in the reward and career system, and the attractiveness of the reward 
and career system. The data reveal that none of the employee governance elements 
of child-care organisations are significantly influenced by the extent to which 
child-care organisations are confronted with market forces.  
In addition to the cross-sectional analyses, the managers of the child-care 
organisations were asked to report on how they perceive the developments in 
employee governance over time. From these findings, presented in Chapter 5, it is 
known that child-care organisations perceive an increase over time in flexibility of 
employment contracts, a stronger focus on pay-for-performance in the reward and 
career system, and an increase in the attractiveness of the reward and career 
system. Over time, the child-care organisations do therefore perceive, as expected, 
a change in employee governance.    
The fact that the results from the cross-sectional analyses do not confirm 
the results from the analyses over time might be due to the small sample size 
(n=30) and the possibility that, at the time of the data collection, the employee 
governance of the child-care organisations had already adjusted to the changes in 
the child-care sector. Over time, all child-care organisations in the Dutch child-care 
sector have been confronted with the same transition from a welfare to a market 
sector. Therefore, all child-care organisations have been forced to increase their 
efficiency in order to secure their financial position, and the employee governance 
of child-care organisations with a welfare tradition may therefore have developed 
over time in accordance with the employee governance of child-care organisations 
that have always had a strong market orientation. As a result, the differences 
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between the employee governance of child-care organisations may have 
diminished so much over time that at the time of collecting the data the differences 
between child-care organisations were too small to find significant results.  
7.2.2 If the employee governance of child-care organisations changes, to what extent do 
these changes influence employee motivation? (research question 2) 
The employee governance of child-care organisations is expected to influence the 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the childminders by affecting the extrinsic and 
intrinsic rewards the childminders derive from their job. From the cross-sectional 
analyses it is clear that employee governance has both negative and positive effects 
on the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. Flexible employment contracts negatively 
influence the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job, 
whereas an attractive career system positively influences the extrinsic and intrinsic 
rewards childminders derive from their job. Finally, a tight job design negatively 
affects the intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job.  
The extrinsic and intrinsic rewards are, in turn, expected to have a positive 
effect on the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the childminders. In addition, it is 
assumed that the higher the productivity of a certain reward, the larger the effect 
on employee motivation will be. The results indicate that the extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation of the childminders are, as expected, triggered by the extrinsic and 
intrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their job, respectively. The results 
further show that, except for flexibility of employment contracts, the extent to 
which child-care organisations are confronted with market forces and the 
employee governance of child-care organisations do not influence the effects that 
intrinsic rewards have on intrinsic motivation. In child-care organisations 
characterised by a higher than average percentage of temporary contracts, the 
intrinsic rewards that childminders derive from their job - measured by the 
reciprocal factor ‘work pressure’ - have a smaller positive effect on the intrinsic 
motivation of the childminders than in child-care organisations that feature a lower 
than average percentage of temporary contracts. This implies that the flexibility of 
employment contracts, as expected, has a negative effect on the productivity of the 
intrinsic reward ‘absence of work pressure’, which indicates that an increase in 
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flexibility of employment contracts is perceived as controlling and therewith 
crowds-out intrinsic motivation.  
In addition to the cross-sectional analyses, the childminders were asked to 
report on how they perceive the developments in extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
over time. The development of extrinsic rewards is measured by the development 
of financial rewards over time, and the development of intrinsic rewards by the 
development of work pressure (reciprocal of intrinsic reward) over time. The 
results indicate that, on average, the childminders perceive a small increase in 
financial rewards over the past three years. For the upcoming years no change in 
financial rewards is expected. Furthermore, the majority of the childminders 
perceive an increase in work pressure over the past three years. For the future a 
further increase is expected. Therefore, over time the childminders signal an 
increase in extrinsic rewards and a decrease in the intrinsic rewards they derive 
from their job. 
Given the fact that extrinsic and intrinsic rewards have been found to 
positively affect the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the childminders, 
respectively, over time an increase in extrinsic motivation and a decrease in 
intrinsic motivation can be expected. According to the childminders the extrinsic 
motivation has, on average, decreased slightly over the past three years, however, 
whereas the intrinsic motivation has increased slightly. The perceived 
development of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation over time is therefore the 
opposite to what was expected on the basis of the perceived development of 
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards over time. 
Although the perceived development of employee motivation indicates 
that the increase in work pressure has not led to a decrease in intrinsic motivation 
over time, in the long term a decrease in intrinsic rewards may, however, result in 
a downward pressure on the intrinsic motivation of the childminders, which might 
even lead childminders to leave the sector. In our sample, we included 
childminders who have resigned from their job during the past three years. The 
childminders in the sample who have left the child-care sector during the last three 
years state that, in addition to personal reasons such as moving or the birth of a 
child, lack of fulfilment and possibilities of developing themselves were the 
foremost reasons for leaving the sector. With regard to the intrinsic rewards they 
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claim to have received from their job and the development of intrinsic rewards 
over time in particular, the former childminders are far less positive than the 
childminders who are currently working in the sector. A portion of the 
childminders who find the decrease in intrinsic rewards over time problematic 
have probably left the child-care sector therefore. Therefore, the introduction of 
market forces in the Dutch child-care sector might be more detrimental to the 
intrinsic motivation of the childminders than is clear from the analyses among the 
childminders who are still working in child care.  
7.2.3 If employee motivation changes, to what extent do these changes influence 
employee performance? (research question 3) 
Finally, we have analysed the extent to which employee motivation affects 
employee performance. In doing so, the focus was on the quality of employee 
performance. The quality of the performance of the childminders is measured by 
individual performance measures and measures with regard to the way in which 
the childminders rate the level of performance of the day-care centre they work for. 
Both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation are expected to have a positive effect on the 
quality of employee performance. 
With regard to the effects of employee motivation on individual 
performance, the results show that none of the individual work performance items 
are significantly influenced by the extrinsic motivation of the childminders. The 
intrinsic motivation of the childminders does, however, significantly affect 
individual performance. Highly intrinsically motivated childminders report 
significantly less often the desire to leave the child-care organisation in the 
upcoming years, and the higher the intrinsic motivation of the childminder, the 
higher their context performance. The self-rating measure of the performance of 
the childminder in comparison with his or her colleagues and the amount of sick 
leave of the childminder, are not significantly influenced by employee motivation.  
The analyses show further that employee motivation has a high impact on 
the way in which the childminders rate the level of performance of the day-care 
centre they work for. Both the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the 
childminders have a significant positive effect on the extent to which childminders 
claim that certain quality aspects are realised in the day-care centres they work for, 
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and on the extent to which childminders claim that the day-care centre focuses on 
professionalism and quality of care. In addition, the intrinsic motivation of the 
childminders significantly affects the general levels of sick leave and personnel 
turnover. The higher the intrinsic motivation of the childminder, the lower the 
level of sick leave and the level of turnover that the day-care centre exhibits, 
according to the childminder. The results indicate therefore that, as expected, both 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation positively influence employee performance. 
With regard to the perceived development of employee performance over 
time, the childminders in the sample report that over the past three years both the 
levels of sick leave and personnel turnover have increased at the day-care centre 
they work for. For the future, a further increase in turnover is expected. The 
childminders were also asked to report on how they perceive the development of 
the attention that is paid to professionalism and quality of care in the day-care 
centre they work for. The childminders perceive an increase in attention that is 
paid to professionalism and quality of care, both in the past three years and the 
coming three years. Over time, the childminders perceive both positive and 
negative developments in employee performance therefore. On one hand, 
increasingly more attention is paid to professionalism and quality of care. On the 
other hand, the levels of sick leave and personnel turnover have increased over 
time. Given that, on the basis of our cross-sectional analyses, we have to conclude 
that the introduction of market forces does not significantly influence the employee 
motivation of the childminders, it remains to be seen whether these perceived 
changes in employee performance are due to the introduction of market forces in 
the Dutch child-care sector. 
 
7.3 Limitations and strengths 
 
The effects of a longitudinal process, the introduction of market forces in the Dutch 
child-care sector, are measured using cross-sectional data. The extent to which 
child-care organisations in the sample are confronted with market forces is 
assumed to be a reflection of the development of child-care organisations over 
time. A strong aspect of this research is the fact that a broad range of child-care 
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organisations were included, characterised by differences with regard to the extent 
to which they are financially dependent on the government, the urbanity of the 
area in which they are located and their size. Also, it was attempted to achieve a 
good understanding of the effects of the introduction of market forces in the Dutch 
child-care sector by including measurements on organisation level, location level 
and employee level.  
Nevertheless, the cross-sectional design applied in this study is subject to 
limitations. Childminders working in day-care centres with a high level of sick 
leave at the time of the data collection might, for example, experience higher work 
pressure. Moreover, given the small differences in employee governance between 
the child-care organisations in the sample and time lag effects, the extent to which 
child-care organisations are confronted with market forces may not provide an 
ideal reflection of the development of child-care organisations over time. 
Another strong aspect of this research involves the investigation of 
crowding effects in the context of paid work. As explained in Chapter 1, the 
measurement of crowding effects in the context of paid work concerns a field of 
empirical research that is very scarce. The research done so far is based mostly on 
activities for which people typically do not expect to be paid, such as puzzle 
solving or volunteer work, using an experimental design. Until now, little field 
research has been done within an organisational context. Therefore, by 
investigating the effects of external interventions on intrinsic motivation in the 
context of paid work this research contributes to a field of empirical research that is 
very scarce.  
 In this research we have attempted to improve the understanding of 
crowding effects by distinguishing between the effects of external interventions on 
intrinsic motivation via a change in intrinsic rewards and the way in which the 
external intervention is perceived. In several respects, our analysis of crowding 
effects is, however, problematic. First of all, the analysis of the effects of external 
interventions on intrinsic motivation could be improved by the use of panel data 
given the causal relationship between external interventions and intrinsic 
motivation. The use of panel data is, however, also subject to limitations such as 
attrition. Second, it might be that in our operationalisation of intrinsic rewards the 
perception effect is partly absorbed, which makes it problematic to distinguish 
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between the effects of intrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation and the perception 
effect. Finally, childminders were not literally asked how they perceive the 
introduction of market forces in the child-care sector. Instead, the perception effect 
is operationalised as an interaction effect between intrinsic rewards and the extent 
to which the child-care organisation is confronted with market forces on intrinsic 
motivation, and between intrinsic rewards and the employee governance of child-
care organisations on intrinsic motivation.  
 
7.4 Implications of this study 
7.4.1 Implications for future research 
What is clear from this research is that extrinsic and intrinsic rewards are 
important for employee motivation and therefore for employee performance. In 
decisions with regard to organisational change, the effects that a change in 
employee governance might have on the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards employees 
derive from their job should be taken into consideration therefore. Given the trend 
in the Netherlands to introduce market forces in traditionally welfare-oriented 
sectors, it would be very interesting to conduct the data collection in other care 
sectors, such as home care and residential care.  
In addition, it would be very interesting to collect new data in the Dutch 
child-care sector a few years from now. In doing so, it will be possible to analyse 
developments over time, which will increase our understanding of the effects of 
the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector on employee 
governance, motivation and performance. Moreover, being able to analyse the 
effects of external interventions on intrinsic motivation in the context of paid work 
using measurements on several points in time will improve our understanding of 
crowding effects.  
7.4.2 Policy implications  
In this research, it was found that the employee governance of child-care 
organisations affects the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that childminders derive 
from their job. The extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, in turn, influence employee 
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motivation and performance. Since intrinsic rewards are a very important source 
of motivation for the childminders, and given the fact that the performance of the 
childminders is influenced mostly by intrinsic motivation, it is clear from this 
research that child-care organisations need to focus on intrinsic rewards when 
governing their employees.     
 Moreover, it was found that the extent to which child-care organisations 
are confronted with market forces does not significantly influence the employee 
governance of child-care organisations. Child-care organisations confronted with a 
low level of market forces were not found to do a better or worse job when 
motivating their employees than child-care organisations confronted with a high 
level of market forces. For the employee motivation and performance of the 
childminders it therefore does not matter much whether or not the child-care 
organisation is confronted with market forces. What matters is how employers in 
child care are governing their employees.   
Finally, it was found that the childminders in the Dutch child-care sector 
report a high level of motivation and willingness to apply themselves to their 
tasks. Since the introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector does 
not seem to affect the motivation and performance of the childminders, and the 
childminders do not perceive large changes in employee motivation and work 
effort over time, the high motivation and performance levels of the childminders 
are found to be relatively stable over time. Given the fact that the performance of 
the child-care sector highly depends on the motivation and performance of the 
childminders, these results can be considered support for the findings of the 
research of Vermeer et al. (2005), who found that the quality of the interaction 
between the childminders and the children was stable over the past ten years. 
Again, this seems to indicate that the introduction of market forces and the 
accompanying emphasis on efficiency in itself is not at odds with high quality 
performance. In fact, it suggests that the quality of the Dutch child-care sector, 
often describes in rather negative terms, is in fact rather positive.    
 
 
Conclusion: Summary and Implications 
135  
7.5 Concluding remarks 
 
All in all, it can be concluded that the introduction of market forces in the Dutch 
child-care sector does not have a large influence on the motivation and 
performance of the childminders. The rewards childminders derive from their job 
do, however, change. The level of extrinsic rewards increases slightly, whereas the 
level of intrinsic rewards decreases slightly. While the childminders perceive, on 
average, an increase in work pressure over time, this increase is modest and hardly 
interferes with the enjoyment derived from working in child care. Although the 
introduction of market forces in the Dutch child-care sector goes hand in hand 
with an increase in attention paid to realising a high efficiency, the childminders 
still greatly enjoy working in child care and are willing to perform in the best way 
they can. Therefore, the quality of the Dutch child-care sector, measured in terms 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics market forces (organisation level) 
 Min. Max. Mean SD α1  H2  N 
Market forces        
Scale financially independent from government 
(scale based on reciprocal z-scores of the scale items)  
-7.37 4.86 0 3.56 .76 .
.3 
30 
  Item 1: welfare background 
  (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
0 2 .90 .76 .62 . 30 
  Item 2: subsidy relationship 
  (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
0 1 .77 .43 .69 . 30 
  Item 3: subsidised child places 
  (percentage of subsidised child places) 
0 39.1 14.26 13.34 .68 . 30 
  Item 4: housing subsidies  
  (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
 
0 1 .17 .38 .79 . 30 
  Item 5: part of a welfare organisation 
  (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
0 1 .13 .35 .77 . 30 
1 In the columns denoted α in this appendix, the Cronbach’s alpha is given for the total scale and for the scale items the 
Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted is given. 
2 In the columns denoted H in this appendix, the Mokken H-value is given for the total scale and for the scale items the 
Mokken H(i)’s are given. 
3 No Mokken analysis since the scale is based on z-scores of the items in the scale. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the employee governance  items (organisation level) 
 Min. Max. Mean SD α H N 
Employee governance        
Flexibility employment contracts 
(percentage of childminders with a temporary contract) 
0 0.38 .15 .10 . . 23 
 
Tightness job design 
















Focus on pay-for-performance in reward system 
(whether or not a higher wage for a better than average performance 
















Focus on pay-for-performance in career system 
















Scale attractiveness reward system 















   
  Item 1: Primary rewards above collective labour   















   
  Item 2: Secondary rewards above collective labour    
















Scale attractiveness career system  
















  Item 1: possibilities offered for broadening tasks  















   
  Item 2: possibilities offered for following courses  















   
  Item 3: influence offered on content of courses 















   
  Item 4: influence offered on policy of day-care centre 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the intrinsic and extrinsic rewards  items (employee level) 
 Min. Max. Mean SD α H N 
Extrinsic rewards        
Fixed contract 
(0 = no, 1 = yes)  
0 1 .85 .36 … . 475 
 
Financial bonus 
















Scale behavioural confirmation from others 
















  Item 1: behavioural confirmation from employer 
















  Item 2: behavioural confirmation from  
  people outside child care 

















  Item 3: behavioural confirmation from colleagues 
















  Item 4: behavioural confirmation from parents 


















       
Appreciation children 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 






Work pressure (reciprocal measure)  
















Scale possibilities for development  

















  Item 1: possibilities to broaden tasks  















   
  Item 2: possibilities to follow courses  
















   
  Item 3: influence on supply of courses  















   
  Item 4: influence on policy of day-care centre 

















Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the employee motivation items (employee level) 
 Min. Max. Mean SD α H N 
Extrinsic motivation        
Extrinsic motivation scale 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
1 5 3.21 .77 .71 .42 466 
 
  Item 1: my benefits are good 
















  Item 2: my chances for promotion are good 
















  Item 3: my job security is good  
















  Item 4: I feel that I am being paid fairly 

















       
Intrinsic motivation scale 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
1.5 
 
5 4.42 .60 .66 .58 474 
 
  Item 1: My job gives me a sense of fulfilment  
















  Item 2: my job is interesting 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for individual performance items (employee level) 
 Min. Max. Mean SD α H N 
Individual performance        
Scale performance in comparison with colleagues 
(1 = much worse .. 5 = much better) 
2.5 5 3.32 .49 
 
.64 .56 473 
 
  Item 1: how well is the performance in comparison     
















  Item 2: how much is done in comparison 
















Scale context performance 
















  Item 1: regularly performing extra tasks 
















  Item 2: thinking constructively about organisation     


































(whether or not the employee has 



















Table 6: Descriptive statistics performance of day-care centre (employee level)  
 Min. Max. Mean SD α H N 
General performance         
Scale quality aspects 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
1.33 5 3.54 .53 .81 .49 467 
 
  Item 1: Presence of stimulating toys 
















  Item 2: Offer of varied activities 
















  Item 3: Continuity relationship child & childminder 
















  Item 4: Stability of child group 
















  Item 5: Balanced placement policy 
















  Item 6: Signalling developmental disorders 
















Scale high quality care 
















  Item 1: attention paid to professionalism of care 
















  Item 2: attention paid to quality of care 
















Sick leave day-care centre  
















Turnover day-care centre 
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Table 7: Descriptives control variables 
 Min. Max. Mean SD α H N 
Control variables organisation level         
Size organisation 
(number of day-care and after-school-care child places) 
80 2239 701.75 667.93 . . 30 
 
Urbanity organisation 
















Control variables location level 
       
Size location 
(number of day-care and after-school-care child places) 
12 240 53.79 34.82 . . 47 
 
Urbanity location 

















Control variables employee level 
       
Age 
(age in years) 
19 62 32.33 9.86 . . 468 
 
Job tenure 



















































Children living at home 
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Table 1: Descriptives perceived development of employee governance over time 
 Min.  Max. Mean  SD P N 
Perceived development over time       
Flexibility employment contracts  (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
2 5 3.41 .63 .00** 29 
Flexibility employment contracts  (future) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
3 5 3.60 .68 .00** 30 
Tightness job design (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
2 4 2.96 .35 .57 25 
Tightness job design (future) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
2 4 3.07 .47 .43 27 
Work pressure (past, organisation) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 4 2.97 .78 .81 29 
Work pressure (future, organisation) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
2 4 3.10 .56 .33 29 
Work pressure (past, location) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 3.61 .80 .00** 66 
Work pressure (future, location) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
2 5 3.32 .66 .00** 68 
Work pressure (past, childminder) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 3.75 .98 .00** 344 
Work pressure (future, childminder) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 3.51 1.18 .00** 435 
Pay-for-performance reward system (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
3 5 3.17 .47 .06 29 
Pay-for-performance reward system (future) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
3 4 3.43 .50 .00** 30 
Pay-for-performance career system (past)   
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase)   
3 5 3.34 .61 .01** 29 
Pay-for-performance career system (future) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
3 4 3.40 .50 .00** 30 
Attractiveness reward system (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
3 5 4.10 .77 .00** 29 
Attractiveness reward system (future) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
3 5 3.55 .57 .00** 29 
Attractiveness career system (past)   
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
3 5 3.45 .57 .00** 29 
Attractiveness career system (future)   
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
2 4 3.28 .53 .01** 29 
T-test of difference between mean and test value 3 (no change): * =significant at 5%,**=significant at 1%.   
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Table 2: Descriptives extrinsic and intrinsic rewards childminders derive from their job 
 Min.  Max. Mean  SD P N 
Extrinsic rewards       
Fixed contract  
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 
0 1 .85 .36 . 475 
Financial bonus  
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 
0 1 .07 .25 . 475 
Behavioural confirmation from others 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
1.5 5 3.55 .56 .00** 473 
Intrinsic rewards        
Appreciation from the children 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high)  
1 5 4.28 .72 .00** 474 
Work pressure 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high)  
1 5 3.44 .68 .00** 472 
Possibilities for development 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high)  
1 4.75 2.96 .69 .26 454 
Perceived development over time       
Work pressure (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 3.75 .98 .00** 344 
Work pressure (future) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 3.51 1.18 .00** 435 
Extrinsic rewards (past) 













Extrinsic rewards (future) 













T-test of difference between mean and test value 3 (not low/not high): * =significant at 5%,**=significant at 1%.   
 
Table 3: Descriptives employee motivation 
 Min.  Max. Mean  SD P N 
Mean level of employee motivation       
Intrinsic motivation 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
1.5 5 4.42 .60 .00** 474 
Extrinsic motivation 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
1 5 3.21 .77 .00** 466 
Perceived development over time       
Intrinsic motivation (past)  
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 3.17 .77 .00** 346 
Intrinsic motivation (future) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 3.20 1.21 .00** 440 
Extrinsic motivation (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 2.86 .70 .00** 335 
Extrinsic motivation (future) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 2.87 1.06 .02* 393 
T-test of difference between mean and test value 3 (not low/not high): * =significant at 5%,**=significant at 1%.   
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Table 4: Descriptives employee performance 
 Min.  Max. Mean  SD P N 
Individual performance       
Performance in comparison with colleagues 
(1 = much worse .. 5 = much better) 
2.5 5 3.32 .49 .00** 473 
Context performance 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high)  
2 5 4.05 .68 .00** 473 
Sick leave 
(number of days absent due to illness) 
0 200 8.42 18.54 . 462 
Turnover intention 
(0 = stay, 1 = leave) 
0 1 .16 .37 . 475 
 
General performance 
      
Quality aspects 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
1.33 5 3.54 .53 .00** 467 
Professionalism and quality of care 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
2 5 4.08 .68 .00** 473 
General level of sick leave  
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
1 5 2.70 .99 .00** 471 
General level of turnover intention  
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
1 5 2.76 .93 .00** 454 
T-test of difference between mean and test value 3 (not low/not high): * =significant at 5%,**=significant at 1%.   
Table 5: Descriptives perceived development of employee performance 
 Min.  Max. Mean  SD P N 
Individual performance1        
Work effort (past) 
(decrease (0), no change (1), increase (2)) 
0 2 1.11 .61 .00** 346 
 
General performance2    
      
Professionalism and quality of care (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1.5 5 3.96 .90 .00** 335 
Professionalism and quality of care (future) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 3.89 .93 .00** 448 
General level of sick leave (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 3.15 .88 .00** 338 
General level of sick leave (future) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 3.03 1.16 .55 415 
General level of turnover intention (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 3.09 .75 .03* 326 
General level of turnover intention (future) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 3.12 1.07 .02* 377 
1 T-test of difference between mean and test value 1 (no change): *=significant at 5%,**=significant at 1%.   




Table 6: Descriptives extrinsic and intrinsic rewards former childminders 
 Min.  Max. Mean  SD P N 
Extrinsic rewards       
Fixed contract (no = 0, yes=1) 0 1 .77 .43 . 35 
Financial bonus (no = 0, yes=1) 0 1 .06 .23 . 36 
Behavioural confirmation from others 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
2.25 5 3.62 .61 .00** 36 
 
Intrinsic rewards  
      
Appreciation from the children 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high)  
3 5 4.42 .65 .00** 36 
Work pressure 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high)  
2 5 3.56 .74 .00** 36 
Possibilities for development 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high)  
1 3.75 2.51 .71 .00** 35 
 
Development rewards 
      
Extrinsic rewards (past) 
  Financial rewards    
  (1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 3.41 .85 .04* 22 
Intrinsic rewards  (past) 
  Work pressure (reciprocal measure) 
  (1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
2 5 4.32 .95 .00** 22 
T-test of difference between mean and test value 3 (not low/not high):*=significant at 5%,**=significant at 1%.   
 
Table 7: Differences in extrinsic and intrinsic rewards between present and former childminders 




F P N 
Extrinsic rewards      
Fixed contract (no = 0, yes=1) .85 .77 1.46 .23 510 
Financial bonus (no = 0, yes=1) .07 .06 .101 .75 511 
Behavioural confirmation from others 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
3.55 3.62 .432 .51 509 
 
Intrinsic rewards 
     
Appreciation from the children 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high)  
4.28 4.42 1.19 .28 510 
Work pressure 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high)  
3.44 3.56 .873 .35 508 
Possibilities for development 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high)  
2.96 2.51 14.32 .00** 489 
 
Development rewards 
     
Extrinsic rewards (past) 
  Financial rewards    
  (1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
3.29 3.41 .535 .47 354 
Intrinsic rewards  (past) 
  Work pressure (reciprocal measure) 
  (1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
3.75 4.32 7.06 .01** 366 
Analysis of difference in means: * = significant at the 5% level,  ** = significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 8: Descriptives extrinsic and intrinsic motivation former childminders 
 Min.  Max. Mean  SD P N 
Mean level of employee motivation       
Extrinsic motivation 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 




(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
2 5 3.94 .95 .00** .36 
 
Perceived development over time 
      
Extrinsic motivation (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 2.73 1.08 .25 22 
Intrinsic motivation (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1 5 2.86 1.11 .56 21 
T-test of difference between mean and test value 3 (not low/not high): * =significant at 5%,**=significant at 1%.   
 
Table 9: Differences extrinsic and intrinsic motivation between present and former childminders 




F P N 
Mean level of employee motivation      
Extrinsic motivation 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
3.21 2.89 5.39 .02* 499 
Intrinsic motivation 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
4.42 3.94 19.28 .00** 510 
 
Perceived development over time 
     
Extrinsic motivation (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
2.86 2.73 .722 .40 357 
Intrinsic motivation (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
3.17 2.86 3.17 .08 367 






Table 10: Descriptives employee performance former childminders 
 Min.  Max. Mean  SD P N 
Individual performance       
Context performance (1= very low .. 5 = very high) 2 5 4.10 .80 .00** 36 
 
General performance 
      
Quality aspects (1= very low .. 5 = very high) 2.17 4.67 3.30 .62 .01** 34 
Professionalism and quality of care 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
1.5 5 3.56 .84 .00** 36 
General level of sick leave  
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
1 5 2.86 1.22 .50 36 
General level of turnover intention  
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
1 5 2.94 .77 .66 35 
 
Development performance 
      
Work effort (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
0 2 .73 .63 . 22 
Professionalism and quality of care (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1.5 5 3.83 1.07 .00** 20 
General level of sick leave (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
2 5 3.24 .89 .23 21 
General level of sick leave (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
2 5 3.29 .64 .06 21 
T-test of difference between mean and test value 3 (not low/not high): * =significant at 5%,**=significant at 1%.   
Table 11: Differences in employee performance between present and former childminders 




F P N 
Individual performance      
Context performance  
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
4.05 4.10 .147 .70 509 
General performance      
Quality aspects (1= very low .. 5 = very high) 3.54 3.30 6.29 .01** 501 
Professionalism and quality of care 
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
4.08 3.56 18.69 .00** 509 
General level of sick leave  
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
2.70 2.86 .823 .37 507 
General level of turnover intention  
(1= very low .. 5 = very high) 
2.76 2.94 1.35 .25 489 
Development performance      
Work effort (past)  
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
1.11 .73 8.33 .00** 368 
Professionalism and quality of care (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
3.96 3.83 .446 .51 355 
General level of sick leave (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
3.15 3.24 .209 .65 359 
General level of turnover intention (past) 
(1= large decrease .. 5 = large increase) 
3.09 3.29 1.40 .24 347 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Het doel van dit onderzoek is om te beschrijven en te verklaren in hoeverre de 
introductie van marktwerking in de kinderopvang in Nederland invloed heeft op 
de aansturing van groepsleid(st)ers in kinderopvangorganisaties en op de 
arbeidsmotivatie en arbeidsprestaties van deze groepsleid(st)ers. 
 
De volgende onderzoeksvragen zijn geformuleerd: 
1. In hoeverre wordt de aansturing van groepsleid(st)ers in 
kinderopvangorganisaties beïnvloed door de introductie van 
marktwerking in de kinderopvang in Nederland?  
2. Als de aansturing van groepsleid(st)ers verandert, in hoeverre beïnvloeden 
deze veranderingen dan de arbeidsmotivatie van de groepsleid(st)ers? 
3. Als de arbeidsmotivatie verandert, in hoeverre beïnvloeden deze 
veranderingen dan de arbeidsprestaties van de groepsleid(st)ers? 
 
De introductie van marktwerking in de kinderopvang 
 
In hoofdstuk twee wordt uitgebreid ingegaan op de ontwikkeling van de  
kinderopvang in Nederland. De kinderopvang ontwikkelt zich van een 
welzijnssector naar een marktsector. Dit overgangsproces is onderdeel van een 
ingezette trend in de gehele Nederlandse samenleving naar een bedrijfsmatiger 
aanpak en een daarmee gepaard gaande noodzaak en wens om de efficiëntie te 
verhogen. Zelfs in sectoren die traditioneel niet functioneren op basis van 
marktkrachten, zoals de zorgsector, wordt marktwerking geïntroduceerd.  
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De overgang in de kinderopvang van een welzijnssector naar een 
marktsector heeft geleidelijk plaatsgevonden. In de loop der jaren zijn gemeenten 
steeds strengere voorwaarden gaan stellen aan de verstrekking van subsidies en is 
het aantal kinderopvangorganisaties dat een beroep kon doen op overheidsgelden 
toegenomen. De laatste stap in de overgang van een welzijnssector naar een 
marktsector heeft plaatsgevonden op 1 januari 2005, met de introductie van de Wet 
Kinderopvang. Met de introductie van deze wet is de financiële organisatie van de 
kinderopvang overgaan van een systeem van aanbodfinanciering naar een systeem 
van vraagfinanciering. Dit betekent dat de vraag naar kinderopvang nu 
gesubsidieerd wordt in plaats van het aanbod. Daarmee zijn ook de nog resterende 
subsidierelaties tussen kinderopvangorganisaties en gemeenten beëindigd. 
De introductie van marktwerking is niet zonder gevolgen. 
Kinderopvangorganisaties dienen de omslag te maken van een non-profit 
organisatie, die terug kan vallen op overheidssubsidies, naar een organisatie die in 
staat is om te verdienen aan de diensten die ze levert. Niet langer kan er 
kinderopvang aangeboden worden onder de kostprijs. Om te kunnen overleven in 
de marktsector, dienen kinderopvangorganisaties inzicht te krijgen in de kosten en 
opbrengsten en dienen ze deze in evenwicht te brengen. De vraag is welke 
mogelijkheden kinderopvangorganisaties hebben om met de veranderingen in de 
kinderopvang om te gaan. Hoe kunnen kinderopvangorganisaties zich aanpassen 
aan de wensen van de markt en hun financiële positie verbeteren?  
Een mogelijke strategie voor kinderopvangorganisaties om zich aan te 
passen aan de wensen van de markt, is door het aanbieden van diensten die andere 
organisaties niet aanbieden, zoals langere of flexibelere openingstijden en het 
aanbieden van andere producten naast kinderopvang. Andere mogelijkheden die 
kinderopvangorganisaties hebben om hun financiële positie te verbeteren zijn, 
bijvoorbeeld, het verhogen van de verkoopprijzen of het verlagen van de kostprijs. 
Gezien het feit dat in de kinderopvang de personeelskosten de belangrijkste 
kostenpost vormen, vormt het efficiënter inzetten van personeel een belangrijke 
manier om een daling van de kostprijs te realiseren. In dit boek richten we ons dan 
ook met name op de mate waarin kinderopvangorganisaties zich aan passen aan 
de introductie van marktwerking in de kinderopvang in Nederland door personeel 
efficiënter in te zetten.  
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We veronderstellen dat de kinderopvangorganisaties, om het personeel 
efficiënter in te kunnen zetten, hun organisatie anders zullen inrichten en de 
werknemers anders aan zullen sturen. De introductie van marktwerking zorgt naar 
verwachting voor een toename in: de flexibiliteit van de arbeidscontracten, de 
efficiëntie van de organisatie van het werk, de mate waarin de beloningen en de 
doorgroeimogelijkheden van de groepsleid(st)ers prestatieafhankelijk zijn, en de 
aantrekkelijkheid van de beloningen en doorgroeimogelijkheden van de 
groepsleid(st)ers. 
 
De arbeidsmotivatie en arbeidsprestaties van de groepsleid(st)ers  
 
Een verandering in aansturing van de groepsleid(st)ers heeft naar verwachting 
gevolgen voor de arbeidsmotivatie en arbeidsprestaties van de groepsleid(st)ers in 
de kinderopvang. In hoofdstuk drie wordt het theoretische model uitgewerkt, dat 
de verwachte effecten van een verandering in aansturing op de arbeidsmotivatie 
en arbeidsprestaties van de groepsleid(st)ers verklaart. 
De effecten van de introductie van marktwerking in de kinderopvang in 
Nederland op de arbeidsmotivatie en arbeidsprestaties van de groepsleid(st)ers 
worden verklaard met behulp van de sociale-productiefunctiebenadering. In deze 
benadering wordt verondersteld dat alle mensen één universeel doel in het leven 
hebben: subjectief welzijn. Het hebben van een baan is een van de bronnen die 
mensen hebben voor het produceren van welzijn: een baan biedt werknemers 
extrinsieke en intrinsieke beloningen. Deze beloningen zijn op te vatten als 
productiefactoren voor de productie van welzijn. De extrinsieke en intrinsieke 
beloningen die werknemers ontlenen aan een baan, beïnvloeden, samen met de 
productiviteit van de beloningen, het welzijnsniveau van de werknemers en 
daarmee de extrinsieke en intrinsieke motivatie. Hoe hoger de extrinsieke en 
intrinsieke beloningen die werknemers ontlenen aan de baan, hoe hoger de 
extrinsieke en intrinsieke motivatie van werknemers. Ook geldt: hoe hoger de 
productiviteit van deze beloningen, dat wil zeggen hoe groter de hoeveelheid 
welzijn die wordt ontleend aan een beloning van een bepaalde omvang, hoe hoger 
de extrinsieke en intrinsieke motivatie van werknemers.  
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In het verklaren van de effecten van de introductie van marktwerking in 
de kinderopvang op de arbeidsmotivatie en arbeidsprestaties van de 
groepsleid(st)ers, wordt de sociale-productiefunctiebenadering geïntegreerd met 
de crowding-theorie. Volgens de crowding-theorie wordt de intrinsieke motivatie 
van werknemers niet alleen beïnvloed door de intrinsieke beloningen maar ook 
door de manier waarop er tegen een externe interventie, zoals een verandering in 
aansturing, wordt aangekeken. Als een externe interventie als stimulerend wordt 
beschouwd, stijgt de productiviteit van de intrinsieke beloningen en als gevolg 
daarvan neemt de intrinsieke motivatie van de groepsleid(st)ers toe. Als de externe 
interventie echter als controlerend wordt beschouwd, daalt de productiviteit van 
de intrinsieke beloningen en als gevolg daarvan neemt de intrinsieke motivatie van 
de groepsleid(st)ers af. Een verandering in de aansturing van groepsleid(st)ers 
heeft naar verwachting dan ook niet alleen gevolgen voor de arbeidsmotivatie van 
de groepsleid(st)ers via een verandering in de extrinsieke en intrinsieke 
beloningen, maar ook via een verandering in de productiviteit van de intrinsieke 
beloningen.  
Zoals aangegeven in hoofdstuk drie, hebben de veranderingen in de 
aansturing van de groepsleid(st)ers in de kinderopvang naar verwachting zowel 
positieve als negatieve gevolgen voor de extrinsieke en intrinsieke beloningen die 
de groepsleid(st)ers ontlenen aan het werk. Het algehele effect van de introductie 
van marktwerking in de kinderopvang op de extrinsieke en intrinsieke motivatie 
van de groepsleid(st)ers, via een verandering in extrinsieke en intrinsieke 
beloningen, is daarom niet op voorhand aan te geven. Wat betreft de productiviteit 
van de intrinsieke beloningen wordt verwacht dat de verandering in de aansturing 
van de groepsleid(st)ers deels positief en deels negatief zal worden beoordeeld. Zo 
zal naar verwachting een verbetering van de doorgroeimogelijkheden positief 
worden beoordeeld en een strakkere arbeidsorganisatie negatief. Tot slot 
verwachten we dat de introductie van marktwerking in de kinderopvang, los van 
de verandering in aansturing die dit mogelijk tot gevolg heeft, negatief wordt 
beoordeeld door de groepsleid(st)ers. Dit omdat de introductie van marktwerking 
voornamelijk vanuit financiële overwegingen in gang is gezet en niet zozeer vanuit 
het belang van de groepsleid(st)ers en/of het belang van de kinderen.  
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Veranderingen in de extrinsieke en intrinsieke motivatie beïnvloeden naar 
verwachting vervolgens de arbeidsprestaties van de groepsleid(st)ers. We 
veronderstellen dat het in het bijzonder in de kinderopvang van belang is om de 
nadruk te leggen op de kwaliteit van de arbeidsprestaties, omdat de kwaliteit van 
kinderopvang in sterke mate afhangt van de inzet van de groepsleid(st)ers. We 
verwachten dat zowel de extrinsieke als de intrinsieke motivatie van de 
groepsleid(st)ers de kwaliteit van de arbeidsprestaties positief beïnvloeden. De 
relatie tussen het motivatie- en het prestatieniveau is gebaseerd op het mutual-
investment-model. Dit model definieert de relatie tussen de werkgever en de 
werknemer als een uitruilrelatie en veronderstelt dat als een werkgever investeert 
in een werknemer, de werknemer dit zal beantwoorden door een hoger 
prestatieniveau te vertonen.  
De gevolgen van de introductie van marktwerking in de kinderopvang 
voor de kwaliteit van de arbeidsprestaties van de groepsleid(st)ers hangt dus af 
van de mate waarin de introductie van marktwerking de arbeidsmotivatie van de 
groepsleid(st)ers beïnvloedt. Omdat de veranderingen in de kinderopvang naar 
verwachting zowel positieve als negatieve gevolgen hebben voor de extrinsieke en 
intrinsieke motivatie van de groepsleid(st)ers, is het saldo van de effecten van de 
introductie van marktwerking op de kwaliteit van de arbeidsprestaties van de 




De gevolgen van de introductie van marktwerking in de kinderopvang in 
Nederland op de aansturing en de arbeidsmotivatie en arbeidsprestaties van de 
groepsleid(st)ers zijn geanalyseerd met behulp van cross-sectionele data. De data, 
operationalisaties en statistische modellen die zijn gebruikt in dit onderzoek, zijn 
beschreven in hoofdstuk vier.  
Aan het onderzoek hebben in totaal dertig kinderopvangorganisaties mee 
gedaan, gedifferentieerd naar: de mate waarin ze financieel afhankelijk zijn van 
hun relatie met de overheid, de regio waarin ze opereren en grootte. Binnen deze 
dertig organisaties zijn 68 kinderdagverblijven geselecteerd waarbinnen in totaal 
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1046 vragenlijsten zijn uitgezet onder de groepsleid(st)ers. Hiervan zijn er 477 
terug ontvangen, een respons van 46%. Tevens zijn er 110 vragenlijsten uitgezet 
onder de groepsleid(st)ers die in 2002, 2003 of 2004 een organisatie uit de 
steekproef hebben verlaten. Hiervan zijn er 36 terug ontvangen, een respons van 
33%. 
Over het jaar 2003 is informatie verzameld over de wijze waarop de 
kinderopvangorganisaties de groepsleid(st)ers aansturen. Op 
groepsleid(st)erniveau is informatie verzameld over de arbeidsmotivatie en 
arbeidsprestaties van de groepsleid(st)ers. In aanvulling op de verzameling van 
informatie over de actuele situatie in het jaar 2003 hebben we gemeten hoe 
veranderingen over de tijd door de kinderopvangorganisaties, 




De resultaten van het onderzoek worden weergegeven in de hoofdstukken vijf en 
zes. In hoofdstuk vijf wordt aandacht besteed aan de beschrijvende analyses en in 
hoofdstuk zes aan de verklarende analyses. Hier worden de resultaten 
samengevat.  
We veronderstellen dat de mate waarin de kinderopvangorganisaties in de 
steekproef financieel afhankelijk zijn van de relatie met de overheid de 
ontwikkeling van de kinderopvangorganisaties over de tijd weergeeft. 
Kinderopvangorganisaties die financieel onafhankelijk zijn van de overheid, en 
dus in hoge mate te maken hebben met marktwerking, worden verondersteld te 
worden geconfronteerd met een grote noodzaak om een hoge efficiëntie te behalen. 
We verwachten dat deze organisaties de groepsleid(st)ers op een andere manier 
aan zullen sturen dan de kinderopvangorganisaties waarbij die noodzaak tot het 
behalen van een hoge efficiëntie minder aanwezig is. De resultaten tonen echter 
aan dat geen van de elementen van aansturing significant wordt beïnvloed door de 




In aanvulling op de cross-sectionele analyses hebben we de managers van 
de kinderopvangorganisaties gevraagd hoe zij de ontwikkelingen in aansturing 
over de tijd waarnemen. Uit deze bevindingen komt naar voren dat de 
kinderopvangorganisaties een toename over de tijd waarnemen in: de flexibiliteit 
van de arbeidscontracten, de mate waarin de beloningen en de 
doorgroeimogelijkheden afhankelijk zijn van de prestaties van de groepsleid(st)ers, 
en de aantrekkelijkheid van de beloningen en doorgroeimogelijkheden van de 
groepsleid(st)ers.  In tegenstelling tot hetgeen bij de cross-sectionele analyses het 
geval is, zijn deze bevindingen conform de verwachting. 
Het feit dat de uitkomsten van de cross-sectionele analyses niet 
overeenkomen met de bevindingen van de analyses over de tijd, wordt 
mogelijkerwijs veroorzaakt door de kleine steekproefomvang (n=30) en de 
mogelijkheid dat ten tijde van de dataverzameling de aansturing van de 
groepsleid(st)ers zich al had aangepast aan de veranderingen in de kinderopvang. 
Mogelijkerwijs zijn de verschillen tussen kinderopvangorganisaties in de manier 
van aansturing van groepsleid(st)ers zo klein zijn geworden dat ten tijde van de 
dataverzameling de verschillen tussen kinderopvangorganisaties te klein waren 
om significante resultaten op te leveren.  
De manier waarop kinderopvangorganisaties de groepsleid(st)ers 
aansturen, beïnvloedt naar verwachting de extrinsieke en intrinsieke beloningen in 
de kinderopvang. Uit de cross-sectionele analyses komt naar voren dat de manier 
waarop kinderopvangorganisaties de groepsleid(st)ers aansturen zowel positieve 
als negatieve gevolgen heeft voor de extrinsieke en intrinsieke beloningen die de 
groepsleid(st)ers ontlenen aan het werk. Flexibele arbeidscontracten hebben een 
negatief effect op de extrinsieke en intrinsieke beloningen, terwijl de 
aantrekkelijkheid van de doorgroeimogelijkheden van de groepsleid(st)ers een 
positief effect heeft op de extrinsieke en intrinsieke beloningen die de 
groepsleid(st)ers ontlenen aan het werk. Daarnaast heeft een hoge mate van 
efficiëntie in de organisatie van het werk een negatief effect op de intrinsieke 
beloningen die de groepsleid(st)ers ontlenen aan het werk  
De extrinsieke en intrinsieke beloningen hebben naar verwachting 
vervolgens een positief effect op de extrinsieke en intrinsieke motivatie van de 
groepsleid(st)ers. Hoe hoger de productiviteit van de beloningen, hoe sterker het 
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verwachte effect van de beloningen op motivatie. De resultaten laten zien dat de 
extrinsieke en intrinsieke motivatie van de groepsleid(st)ers, zoals verwacht, 
worden beïnvloed door respectievelijk de extrinsieke en intrinsieke beloningen die 
de groepsleid(st)ers ontlenen aan het werk.  
Vervolgens is gekeken of de intrinsieke motivatie van de groepsleid(st)ers 
ook wordt beïnvloed door de manier waarop er door de groepsleid(st)ers tegen de 
veranderingen in de kinderopvang wordt aangekeken. De resultaten laten zien dat, 
behalve wat betreft de flexibiliteit van de arbeidscontracten, de mate waarin 
kinderopvangorganisaties worden geconfronteerd met marktwerking en de 
verschillende elementen van de aansturing van de groepsleid(st)ers, het effect van 
intrinsieke beloningen op intrinsieke motivatie niet beïnvloeden. Alleen in 
kinderopvangorganisaties gekenmerkt door een hoger dan gemiddeld percentage 
tijdelijke contracten, hebben de intrinsieke beloningen die de groepsleid(st)ers 
ontlenen aan hun werk (gemeten via de reciproque van werkdruk) een kleiner 
positief effect op de intrinsieke motivatie. Dit impliceert dat flexibele 
arbeidscontracten, zoals verwacht, een negatief effect hebben op de productiviteit 
van de intrinsieke beloning ‘afwezigheid van werkdruk’, wat betekent dat een 
toename in flexibiliteit van arbeidscontracten door de groepsleid(st)ers als 
controlerend wordt beschouwd en daardoor de intrinsieke motivatie verdringt.  
In aanvulling op de cross-sectionele analyses, hebben we de 
groepsleid(st)ers gevraagd welke ontwikkelingen ze over de tijd waarnemen in de 
extrinsieke en intrinsieke beloningen. De ontwikkeling over de tijd in extrinsieke 
beloningen is gemeten via de ontwikkeling van financiële beloningen, de 
ontwikkeling over de tijd in intrinsieke beloningen via de ontwikkeling van 
werkdruk (reciproque maat van intrinsieke beloningen). De resultaten laten zien 
dat de groepsleid(st)ers gemiddeld genomen een kleine toename in financiële 
beloningen waarnemen over de afgelopen drie jaar. Voor de komende drie jaar 
wordt geen verandering in financiële beloningen verwacht. De meerderheid van 
de groepsleid(st)ers neemt verder een toename in werkdruk over de afgelopen drie 
jaar waar en ook voor de komende drie jaar wordt een toename in werkdruk 
verwacht. Over de tijd wordt door de groepsleid(st)ers dus een toename in 
extrinsieke beloningen en een afname in intrinsieke beloningen waargenomen. 
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Omdat de extrinsieke en intrinsieke beloningen die de groepsleid(st)ers 
ontlenen aan het werk een positief effect hebben op respectievelijk de extrinsieke 
en intrinsieke motivatie van de groepsleid(st)ers, kunnen we over de tijd een 
toename in extrinsieke motivatie en een afname in intrinsieke motivatie 
verwachten.  Volgens de groepsleid(st)ers is de extrinsieke motivatie gemiddeld 
genomen echter licht gedaald over de afgelopen drie jaar. Voor de toekomst wordt 
bovendien een verdere daling in extrinsieke motivatie verwacht. De intrinsieke 
motivatie is daarentegen volgens de groepsleid(st)ers gemiddeld genomen iets 
gestegen de afgelopen jaren. Voor de toekomst wordt een verdere toename in 
intrinsieke motivatie verwacht. De waargenomen ontwikkeling in extrinsieke en 
intrinsieke motivatie over de tijd is derhalve tegenovergesteld aan de 
waargenomen ontwikkeling in extrinsieke en intrinsieke beloningen over de tijd. 
Alhoewel de waargenomen ontwikkeling in arbeidsmotivatie er niet op 
wijst dat de toename in werkdruk heeft geleidt tot een afname in intrinsieke 
motivatie over de tijd, kan een afname in intrinsieke beloningen op de lange 
termijn echter voor een neerwaartse druk op de intrinsieke motivatie van de 
groepsleid(st)ers zorgen, wat er zelfs toe kan leiden dat groepsleid(st)ers de sector 
kinderopvang verlaten. In onze steekproef hebben we groepsleid(st)ers 
meegenomen die tijdens de afgelopen drie jaar ontslag hebben genomen. Deze 
groepsleid(st)ers geven aan dat, naast persoonlijke redenen zoals een verhuizing of 
de geboorte van een kind, gebrek aan voldoening en gebrek aan mogelijkheden om 
zich te ontplooien de belangrijkste redenen vormden om ontslag te nemen. Met 
name over de intrinsieke beloningen en de ontwikkeling van de intrinsieke 
beloningen over de tijd, zijn de ex-groepsleid(st)ers veel minder positief dan de 
huidige groepsleid(st)ers. Een deel van de groepsleid(st)ers die de daling in 
intrinsieke beloningen over de tijd problematisch vindt, heeft de kinderopvang 
waarschijnlijk dan ook inmiddels verlaten. De introductie van marktwerking in de 
kinderopvang kan daarom mogelijkerwijs nadeliger zijn voor de intrinsieke 
motivatie van de groepsleid(st)ers dan uit de analyses onder de huidige 
groepsleid(st)ers naar voren komt.             
Tot slot hebben we geanalyseerd in hoeverre de extrinsieke en intrinsieke 
motivatie van de groepsleid(st)ers de kwaliteit van de arbeidsprestaties van de 
groepsleid(st)ers beïnvloedt. De kwaliteit van de arbeidsprestaties is gemeten 
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zowel via individuele prestatiemaatstaven, als via maatstaven die betrekking 
hebben op het prestatieniveau van het kinderdagverblijf waar de groepsleid(st)er 
werkzaam is. Zowel de extrinsieke als de intrinsieke motivatie van de 
groepsleid(st)ers hebben naar verwachting een positief effect op de kwaliteit van 
de arbeidsprestaties. 
Met betrekking tot de effecten van extrinsieke en intrinsieke motivatie op 
de individuele prestatiemaatstaven, geven de resultaten aan dat geen van de 
individuele prestatiemaatstaven significant wordt beïnvloed door de extrinsieke 
motivatie van de groepsleid(st)ers. De individuele prestatiemaatstaven worden 
wel significant beïnvloed door de intrinsieke motivatie van de groepsleid(st)ers. 
Groepsleid(st)ers met een hoge intrinsieke motivatie geven significant minder vaak 
aan dat ze hun werk de komende jaren op willen zeggen, en hoe hoger de 
intrinsieke motivatie van de groepsleid(st)ers hoe hoger de bereidheid om extra 
taken te doen en hoe hoger de bereidheid om mee te denken over het verbeteren 
van de organisatie. De mate waarin de groepsleid(st)ers hun eigen prestaties 
waarderen ten op zichte van de prestaties van hun collega’s en het ziekteverzuim 
worden niet significant beïnvloed door de arbeidsmotivatie van de 
groepsleid(st)ers.     
De analyses laten verder zien dat de extrinsieke en intrinsieke motivatie 
van de groepsleid(st)ers een grote invloed hebben op het prestatieniveau die de 
groepsleid(st)ers toekennen aan het kinderdagverblijf waar ze werkzaam zijn. 
Zowel de extrinsieke als de intrinsieke motivatie van de groepsleid(st)ers hebben 
een significant positief effect op de mate waarin groepsleid(st)ers aangeven dat 
bepaalde kwaliteitsaspecten worden gerealiseerd en op de mate waarin er volgens 
de groepsleid(st)ers aandacht wordt besteed aan professionaliteit en kwaliteit in 
het kinderdagverblijf waar ze werken. Daarnaast heeft de intrinsieke motivatie van 
de groepsleid(st)ers een significante invloed op de hoogte van het ziekverzuim en 
het verloop dat de groepsleid(st)ers waarnemen in het kinderdagverblijf. Hoe 
hoger de intrinsieke motivatie, hoe lager het ziekverzuim en het verloop in het 
kinderdagverblijf volgens de groepsleid(st)ers.  
Met betrekking tot de waargenomen ontwikkeling in arbeidsprestaties 
over de tijd, geven de groepsleid(st)ers aan dat over de afgelopen drie jaar het 
ziekverzuim en het verloop is toegenomen in het kinderdagverblijf waar ze 
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werken. Voor de toekomst wordt een verdere toename in verloop verwacht. We 
hebben de groepsleid(st)ers ook gevraagd aan te geven hoe ze vinden dat de 
aandacht die wordt besteed aan professionaliteit en kwaliteit in het 
kinderdagverblijf waar ze werken zich heeft ontwikkeld over de tijd. De 
groepsleid(st)ers geven, gemiddeld genomen, aan dat ze over de afgelopen drie 
jaar een toename hebben waargenomen in dergelijke aandacht. Voor de toekomst 
wordt een verdere toename verwacht. Over de tijd nemen de groepsleid(st)ers dus 




Uit dit onderzoek komt naar voren dat de manier waarop 
kinderopvangorganisaties groepsleid(st)ers aansturen, invloed heeft op de 
extrinsieke en intrinsieke beloningen die groepsleid(st)ers ontlenen aan hun werk.  
De extrinsieke en intrinsieke beloningen beïnvloeden vervolgens de 
arbeidsmotivatie en arbeidsprestaties van de groepsleid(st)ers. Omdat de 
intrinsieke beloningen de belangrijkste motivatiebron vormen en de 
arbeidsprestaties vooral beïnvloed worden door de intrinsieke motivatie van de 
groepsleid(st)ers, is het van groot belang dat de kinderopvangorganisaties 
aandacht besteden aan intrinsieke beloningen bij de aansturing van de 
groepsleid(st)ers. 
Het onderzoek laat verder zien dat de mate waarin 
kinderopvangorganisaties worden geconfronteerd met marktwerking geen invloed 
heeft op de manier waarop kinderopvangorganisaties de groepsleid(st)ers 
aansturen. Kinderopvangorganisaties die in hoge mate te maken hebben met 
marktwerking sturen groepsleid(st)ers niet beter of slechter aan dan 
kinderopvangorganisaties die niet of nauwelijks geconfronteerd worden met 
marktwerking. Voor de arbeidsmotivatie en arbeidsprestaties van de 
groepsleid(st)ers maakt het dan ook niet uit of de kinderopvangorganisatie al dan 
niet wordt geconfronteerd met marktwerking. Van belang is hoe de werkgevers in 
de kinderopvang de werknemers aansturen.  
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 Tot slot vinden we dat de groepsleid(st)ers in de kinderopvang in 
Nederland een hoge arbeidsmotivatie en arbeidsinzet vertonen. Omdat de 
introductie van marktwerking de motivatie en prestaties van de groepsleid(st)ers 
niet lijkt te beïnvloeden en de groepsleid(st)ers over de tijd geen grote 
veranderingen in arbeidsmotivatie en arbeidsinzet waarnemen, kan het hoge 
motivatie- en prestatieniveau van de groepsleid(st)ers als relatief stabiel worden 
beschouwd. Omdat de prestaties in de kinderopvang grotendeels afhangen van de 
motivatie en prestaties van de groepsleid(st)ers, kunnen deze resultaten als 
bevestiging van het onderzoek van Vermeer et al. (2005) worden gezien. Uit hun 
onderzoek komt naar voren dat de kwaliteit van de interactie tussen de 
groepsleid(st)ers en de kinderen stabiel is gebleven over de afgelopen tien jaar. 
Ook dit lijkt er op te duiden dat de introductie van marktwerking en de daarmee 
gepaard gaande aandacht voor efficiëntie niet noodzakelijkerwijs in tegenspraak 
hoeft te zijn met het bieden van een hoog kwaliteitsniveau. Sterker nog, het wijst er 
op dat de kwaliteit van de kinderopvang in Nederland, de laatste tijd vaak 
beschreven in negatieve termen, in feite vrij positief is.  
Al met al kunnen we concluderen dat de introductie van marktwerking in 
de kinderopvang in Nederland de arbeidsmotivatie en arbeidsprestaties van 
groepsleid(st)ers niet in grote mate lijkt te beïnvloeden. Het pakket aan beloningen 
dat groepsleid(st)ers ontvangen voor het werk dat ze doen, lijkt echter wel iets te 
veranderen: het werk lijkt intrinsiek iets minder aantrekkelijk en extrinsiek juist 
aantrekkelijker te worden. Hoewel de meerderheid van de groepsleid(st)ers een 
toename in werkdruk constateert over de tijd, lijkt deze toename bescheiden te zijn 
en niet in grote mate afbreuk te doen aan het plezier dat de groepsleid(st)ers 
ontlenen aan het werk. Terwijl de introductie van marktwerking in de 
kinderopvang in Nederland samengaat met een toename in aandacht die wordt 
besteed aan het realiseren van een hoge mate van efficiëntie, zijn de 
groepsleid(st)ers in de kinderopvang over het algemeen erg gemotiveerd in hun 
werk en vertonen een grote werkinzet. De kwaliteit in de kinderopvang in 
Nederland, gemeten in termen van de kwaliteit van de prestaties van de 
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Tot slot wil ik mijn familie en vrienden bedanken voor de getoonde interesse en 
medeleven. Hoewel het niet altijd even makkelijk was om te begrijpen wat ik nu 
hele dagen uitvoerde hebben jullie daar wel altijd je best voor gedaan. Vooral in de 
afrondingsfase van mijn proefschrift was het soms lastig om uit te leggen waar ik 
tegen aan liep in mijn werk. Ik kan me nog herinneren dat ik dat een keer 
probeerde uit te leggen door aan te geven dat het voelde alsof ik een puzzel aan 
het maken was, maar dat ik de puzzel maar niet kloppend kreeg. Mijn nichtje vond 
toen dat ik wel een erg leuke baan moest hebben als ik de hele dag mocht 
puzzelen. Ja, en daar had ze wel gelijk in. Iris, Tamara, Rénee, Ilse, Gosse, Tiba en 
Mette bedankt dat jullie model hebben willen staan voor mijn vragenlijsten en voor 
de voorkant van mijn proefschrift. Korien en Janneke heel erg bedankt voor al 
jullie steun. Ik kan me geen betere paranimfen wensen. Als laatste dank ik de twee 
belangrijkste personen in mijn leven. Arjen wat ben ik blij dat ik jou aan mijn zij 
heb en wat ben ik gelukkig en trots om mama te mogen zijn van onze kleine vent 
Maik. Alle puzzelstukjes zijn op zijn plaats gevallen. Ik ben gelukkiger dan ooit en 
weet dat ik dat zal blijven zolang ik jullie bij me heb! 
 
Mirjam Plantinga, juli 2006 
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